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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
FIRST SITTING
Thursday, 22nd March 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the
Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session (Doc. l2l5).
1, Opening of the extroordfuwry session
The President declared open the extraor-
dinary session of the Assembly in accordance
with Article lll (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of
the Rules of Procedure.
2. Auenfunce register
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mn Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
6. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe - prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Eastern Europe (Presentation of the report of
the Polilical Committee, Doc. 1216 and arirendmCnts). -
7. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Chairman-inOffice of the Council.
8. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe 
- 
prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Fastern Europe (Debate on the report ofthe
Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).'
5. Address by tlu Presidcnt of tlu Asscmbly
The President addressed the Assembly.
6. Obsemen
The President welcomed the observers from
Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and
Yugoslavia.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business
for the extraordinary session
(Doc, 1215)
The President proposed the adoption of the
draft order of business.
Speaker: Mr. Hardy.
The draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session was adopted.
8. Addrcss by Mn Eyskcns,
Minister for Foreigt Atfain of Belgium,
Chainnan-in-Oflice of tha Council
Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Eyskens answered questions put by MM.
Ewing, De Decker and Baumel.
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Ewing.
3. Address by Mrs. Hcnnicot-Schoepges,
President of thc Chanber of Deputies
of Luxcmbourg
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the
Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg, addressed
the Assembly.
4. kanination of crudentials
In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letterfrom the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe informing
the Assembly that the credentials of the repre-
sentatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1
had been ratified by that Assembly.
MINUTES FIRST SITTINC
9, Establishment of a just,
Waceful and secure order in Europe -
pn swts stemming from devehpments
in Central and Eastem Eump
(hesentation of and dobatc on thc ,cport
of the Political Committcc,
Doc. 1216 aad onwdments)
The report of the Political Committee
presented by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.
The debate was opened.
Speakers: MM. Caro, Soell and De Decker.
The debate was adjourned.
10, Date, time and orders of the doy
of the next sitting
The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at
3 p.m.
The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.
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APPENDIX FIRST SITTING
APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
France
MM. Baumel
Pistre (Beix)
Caro
Durand
Hunault (Fillon)
AndrL (Galley)
Jeambrun
Jung
Koehl (Oehler)
Pontillon
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
Belgium
MM. Noerens (Adriaensens)
C auw e nb er g hs (Biefnot)
De Bondt (Derycke)
De Decker
(Kempinaire)
Eicher (P6criaux)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Mr. Uyttendaele
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Ahrens
Biichner
Mrs Beer (Eich)
MM. Bindig (Holtz)
Kittelmann
Niegel
Klejdzinski (Scheer)
Soell
Italy
MM. Rubner (Caccia)
Fassino (Filetti)
Fioret
Stegagnini (Kessler)
Malfatti
Martino
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Parisi
Pieralli
Sarti
Scovauicchi (Sinesio)
Luxenbourg
Mrs. Polfer (Goerens)
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Mrs. Luuk
MM. Miiller
Reddemann
von Schmude
Unland
Wulff
Italy
MM. Benassi
Gabbuggiani
Intini
Natali
Pecchioli
Netherlands
Mr. Eversdijk
Mrs. Haas-Berger
MM. Stoffelen
Tummers
United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Ewing
Dame Peggy Fenner
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Garrett
Hardy
Hill
Jessel
Sir Russell Johnston
lard Rodney (Earl of
Kinnoull)
MM. Morris
Parry
Sir William Shelton
Sir Dudley Smith
I.ard Newal/ (Speed)
Sir John Stokes
Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Rodoti
Rubbi
Luxembourg
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
MM. Aarts
Nijpels
van Velzen
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
France
MM. Bassinet
Collette
Forni
Fou116
Gouteyron
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Antretter
Biihm
Hitschler
Irmer
I . The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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SECOND SITTING
Thursday, 22nd March 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
l. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland.
2. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe
- 
prospects stemming from developments in Central and
Eastem Europe (Resuzed debate on the report of the
Polilical Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Luxembourg.
1, Attendance register
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adoption of the ninutes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were agreed to.
3. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski,
Minister for Forcign Affairs of Poland
Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland, addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Skubiszewski answered questions put
by MM. Jung, Baumel, Jessel, Klejdzinski,
Rathbone and Morris.
4. Establishment of a just, paceful
and secure ordcr in Eurupe -
prosryts stemming fmm developments
in Central and Eastern Eumpe
(Raumd dofute oa the reprt of the Polilical Committeg
DN. 1216 and amendmeats)
The debate was resumed.
Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr.
Klejdzinski and Sir Dudley Smith.
Sir GeolIrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Kittelmann, Martino and Sir
Russell Johnston.
4. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign
AfTairs of Italy.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe 
- 
prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on the
report of the Political Committee, Doc. I 2 16 and amend-
ments).
Mn Goerens, President of the Assembly,
resumed the chair.
Speakers: MM. Stegagnini, Pieralli, Baumel,
Wilkinson, Jung and Tummers.
The debate was adjourned.
5, Addrcss by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Alfairs of Luxembourg
Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Alfairs of
Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.
6. Address by Mr. Yitalone,
Minister of State for Foreign Alfairs of ltaly
Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs of ltaly, addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Poos answered a question put by Mr.
Caro.
MM. Vitalone and Poos answered questions
put by Mr. Jessel.
7. Estoblishment of a iust, peaceful
and secure order in Eutope -
pruspecTs stemming from developments
in Cental and Easteru Euro^e
(Resumed debate on the ,eport oI ilE Political Committee,
D@. 1216 ard arncndrrut ts)
The debate was resumed.
Speaker: Earl of Kinnoull.
Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took
the Chair.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
ll
SECOND SITTING
Speakers: Mr. Fioret, Mrs. Glumac-Levakov(Observer from Yugoslavia), MM. Cetin(Observer from Turkcy). Biacs (Obsener from
Hungary), Fassino, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
and Mr. Pontillon (Rapporteur).
The debate was adjourned.
8. Date, time ud ordcn of the day
of the next sitting
The orders of the date for the next sitting were
agreed to.
The next sitting was fixed for Friday, 23rd
March 1990, at l0 a.m.
The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.
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APPENDIX SECOND SITTING
APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
Belgium
MM. Noerens (Adriaensens)
C auwenberghs (Biefnot)
Kempinaire
Eicher (Pdcriaux)
Uyttendaele
France
MM. Baumel
Pistre (Beix)
Caro
Durand
Hunault (Fillon)
Andr€ (Galley)
Jung
Koehl (Oehler)
Pontillon
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
. 
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Klejdzinski (Antretter)
Bindig (Holtz)
Kittelmann
Soell
Italy
MM. Rubner (Caccia)
Fassino (Filetti)
Fioret
Stegagnini
(Gabbuesiani)
Malfatti
Martino
Mezzapesa
Parisi
Pieralli
Sarti
Scovacricchi (Sinesio)
Luxembourg
Mrs. I-entz-Cornette
Netherlands
Mrs. Haas-Beryer
MM. Verbeek (Nijpels)
Stoffelen
Tummers
United Kingdom
Mr. Coleman
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Rathbone (Hill\
Jessel
Sir Russell Johnston
Earl of Kinnoull
MM. Morris
Parry
Sir Dudley Smith
Mrs. Roe (Speed)
Mr. Wilkinson
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
Belgium
Mr. Derycke
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
France
MM. Bassinet
Collette
Forni
Fou116
Gouteyron
Jeambrun
Seitlinger
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Ahrens
Biihm
Biichner
MM. Eich
Hitschler
Irme;
Mrs. Luuk
MM. Miiller
Niegel
Reddemann
Scheer
von Schmude
Unland
Wulff
Italy
MM. Benassi
Intini
Kessler
Natali
Pecchioli
Rodoti
Rubbi
Luxembourg
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
MM. Aarts
Eversdijk
van Velzen
United Kingdom
MM. Cox
Ewing
Dame Peggy Fenner
MM. Garrett
Hardy
Sir William Shelton
Sir John Stokes
I . The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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THIRD SITTING
Friday 23rd March 1990
ORDERS OF THE DAY
l. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Ministerfor Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of
1. Attendarce rugister
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are
given in the appendix.
2. Adogion of the minutes
The minutes of proceedings of the previous
sitting were agreed to.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Yice-Chancellor
ond Minister for Foreign Affairs
of tlrc Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister
for Foreign Alfairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany, addressed the Assembly.
Mr. Genscher answered questions put by MM.
Skubiszewskr (Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Poland), Tummers, Soell, Baumel and Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
4. Address by Mr. Falin,
Diredor of the International Depnrtment
of the Centrul Committee of the Communist Party
of the Sofia Union, Member of the Committee
of the Suprcme Soviet
rcsponsible for intcrnational alfain
Mr. Falin, Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet (Jnion, Member
of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet respon-
sible for international affairs, addressed the
Assembly.
Mr. Falin answered questions put by Mrs.
Lentz-Cornette, MM. Soell and Biichner.
the Supreme Soviet responsible for international
affairs.
3. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe
- 
prmpects stemming from developments in Central and
Eastem Fatrorr', (Resumed debate on the report of the
Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).
5. Establishment of a iust,
peaceful and secure order in Eumpe -
proq,ects stemming fmm detelopments
in Centrol aad fustern Europe
(Resumad debate on the rcport of ,lE Political C.ommiau
and vote oa the dmft rccornmctMbh
Doc. 1216 and anuadncnts)
The debate was resumed.
Speakers (points of order): MM. Ahrens(Chairman of the Political Committee), Soell,
Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mrs.
Baarveld-Schlaman; Mr. Malfatti.
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.
Speakers: MM. Fourr6, Mezzapesa and Sir
William Shelton.
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair.
Speakers: Mrs. Beer, MM. Scovacricchi,
Roseta (Observer from Portugal) and van
Eekelen (Seuetary-General of WEU).
The debate was closed.
Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens,
Chairman of the Political Committee, replied to
the speakers.
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.
The draft recommendation was agreed to.(This recommendation will be published as No.
479) t.
Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Dg
Decker and Tummers.
6. Close of the extruordinary session
The President declared the extraordinary
session of the Assembly closed.
The sitting was closed at 1.35 p.m.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
t4
l. See page 16.
MINUTES THIRD SITTING
APPENDIX
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendancer:
France
MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Pistre (Beix)
Caro
Durand
Hunault (Fillon)
Fou116
Andrd (Galley)
Jeambrun
Koehl (Oehler)
Pontillon
Seitlinger
Thyraud
Vial-Massat
Belgium
MM. De Decker
(Adriaensens)
C auwenberglu (Biefnot)
De Bondt (Derycke)
Kempinaire
Eicher (P6criaux)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Mr. Uyttendaele
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Ahrens
Klej dz i nski (Antretter)
Biichner
Mrs Beer (Eich)
Mr. Bindig (Holtz)
Mrs. Blunck (Mrs. Luuk)
Mr. Soell
Italy
MM. Scovacricchi (Caccia)
Fioret
Stegagnini
(Gabbuggiani)
Fassino (Intini)
Rubner (Kessler)
Malfatti
Martino
Mezzapesa
Parisi
Pieralli
Colombo (Sinesio)
Luxembourg
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
MM. Scheer
von Schmude
Unland
Wulff
Italy
MM. Benassi
Filetti
Natali
Pecchioli
Rodoti
Rubbi
Sarti
Netherlands
MINI. Eisma (Aarts)
Eversdijk
Mrs. Haas-Berger
MM. Verbeek(Nijpels)
Stoffelen
Tummers
.United Kingdom
MM. Coleman
Cox
Dame
Sir
Lord
Mr.
Lord
Lord
Iord
Mr.
Sir
Sir
Mrs.
Sir
Peggy Fenner
Geoffrey Finsberg
Kirkhill (Hardy)
Hill
Newall (Jessel)
Mackie (Sir Russell
Johnston)
Rodney (Earl of
Kinnoull)
Morris
William Shelton
Dudley Smith
Roe (Speed)
John Stokes
The following representatives apologised for their absence:
France
MM. Collette
Forni
Gouteyron
Jung
Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Btihm
Hitschler
Irmer
Kittelmann
Miiller
Niegel
Reddemann
Luxembourg
Mr. Regenwetter
Netherlands
Mr. van Velzen
United Kingdom
MM. Ewing
Garrett
Parry
Wilkinson
1 . The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.
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TEXT ADOPTED THIRD SITTING
RECOMMENDATION 479
on tlrc estdlishment of a just, Woceful and secure order in Europ -
pnospocts stemming from dcvelopments in Central utd Eostern Eumpe
The Assembly,
I
(t) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroika movement in the
USSR and continued in,many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible
to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;(it) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of
those countries;
(iir) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified
that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first
agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;(iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give
new scope to the CSCE process;(v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to
give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new
European order;
(vt) Anxious, however, not to precipate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so
far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more diflicult to establish this new peaceful order
and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period
as necessary;
II
(t) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system,
which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;(ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two
German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between
the two states and the four responsible powers;(iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new
German state at the heart of Europe;(iv) Considering that the permanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a
prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the
creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an
obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;(v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the
Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;(vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of
Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
(vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it unde-
sirable to grant it neutral status;
(viii) Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to
many Central and Eastern European countries;
(jn Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a
European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and
constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;
t6
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TEXT ADOPTED THIRD SITTINC
III
O Noting that in a period of instability it is hardly desirable to add to the degree and variety of
uncertainty and hence the maintenance of the alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long
as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;(iil Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to
conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;(iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new
deployment than heretofore;
(iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;
(v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint
security is becoming essential;(vil Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise
greater political responsibilities, particularly in regard to arms control, organising the collective
iecurity of Europe as a whole and defence against any threat from outside the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty,
RrcoutrreNos rHAT rns CoulrcII-
I
l. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of
a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences ofthe changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview
that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;
II
l. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of
Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of
the Federal Republic of Germany's commitments to a unified German state for the application of the
treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
(a) co-operution between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
(b/ implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraph
III.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries are now
obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
(c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII
' . 
aicording to whiih the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed
against any of them;
(d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos- II, III and IV ar.td, in^par-' ' 
ticular, Annex I to Protocol No. III bn determining the level of forces, renunciation of the
production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant under-
takings;
(e) respectfor Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right
to cease to be a party to the treat);
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are
duly and fully informed of these reiults sb that they may take account of the guarantees.offered-by the
modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the
establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;
t7
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III
l. Explore forthwith_the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to ,l
member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European securiiy-area for which it
might eventually be an appropriate framewoik, in particular: 
i(a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters; i
(b) for analysing the concept of shared security; i(c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use wEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
(a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unifi- I
cation of the two German states;
(D/ gpsgp respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements !limiting forces or annaments or the non-production of certain weapons; 
i3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on afair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modiflred 
_Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member
states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presenCe would help to strengthen apeaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of 
.chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European arma-
ments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such
arrnaments;
6. 
. 
Dlay up^lgogramme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the appli-
cation of the CFE agreements;
7. 
.-. 
For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation
satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Secu.rity Studies organise a permanent exchange of information with
the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the afplication of the CFE
agreements;
2. Keep th-e public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allowEuropean public opinion to become aware of co-operation in the framewbrk of WEU. -
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Suruulny
l. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the
Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Observers.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraor-
dinary session (Doc. l2l5).
Speaker: Mr. Hardy.
1. Opening of the extraordinary session
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The sitting
is open.
In accordance with Article lll (b) of the
Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, I
declare open this extraordinary session of the
Assembly of Western European Union.
2. Attendance rcgister
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedings 
'.
3. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Sch@p96,
President of the Chanber
of Deputics of Luxombourg
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Before
starting our work, I shall call Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Dep-
uties of Luxembourg, whom I have particular
pleasure in inviting to come to the rostrum of
our Assembly.
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (President of
the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg)(Translation). 
- 
Ladies and gentlemen, it gives
8. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in{flice of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Eyskens to questions put by: Mr. Ewing,
Mr. De Decker, Mr. Baumel; Mr. Ewing (point of order).
9. Establishment of a just, p€aceful and secure order in
Europe 
- 
prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Eastern Europe (Presentation ofand debate
on the repoil of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and
amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pontillon (Rapporteur),
Mr. Caro, Mr. Soell, Mr. De Decker.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
me gfeat pleasure to welcome you to Luxem-
bourg today, particularly since for five years I
was myself a member of your parliamentary
Assembly.
For the second time, your parliamentary
Assembly is holding an extraordinary session in
these premises. I thereby conclude that this
chamber, the surrounding offices and Luxem-
bourg hospitality have been favourable to you
and have given you satisfaction. I hope that your
stay in Luxembourg will also allow you to dis-
cover the advantages and the charm of a small
country with a big heart.
Western European Union is meeting at a time
- 
and this is the point of departure of this
session 
- 
when events are gathering speed and
overtaking each other in importance and
rapidity. We were certainly not prepared to see
such a precipitous collapse of cultures, barriers,
walls and totalitarian r6gimes. We are not really
prepared to come to grips with the new idea of a
large common house. Nor is our economy
immediately prepared to live without a large
sector ofproduction 
- 
the defence sector. Conse-
quently, for that reason and for many others,
talk of disarmament must include thoughts
about economic conversion in both Eastern and
Western Europe. These thoughts must also cover
other important sectors such as justice and
culture, which are equally decisive for
organising a new European order.
In examining, today and tomorrow, the
question of establishing a just, peaceful and
secure order in Europe, you will be paving the
The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
l. See page 10.
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way, expressing wishes, showing directions and
adopting recommendations. Do all that, ladies
and gentlemen, with perspicacity and courage.
There are many sides to peace and security in
Europe. Defence is far from being their only
corollary. There is also economic well-being,
social security, convergence towards joint
ideas.
Moreover, all the dangers have not been
averted and, as your Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon,
has correctly emphasised, now is certainly not
the time to abolish the systems of alliance. It is
rather a question of seeking together, and your
efforts in this direction are praiseworthy, the
right course and reorganising them in order to
meet the requirements of security in a changed
and continually changing world.
The presence of so many eminent guests and
observers, particularly from the eastern coun-
tries, in the Assembly of Western European
Union enlarged with the presence of Portugal
and Spain, makes me particularly confident and
optimistic. To these sentiments is added my
pride to see yolu Assembly chaired so compe-
tently by my fellow countryman and colleague,
Charles Goerens.
Mr. President, your excellencies, ladies and
gentlemen, it is my wish that your session in
Luxembourg will enter the annals of Western
European Union and occupy its due place in this
thrilling period of history we are now expe-
riencing. Welcome to Luxembourg and may
your work be fruitful.
4. Erumination of credcntials
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the examination of creden-
tials of the new representatives and substitutes
nominated since our Assembly's last part-
session, whose names have been published in
Notice No. l.
In accordance with Rule 6 (l) of the Rules of
Procedure, these credentials have been attested
by a statement of ratification from the President
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.
Is there any objection to ratifying these cre-
dentials?...
The credentials are ratified by the Assembly.
I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.
I am also able to inform the Assembly that all
. 
member states have now ratified the protocol of
- 
accession of Portugal and Spain to Western
European Union. On l2th March last, the
Assembly of the Republic of Portugal adopted
this text. However, as of today, I have no official
notification from the Council regarding com-
pletion of the ratification procedure. Conse-
quently, to my great regret, representatives from
Portugal and Spain cannot yet sit as full
members and they retain the status of
observers.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It is a very
special privilege for me to open, here in Luxem-
bourg, the extraordinary session that our
Assembly decided to organise this spring of
1990. It is therefore in my own country that we
are holding the session which will terminate the
presidency you entrusted to me almost three
years ago. I thank you for this and also, on your
behalf, I thank the Luxembourg authorities for
receiving us. Special thanks are due to Mrs.
Hennicot-schoepges, President of the Chamber
of Deputies, who is a former colleague of ours in
the WEU Assembly, and to Mr. Poos, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who is unable to be in our
midst at this opening sitting but will speak
tomorrow.
The decision to hold this session was taken at
our last ordinary session at the beginning
of December. Under urgent procedure, the
Assembly adopted an order deciding to devote
an extraordinary session to the organisation ofa
new peaceful, just and secure order in Europe. It
was led to this by the succession of events in
Eastern Europe in the last months of 1989
because it saw that the fast-moving changes then
taking place in all the countries of the region
were likely to transform radically the facts of the
problem that is in the centre of our responsibi-
lities and activities: European security.
There could be no question of waiting until
June, when our ordinary session normally starts,
for WEU to examine the consequences for this
organisation of the changes in Eastern Europe.
Our governments are compelled, for themselves
and in the various bodies in which they are asso-
ciated, to take decisions that are important for
the future of Europe, and these decisions will
inevitably have major repercussions for WEU.
The reorientation of the Atlantic Alliance and
its organisation is now on the agenda. The
Council of Europe is about to welcome several
Eastern European countries. The European
Community has been given the task of orga-
nising western assistance to those countries.
WEU, which considers itself to be both the
European pillar of the alliance and the Western
European security organisation, is directly
concerned with these matters and cannot stand
by in silence while decisions taken in other fra-
meworks determine its fate.
In this connection, I wish to stress the conver-
gence between the work of our Assembly and
that of the Council as described by the Secre-
tary-General in his information letter of 15th
2t
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March which was distributed to you at the
beginning of this session. In particular, he tells us
that * future prospects are... being discussedjointly in the search for new solutions and in
preparation for future decisions concerning the
implementation of agreements for the reduction
of armaments and the restructuring and rede-
ployment of forces'. This is just what we shall be
doing here by examining the rOle WEU will have
to play on the one hand to set about organising a
new peaceful and secure order in Europe and on
the other hand to make a contribution to this
order once it has been established.
However, I see no reason why we have to
choose, as is suggested in that letter, between
structuring the CSCE, i.e. the common
European house, extending, if not the responsi-
bilities, at least the activities of European insti-
tutions empowered to deal with European
security, i.e. principally WEU, as speciflred in
the Single European Act, and strengthening the
European pillar of an Atlantic Alliance which,
by the force of circumstances, will no longer be
what it used to be. I believe that it is by acting in
all three directions that we shall be able, first, to
prevent events in the East calling in question the
security structures that already exist in Western
Europe, then to extend eastwards the benefits we
derive from this peaceful order and, finally, to
associate our American allies and the Soviet
Union with the new organisation. This is, in any
event, the approach proposed in the report by
the Political Committee that we are to debate.
However, this approach also means asking the
Council to enlarge its work, which cannot be
limited to studying the consequences of the
forthcoming CFE agreement but must, in the
framework of strict application of the modiflred
Brussels Treaty, cover all questions raised by the
er.lergence of a new peaceful order in Europe.
The need to discuss these matters was particu-
larly great because, since October, we have been
faced with the question of what is known as
German reunification, i.e. the union of the two
German states born of the second world war and
the cold war. In 1954, WEU was the instrument
used to allow the Federal Republic to play a full
part in a collective western security system. The
reunification of Germany, in whatever form and
whatever the procedure leading up to it, and the
preparation of a new secure order in Europe
raise in new terms questions which had then
been solved in the light of the circumstances at
that time. Born of the suspicion left by the
second world war and by the cold war, WEU
must rethink its r6le now that confrontation
between Eastern and Western Europe is no
longer the major aspect of our security problems
and the Federal Republic is about to stop being
what it was and make way for a German state of
yet unknown form.
The prospect of the German states being
reunited makes me recall one absolutely
remarkable fact that I believe has not been suf-
ficiently stressed: there was no opposition in
any European country to the reunification of
Germany once the will of the German people
was able to express itself. This is a fact that our
German friends must not forget. Whatever the
fears, justified or not, reservations and condi-
tions that may have been expressed here and
there in recent months, in no case has any
doubt been voiced of applying to Germany the
right of peoples to self-determination. This fact
alone is the sign of the deep change that has
taken place in European minds and national
reactions in the last forty years. There can be no
doubt that this is the result of the considerable
development of structured order and interna-
tional co-operation in Western Europe. For us
all, it is the reward for forty years of incessant
efforts in which WEU has played a large part.
We must therefore be careful that the structures
set up in the past forty years are notjeopardised and that the results of our efforts
will not be wasted.
Clearly this does not mean that the way the
German states are united does not raise ques-
tions for their neighbours in both East and West
and I am gratified that, for the first time in the
history of WEU, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of a member country of the Warsaw Pact has
agreed to join us to speak about these questions.
The fact that it is Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Poland, the country most con-
cerned by the consequences of German reunifi-
cation, who is to address us at this session shows
our will not to shirk the most delicate matters
and to be fully informed of all opinions in order
to conduct our debates in the most open manner
possible. I wish to thank the Minister very par-
ticularly for having agreed not only to convey
his message but also to attend the whole session,
thus showing the value he attaches, like us, to a
real, public dialogue on matters that are
essential for his country as well as ours.
Our debates will obviously have to take full
account of last Sunday's elections which will
allow the German Democratic Republic to have
political authorities legitimised by universal suf-
frage to tackle the negotiations that are to lead to
reunification. I am convinced that they will be
well aware that the German problem is not only
an inter-German problem but one that concerns
the whole of Europe. Tomorrow's visit by the
Minister for Foreign Alfairs of the Federal
Republic, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who
was anxious to address us during the few hours
available to him between a visit to Africa and
the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe in Lisbon, and who has
expressed the wish to answer all the questions
we want to put to him, shows how aware he is of
,1
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the European dimension of the German
question. It is therefore for two reasons that I
express our gratitude to him.
I must also emphasise the importance of the
presence among us of Mr. Valentin Falin,
Director of the International Relations
Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He will
address us tomorrow but wished to be present
throughout the session and I wish to thank him
for the interest his country has been showing for
several years in our Assembly and for his contri-
bution to our debates.
Apart from this governmental participation,
the Assembly appreciates the fact that a particu-
larly large number of delegations of observers
representing parliaments of countries that are
not members of WEU are attending this session.
Their presence is a clear sign of the interest the
matter we are to debate raises throughout
Europe. We are grateful to all the parliaments
which accepted our invitation and sent delega-
tions which, it will be clear to everyone, are of a
very high standard of competence and responsi-
bility.
Since July 1989, the Kingdom of Belgium has
had the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU
Council and it is therefore its Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mark Eyskens, who will
open our debates by describing the progress of
the Council's work on the subject that brings us
together today.
We congratulate the Belgian chairmanship-in-
oflice for the dynamism it has shown in guiding
the work of the Council and in developing its
dialogue with the Assembly. We share its regret
that several of its initiatives have not yet
received the response from other governments
that we might have wished.
Our former colleague, Senator Vitalone, now
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy,
also wishes to give his government's views.
Finally, I express our gratitude to the
Assembly's Political Committee, its Chairman,
Mr. Karl Ahrens, and its Rapporteur, Senator
Robert Pontillon, who managed to prepare and
adopt in a minimum of time a detailed report
and recommendation for us to debate. Everyone
will appreciate the firm approach of this doc-
ument which should allow us to adopt a clear,
measured position on what WEU can do in the
years ahead. The number of amendments
already tabled shows that the text has already
been read and carefully studied.
One of the merits of Senator Pontillon's
report is to place our thinking on two separate
levels corresponding to the two stages that will
have to be respected in order to achieve this new
peaceful, just and secure order to which we all
aspire. The first stage concerns what we can and
must do here and now in order not to lose, at
this new juncture and in our present uncertainty
about what Europe will become, the benefits of
what we have been doing for forty years to
organise peace and build up the part of Europe
in which we can act. The second stage is the one
we shall have to reach in order to achieve a new
order in which this peaceful organisation will be
able to extend to the whole of Europe.
The future of Europe will depend above all on
how we act during the first stage. In several
regions, we can already see the emergence, if not
ofthreats to peace, at least of disturbing signs of
the rebirth, now that ideological confrontations
are dying down or disappearing, ofnational pas-
sions, traditional mistrust and claims which, if
they were to determine the policies of states,
would set us back half a century to that Europe
of sacred egotism and permanent instability to
which our continent owed two world wars and
its relative loss of place in the world. Today,
therefore, we must be on our guard against this
danger and examine how to meet it. This will be
the main purpose of our debate.
It is my wish that the Council will attach all
due importance to the recommendation that we
adopt. It will perhaps not be possible for it to
give a detailed answer to all the questions put to
it by the Assembly in time for our next ordinary
session, but I do not want it to use this as a
pretext for delaying its examination of the text
as a whole nor giving the Assembly an answer to
those points on which it is already able to give
its opinion. It would be a good precedent for it
to give a provisional answer, but not an answer
without substance, in two months'time to those
parts of the recommendation on which it has to
defer a final answer. If it failed to adopt such an
approach, there would be good reason to fear
that, instead of a dialogue, the two WEU organs
are conducting two parallel monologues having
no influence on each other. This would be tanta-
mount to renouncing the advantages of having a
parliamentary organ in our organisation at the
side of the ministerial organs.
In any event, the Council can but note that the
Assembly has done its utmost to ensure that its
share ofthe dialogue is conducted at the highest
level. It is now for it to maintain the same
standard in our exchanges.
On l3th March, the Portuguese Parliament
ratified the act of accession of Portugal and
Spain to WEU. It was the last to do so and we
can now consider that WEU has been enlarged
to include these two countries. This gives me the
privilege of welcoming to our midst, for the first
time, delegations of full members of our
Assembly formed by the Portuguese Parliament
and the Spanish Cortds in accordance with
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.
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I am well aware that the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty by which our
Assembly has the same delegations as those
from member countries' parliaments to the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
does not meet the wishes of the parliaments bf
these two countries. It also raises delicate
problems for several of the more longstanding
members of WEU. But our Assembly has alwayi
upheld the scrupulous application of the treaiy
and cannot on this occasion deviate from a
position that it has constantly endorsed. I can
nevertheless tell you that, aware of the problem
thus raised, its Presidential Committee has just
asked the Political Committee to submil a
report on the possibility of revising Article IX of
the treaty with a view to separating the delega-
tions that form our Assembly from those
Qrming the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe. The time seems rip6 to make
such a ryquest to the governments which, in any
event, have undertaken to revise the treaty fol-
lowing the accession of Portugal and Spain. In
any case, the problems raised by German reuni-
fication will compel member countries to review
several provisions of the treaty. There is thus
every reason to think that the Assembly will be
able, next December, to make recommendations
to the Council concerning this revision.
The brevity of this session, the number and
rank of government speakers who are to takepart, my wish to allow parliamentary observers
to give their views and the importance of the
subject we are to examine urge me to conclude
my speech and invite you to start your debates
immediately.
6. Obsemen
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Ladies and
gentlemen, allow me to welcome observers from
Denmark, Norway and Turkey, together with
those from Portugal and Spain who will sit as
full members at our next seision. Also attending
our session for the first time are representativeifrom Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. I
welcome them at the same time as the members
of the Permanent Council attending this
session.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business
for the extraordinary sesiion
(Docamcnt 1215)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the adoption of the draft
order of business for the extraordinary session,
Document 1215.
Are there any objections to the draft order of
business?...
I call Mr. Hardy.
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). 
- 
I should
hate to appear ungracious or to appear in any
way churlish, especially in view of the graceful
way in which you presented your report as Pres-
ident, but you made a point in your remarks that
we will have carefully read and studied the
amendments 
- 
and some of them, as you will be
aware, Mr. President, are amendments of very
considerable importance and character. Now,
we have not had an opportunity to study care-
fully the amendments. Some of us did not see
them until 9.30 this morning and I really think
that we ought to be very careful indeed before
we make a decision on some of those amend-
ments given the importance of their character. I
do not want to say any more, except that I
recogn-ise that it is a meeting of the Assembly at
one of the most historic moments in European
history, but that historic moment does require a
maturity ofjudgment and an exercise, when nec-
essary, of caution. By all means let the pace of
history proceed in a brisk manner, because thatis very much in Europe's and the planet's
interest, but for us to be hurrying to make a
decision on amendments that we have not seen
before until literally little more than an hour and
a half ago does seem to me to be a rather dan-
gerous practice and I would like to suggest that,
unless the Assembly is of whole-heaned dispo-
sition to approve amendments with a degree of
enthusiasm and unanimity, then it ought not to
Qe put into a position where some of us mightfeel caution would be wiser.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Hardy. I see that you are not proposing any
change to the draft order of business. I can
assure you that we have taken account, insofar
as possible, of your concerns and that is why we
have already brought the beginning of our
meeting forward by one hour in ordei to allow
parliamentarians to air their views about the
Pontillon report. The amendments will be dis-
cussed in full at the last sitting of this session,
which will be started tomorrow afternoon.
Are there any objections to the draft order of
business?...
The draft order of business is adopted.
The order of business for this brief extraor-dinary session is very full. Twenty-eight
speakers have put their names down to speakbn
the report by Mr. Pontillon. Five ministers and a
representative of the Soviet authorities are to
give addresses which will most certainly be fol-
lowed by questions. Seventeen amendments
have already been tabled to the draft recommen-
dation. In accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules
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of Procedure, I therefore propose that the
Assembly limit all speeches to five minutes
except for chairmen and rapporteurs of com-
mittees. I would recall that under the same rule,
the Assembly has to vote on this proposal
without debate.
Are there any objections?...
It is so decided. I also propose that one
observer per delegation be allowed to speak in
the debate on the report by Mr. Pontillon.
Does the Assembly agree?...
It is so decided.
8. Address by Mr. Eyskens,
Minisur for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Olfice of the Council
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the address by Mr. Eyskens,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Mr. Minister, your previous speech to our
Assembly last December just after the NATO
summit meeting aroused considerable interest. I
welcome you and thank you for again coming to
this rostrum.
Mr. EYSKENS (Ministerfor ForeignAffairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)(Translation). 
- 
Ladies and gentlemen, I should
also like to say a few words in the language
spoken by the majority of people in my country
and in at least one other country of the
European Community, which is also a member
state of WEU.
I just want to emphasise, Mr. President, how
fortunate it was that you took this initiative.
This extraordinary part-session does indeed
respond to extraordinary circumstances. I have
often heard it said in recent months that
political leaders are acting very nervously and
hurriedly, frequently improvising. In fact, ladies
and gentlemen, we have no choice. It is not the
politicians who are being hasty: it is the events,
and it is precisely because of the whirlwind of
events in the last few years and especially the
last few months that we need to reflect and to
adopt a position. We may have only a few
months to adopt a position and guide history
down the right road.
(The speaker continued in French)
We are all witnessing, but are also involved in,
truly historic events. History is back on course
after a break of over forty years following the
tragedy of the last world war. A page is now
being turned, Europe is overcoming its divisions
and the reunification of Germany is also, in
many respects, the reunification of Europe as a
whole.
The elections just held in the German Demo-
cratic Republic and shortly to be held in other
East European countries are tangible and elo-
quent proof that Europe 
- 
the wh^ole of Europe 
-
is regaining a common heritage founded on the
rule of law and freedom.
Europe and its values are not confined to geo-
political Europe. Europe is above all a legacy
and an act of faith in mankind. It is a demo-
cratic ideal without which nothing lasting can be
achieved. History is there to remind us of the
fact.
Today, everything is possible but, in some
ways, everything remains to be done to build
Europe in peace and freedom, respecting both
the interests and the special character of each
and all.
All Europeans are pan-Europeans by vocation
but this ideal has failed us too often. We owe it
to ourselves and to the generations coming after
to analyse with absolute clarity what is at stake
and what is to be done. Hence the value of this
extraordinary session attended not only by
elected representatives from the WEU member
countries but also, as privileged observers and
participants, representatives from what was
called " the other Europe " until a very short
time ago. The presence of my colleague Mr.
Skubiszewski is eloquent testimony to the
progress that has been achieved.
WEU was brought into being by a collective
defence treaty, the modified Brussels Treaty,
which, side by side with the Treaty of Wash-
ington, retains all its importance, because it isthe only specifically European security
instrument. WEU is not and has never been a
military organisation. It has no intention of
becoming one. It is above all the expression of a
European solidarity through which the wartime
divisions of Western Europe were healed. The
treaty was an important step on the road to
union, even though a number of its provisions
have been translated into practical form not
within WEU as such but in the framework of the
European Community created by the Treaty of
Rome. WEU has no intention of becoming a for-
tress looking in on itself. This would be contrary
to its vocation. On the contrary, it intends to
contribute, at its own level and as a separate but
closely-associated entity, to the process of
European integration and the establishment of
an order combining peace, stability and
co-operation throughout Europe.
Your Assembly is alone in possessing security
and defence attributes. Now, security is at the
heart of the debate now going on in Europe,
whether the subject is Germany, the rOle of the
alliances or the shape of Europe of tomorrow.
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The thirty-f,rve power summit scheduled for the
end of the year will be largely devoted to all
these questions. We must prepare for it together,
all together, all thirty-five of us, but we must not
forget our own Atlantic or European soli-
darity.
The aim is to lay the foundations of a Europe
where everyone will have their place, where
everyone's legitimate interests will be respected
and where everyone's security will be guar-
anteed, which means that everyone must
co-operate.
Myself, I shall try to contribute to the debate
by suggesting a number of what seem to me to be
essential directions to follow.
1. Security reguirements
There can be no real security without a
balance between the various components which
today still govern force relationships in Europe,
which has to include the United States and
Canada, and, of course, the USSR which is
much more than a European power. We cannot
therefore ignore the objective realities, while
accepting that stability must be sought at the
lowest possible level of forces. I shall come back
to this later.
Whatever its present troubles, the USSR or
Russia will unquestionably remain a super-
power. This seems to me to be part of the
natural order of things. It would moreover be
not only paradoxical but ridiculous to deny it
that historical status on the pretext that it will,
as we hope, move towards democracy.
This means that, for the sake of this European
equilibrium which must be strengthened, the
United States must maintain its commitment on
the continent of Europe, side by side with its
allies; for the foreseeable future, therefore, an
American military presence must be ensured in
Europe, with both conventional and nuclear
forces. Numbers will certainly be reduced as a
consequence of arms control and a political situ-
ation with its firm emphasis on d6tente;but they
will still be substantial if they are to have the
desired effect.
Such a North American presence in Europe is
inconceivable without the continued existence
of a western alliance, the Atlantic Alliance. But
it must adapt to the new security environment
brought about by the reductions and the conse-
quent restructuring or by the signs that two
Europes opposing each other until recently are
moving closer together politically. Changes
within the alliance must also be expected and
Europeans will, in consequence of the American
reductions, be required to shoulder a bigger
share 
- 
if only in relative terms 
- 
of responsi-
bility for their own security. The alliance will
therefore have to Europeanise itself, which is
not the same thing as creating a European pillar
in the Atlantic Alliance as the stock phrase goes.
WEU certainly has a r6le to play in this
change, not by becoming a substitute for the
alliance but as an instrument for adapting it.
The question of the Warsaw Pact and its
future is an entirely different problem. It is not
for us, in the West, to pass judgment on its
maintenance or on the far-reaching changes it
will have to undergo in order to convert itself
into what may be a political structure. Can there
be a political structure without solidarity? Can
such solidarity be established on new bases
between the present members of the pact? That
is the whole question. The very fact that it has to
be asked emphasises that there is no common
measure between the pact and the alliance.
The fact is that the USSR's influence in
Central and Eastern Europe is going to decline
for reasons connected with the force cuts and as
a consequence of the democratisation of the
former satellites. It is clear that the strategic
void so created must not be filled by the
alliance. That would be to sow the seed of new
imbalances.
The incorporation of the present GDR into
Germany clearly poses a problem which will
have to be resolved. Incorporation must not
upset the military balance but Germany must
remain part of western solidarity and the
European Community system in which WEU
has its r6le. This is the nature of the German
paradox which is not for solution by the two
plus four on their own. The status of reunified
Germany in Europe and in the alliance is a
matter of direct interest to us Belgians, and to
others ofcourse, not because we are neighbours
but because we are allies and partners.
There is no place in Europe for a neutral
Germany. It now remains to convince the USSR
and Germany's eastern neighbours that this is
also in their interest. It must therefore be pos-
sible to give them the necessary guarantees
which I will call a new kind of confidence-
building measures with a political as well as a
military content. Among others, I am thinking
of measures to: confirm speedily and categori-
cally that the frontiers and in particular the
Oder-Neisse frontier are sacrosanct 
- 
no other
solution is possible for this question; announce
that NATO troops 
- 
and this has virtually been
done already 
- 
will not be stationed on former
GDR territory; spread the withdrawal of Soviet
forces over a transitional period, the length of
which could be discussed in close conjunction
with the development of the CFE process; obvi-
ously, continue and extend the process of dis-
armament in parallel with the establishment of
co-operative structures geared to the new
European environment.
i
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These constitute a whole set of questions
which I shall later consider in more detail but
for which we must find a solution without delay,
in time for offrcial recognition at the thirty-five
nation end-of-year summit. This will call for
intense consultation and co-operation from all
concerned at all levels.
But confidence-building is not a one-way
process. The progress towards democracy must
be speeded up at the same time in the Soviet
Union itself. To me this is of fundamental
importance.
2. The future shape of Europe
The alliances have preserved peace for us in
disturbed times. They have played a useful r6le
in the Vienna negotiations. They will quite cer-
tainly continue to do so by affording help with
verification.
But, beyond this, Europe's future security
calls for a {nore dynamic approach which
amounts to more than the maintenance of the
military blocs. Co-operative structures must be
built up gradually so that all concerned, whether
or not members of an alliance, can join in.
Clearly, Europe's security will have to be
worked out by the Thirty-Five with the active
participation of the United States, Canada and
the USSR. It will, however, still be necessary to
go forward a step at a time taking care not to
upset the delicate balances on which stability is
based and maintaining a cohesive line of action
which will not water down the integration now
going forward and in particular the advance
towards European union or call in question the
Atlantic solidarity whose vital importance I
have already stressed.
At this stage, the problem of the CSCE is less
that of setting up institutions, of which we hear
so much, than of stepping up the dialogue
between the Thirty-Five in order to work out a
new European order together. The institutions
to be set up will follow naturally from the order
established and not vice-versa. We must not put
the cart before the horse.
To be effective this dialogue must quickly be
formalised at the level of heads of state and
government, foreign ministers and experts. A
small secretariat is no doubt a natural adjunct.
The aim is that the end-of-year summit should
produce satisfactory answers to the external
problems of German unification, starting with
the frontier question which I mentioned earlier.
Ethnic minorities will also have to be guar-
anteed their basic right to practise their religion
and use their own language. Principles which
must be acknowledged in appropriate form
include political pluralism, the rule of law, the
separation of powers, the essential political and
economic freedoms and social rights, the welfare
market economy and environmental values 
- 
all
principles which must be acted upon so that
democracy can work on a lasting basis. In other
words, an effort will have to be made to release
the full potential of the final act of Helsinki, in
the realisation that this work will have to be
carried forward with its sights set on Helsinki II
in 1992. The end-of-year summit is only a stage,
however important it may be.
In this way we shall really go forward from
ddtente to understanding and this implies
common action based on shared values.
In the longer term, the ultimate aim is the
question of new structures for co-operation
between Europeans themselves in the
framework of a security charter with which the
North Americans and the Soviets would be asso-
ciated by a set of mutual guarantees. A system in
which Europe would be a partner in its own
right. This Europe would not only be united but
would be master of its destiny and in charge ofits security, knowing its rights but also
respecting those of others.
This Europe requires the creation of a fede-
ration which would itself be credible for the
Central and East European partners, for the
USSR and, of course, for the United States and
Canada. It is with this prospect in view that inte-
gration of the Twelve must be carried forward
and intensified. This federation would be open
to other European applicants provided they are
so inclined and fulfil the required conditions.
This vision of Europe is clearly the opposite of
what I would call a kind of diluting pan-
Europeanism under cover of which nation states
would quickly re-emerge with all that implies,
without any guarantee of real stability. Con-
versely, pan-Europeanism must not lead to the
setting up of a directoire, must not give exor-
bitant powers to the superpowers and must not
impose some kind of tutelage on the process of
Community integration.
There is therefore no way of creating a really
united Europe except through a process leading
ultimately to federation, whatever the stages and
the intermediate forms of association with those
who by choice or necessity would at first be
unable to endorse the ultimate objective or fallin with what the Community has already
achieved.
3. Disarmament
Quite clearly, the emergence of the new
Europe will be a long and complex process.
What is essential is to act so that the process can
start and can succeed, which I repeat means
maintaining the balance at all stages. This is
really the crucial point.
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The process must be accompanied by disarm-
ament measures, not as an end in themselves but
as an essential instrument for the development
of co-operation.
For the immediate future, we must ensure
that the CFE agreement, which is an indispen-
sable first step, can be concluded as quickly as
possible. There are some who argue that such an
agreement is already out-dated by reason among
other things of German unification. Some adap
tation will be needed but it remains a fact that
the process of disarmament in Europe will come
to a sudden stop if it is not developed on a
sound and undisputed basis.
Parity between the two existing alliances at a
lower level of forces is therefore an absolute
necessity. To cut out this stage on the pretext
that it has been superseded would be to build on
sand. That is in no one's interest.
As soon as CFE I has been agreed, an imme-
diate start will have to be made on CFE II. After
the reductions, the problem will be that of
restructuring forces, which is vastly more
complex because defence policies are involved.
A great deal is heard about defensive defence.
My own view is that we should also be talking of
defensive, mutual deterrence, the conditions for
which will have to be worked out jointly.
The whole question will clearly be to
determine how to proceed, with whom and
where, with thirty-five or twenty-three or, even
more likely, twenty-two. All questions on which
the present members of the Warsaw Pact and
the neutral and non-aligned countries will want
to have their say. All these questions must be
settled before the summit if a break in the nego-
tiations is to be avoided. It is essential that we
take a flrrm line on the results and show the nec-
essary flexibility as regards ways and means.
Disarmament is still much more than the CFE
process, however vital these negotiations may be
for Europe.
Beyond START and the banning of chemical
weapons I am thinking in particular of the SNF
negotiations which, in accordance with the
global view, should begin as soon as the imple-
mentation of CFE I has started, that is in the
course of next year. Here again, I note that the
environment has changed. The problem is
already no longer posed in the same terms as a
year ago, especially as regard the modernisation
of the Lance missile. But equally there can be no
real deterrence without nuclear weapons.
Having said this, the r6le of such weapons, not
to speak of their number, will have to be
reviewed in a post-CFE environment which we
can already glimpse in outline.
There are a number of fundamental questions
which you are debating at this extraordinary
session and will have to be considered at the
next ministerial Council in April, although it
will be unable to give all the answers because
some of the questions are not matters for us
alone. The European world has been enriched
but it has also become more complex and we
cannot confine ourselves to set ideas.
I have tried to give you at least the elements of
a vision of Europe of the future. I note that there
is convergence on many points with the report
presented by Mr. Pontillon which has identified
what is at stake in a remarkable manner and has
sketched out the proposals.
In particular, I am, like your Rapporteur, con-
vinced that the way to the necessary opening to
the East and the development of new structures
for co-operation is through the consolidation
and extension of the structures of Western
Europe. We in the West certainly have no
monopoly of the European identity but we have
gradually provided ourselves with the means of
adding to its content. A number of the draft
recommendations before you take the same line.I welcome the fact. The Council will consider
them with the greatest interest.
I began by saying that in Europe today every-
thing is possible if we show the necessary vision.
The history of the construction of Europe with
the creation of WEU, the Rome Treaty, the
Single Act and prospects for union, starting with
the EMU, are all reasons for thinking that this
Europe is truly capable of vision. We see in past
achievements reasons for hoping that the attain-
ments of the Community in the widest sense 
- 
I
include WEU 
- 
will tomorrow provide the basis
for a new Europe where all citizens, from the
West, the Centre and the East, will be able to
live in the peace and freedom, which should
never have ceased to be their common
destiny.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I thank the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Three members have asked to put questions,
Mr. Ewing, Mr. De Decker and Mr. Baumel.
I call Mr. Ewing to put the first question.
Mr. EWING (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
Could I
first of all say that I found the Minister's speech
in parts rather worrying with its heavy emphasis
on the need to obtain guarantees on human
rights issues for ethnic minorities from the
Soviet Union? I accept, and most people here
would accept, that there are problems in relation
to ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, there
are problems in relation to ethnic minorities in
Western European countries as well and one of
the things that worries me 
- 
and I hope the Min-
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ister will take this on board 
- 
is that the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries,
having made so much progress, at such a rapid
pace, over the past few months, really ought not
to be pushed, as we seem to be pushing them,
beyond the limits of their ability to meet the
demands that the Minister seems to be placing
on the Soviet Union. The surest way to failure is
to set demands that cannot be met in the
timescale that is being set for these demands to
be met. I hope that the Minister would recon-
sider that position.
On the question of German neutrality, most
of us take the view that the idea of German neu-
trality is incomprehensible and beyond belief.
But I think that we should tread warily here
because there is a possibility of German neu-
trality and I hope, personally, that this whole
question of where a united Germany would find
its place in Europe will be one of the major
issues in the Federal Republic's elections which
are due later this year. I do not see any sign of
opinion from the Federal Republic on this
question of neutrality. Of course, there is also
the whole question of the status of Berlin. Until
the allied powers who control Berlin 
- 
the three
allied powers in West Berlin and the Soviet
Union in East Berlin 
- 
make clear their inten-
tions in relation to the future of Berlin, I think
the whole future of the unification of Germany
and its rOle in Europe has a long way still to go
and there has to be a great deal more discussion
and consideration.
Mr. EYSKENS (Ministerfor ForeignAffairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council)(Translation). 
- 
I do not believe I gave the
impression that I am unduly impatient about
the reforms in the Soviet Union. In truth,
reforms already started five years ago. My per-
sonal feeling, and I do not ask anyone to share it,
is that at economic level, for instance, the
reforms are too slow and this leads to certain
contradictions which Mr. Gorbachev has to face
up to.
As to the problem of ethnic minorities and
nationalities in the Soviet Union, we shall not
interfere in the internal affairs of that great
country, but I believe I should say that there are
principles which transgress frontiers and if one
defends pluralist, tolerant parliamentary
democracy which respects human rights it
cannot stop at certain frontiers. That is our
message, otherwise we would be unworthy of
being Europeans. I therefore regret that you gave
the impression that certain countries should be
erected as unassailable islands. No, we have
responsibility, a task also, but we must avoid
naivety. Time is Mr. Gorbachev's greatest
enemy and also his greatest ally and we must
help him to buy time so that all that can be done
progressively.
Turning to your second question about the
neutrality of Germany, I still believe that if we
want a stable Europe and balance in Europe it is
preferable for defence to be organised in a uni-
lateral manner and I do not believe that a great
country like reunified Germany with neutral
status is the best way to achieve this. But I think
I have understood what you are alluding to. In
fact, you are in favour of a neutral, reunified
Germany in a neutralised Europe. That is even
worse. A sub-continent like ours, neutralised,
would be bound hand and foot. It would be
handed over body and soul to the influences of
clearly stronger and gteater powers than this
neutralised Europe. I reject this with all my
might. It would be a historical error and I can
therefore only repeat that I am in no way in
agreement with you on either of your two com-
ments.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Eyskens.
I call Mr. De Decker.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium)(Translation). -
Mr. President, I first wish to congratulate the
Minister and Chairman-in-Oflice for his
important and courageous speech and I suppose
he will appreciate that praise even more since it
comes from a parliamentarian who, in his own
country, is in the opposition. I congratulate him
on his speech because it has the merit of being
clear, frank and firm on essential points.
First, you said there was no place in Europe
for German neutrality and you are clearly right.
Next, you explained that there was no means of
planning final European political unity without
a deterrent to cover Europe, which implies- a
nuclear component; I believe that had not been
recalled for a long time. Finally, you were also
very clear about the institutional visions of the
present debate between countries and powers in
regard to the CSCE in particular.
I wish to put to you a few questions about the
logic of this approach. Regarding events, some
have other institutional ideas. You were right to
recall the growing importance of the Atlantic
Alliance in future years. You also recalled the
links between the alliance and WEU. My frrst
question is therefore, does the Minister believe
it is possible for WEU one day to be enlarged to
include countries not members of the Atlantic
Alliance?
Now my second question. The important
problem you did not tackle is the applicability of
the Brussels Treaty to reunified Germany. There
is the whole legal problem of how to apply the
Brussels Treaty to reunified Germany. Can the
Minister enlighten us on the procedure
envisaged in this respect?
My third and last question is that you think
that ultimately the EEC and the Community
institutions should take over problems of
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European security. What time frame do you
envisage for this evolution?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Before
calling Mr. Eyskens, I wish to welcome among
us Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland, who has just entered the
chamber and is now following our work. You are
most welcome, Minister.
I call Mr. Eyskens.
Mr. EYSKENS (Ministerfor Foreign Affairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)
(Translation). 
- 
I thank Mr. De Decker for his
kind words. In Belgium he is in the opposition -
I was about to say so little. We have always been
on the best of terms and our views have often
converged on essential matters. His first
question was should WEU be enlarged to coun-
tries not belonging to the European Community
and the Atlantic Alliance? I believe the answer
to this question depends first on what Europe
will do, and I am thinking mainly of Com-
munity Europe and its security problems. Will
Europe take over its own security problems
within the Community bodies or not? There is
something of your last question in this,
moreover.
Belgium is quite favourable to defence and
security problems being the responsibility of
European bodies but there are legal difficulties
to be overcome to achieve this. For what may be
quite a long time, we must therefore maintain
and strengthen WEU. During that time, which
will be decisive for our future and for our
history, enlargement in conditions to be agreed
- 
since one may be a member, observer, more or
less associated or partners of various kinds 
- 
is
not to be rejected a priori, if that can help to
give a hearing in the major negotiations being
prepared, to a coherent voice from twelve-power
Europe or from the Atlantic Alliance or from
both. My answer to your question is therefore
nuanc6, but positively nuanc6.
Your second question, i.e. the impact on the
Brussels Treaty of the reunification of Germany,
is certainly a problem. We must first await the
outcome of the two plus four negotiations and
we know that the two plus four have agreed to
associate other countries from the moment their
interests are affected 
- 
I am thinking of Poland
and the success of Polish diplomacy in obtaining
this result. Moreover, I, like other European col-
leagues, have received a letter from the United
States Secretary of State explaining that we too
may be associated in one way or another with
the negotiations from the moment questions
concerning us are brought up in the two plus
four discussions. We must therefore wait for the
results and the outcome of these negotiations to
see exactly what is the legal context in which we
shall operate 
- 
nor is it without importance to
know what legal course the German authorities
themselves will choose, the new government in
the GDR and of course that of the FRG: will it
be Article 23 or Article 146 of the Constitution?
This is an important question. In any case, we
shall have to prepare for 1998, i.e. the year in
which the Brussels Treaty expires after fifty
years, and for me that seems to be the final date
before which we shall have to decide exactly
how to revise the treaty.
Finally, Mr. De Decker asked how long it
would take for the European institutions to be
able to debate and adopt positions on questions
of security and defence. My personal answer is
very clear: it could be tomorrow. That is my
wish, but we have to be realistic. This is not a
simple matter. As a small country, we wish to
insist on this but in no way can I fix the probable
time. I still think it is a very desirable scenario,
but to say that the chances are eighty, fifty or
twenty per cent would be trying to quantify
political attitudes which, by definition, are more
qualitative and psychological than quantifiable.
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister.
I now invite Mr. Baumel to put the last
question.
Mr. BAUMEL (France)(Translation). 
- 
You
have just made a very clear speech, very precise,
lucid and full of proposals or ideas. If I may, I
wish to ask you two questions: first you spoke at
length of CSCE, its future r6le and, second, you
mentioned different European bodies between
which the respective weight and responsibility
would have to be shared out. In this matter,
what is your view of President Mitterrand's idea
of a European confederation? How do you placeit in relation to the Thirty-Five and present
European institutions, particularly the EEC?
My second question is particularly important
in that here today we have the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Poland, and, as you know,
Poland has proposed creating a European
co-ordination body about which you have not
spoken. I wish to know your opinion on this
Polish proposal.
Finally, allow me to say that I am a little sur-
prised, as a parliamentarian of the Council of
Europe, that in your very important and very
lucid speech you in no way referred to the r6le,
responsibility and future of the Council of
Europe at a time when its members are trying to
determine what might be the future r6le of their
organisation which has now received a few dele-
gations from the liberated nations of the East. In
this context, we believe very important struc-
tures can be foreseen since, of all the assemblies,
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the Council of Europe seems to be the one which
attracts their sympathy and their attention
today.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thankyou,
Mr. Baumel.
I call the Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council.
Mr. EYSKENS (Minister for Foreign Alfairs of
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)(Translation). 
- 
This idea, suggested amongst
others by President Mitterrand, seems judicious
and interesting. Moreover, we ourselves have
already mentioned it six or seven months ago.
Everything also depends on the content given to
this confederation. It is clear that if the evo-
lution is towards co-operation in greater Europe,
this co-operation will have to be structured and,
so far, all thinking in this direction is at the level
of intergovernmental co-operation. I have heard
no one defend the idea of supranational inte-
gration of all European countries. We are
defending this idea at the twelve-power level
and that is the'great difference between the
European federation we wish and the wider
structure which will be one of intergovernmental
co-operation, implying that each government
maintains a veto right and a consensus has to be
obtained. In that context, confederal type
co-operation may be envisaged. That does not
mean that confederation would need a pres-
ident. There could quite well be a President-in-
Office, a Council of Ministers and that is an
interesting possibility. I would make two reser-
vations, however. First, this greater European
confederation should not become a super-
structure over and above existing organisations,
starting with the European Community. Second,
this is a condition for me, if such an intergovern-
mental confederation is created, it would clearly
be elementary for Community Europe of the
Twelve, or perhaps of the Fourteen, to be pan of
it as a community and to speak with a single
voice because othenvise we might permanently
be in danger of diluting and dividing Europe
from the moment the member countries of the
Community had to take individual stands
within the confederation.
The idea of a council of co-operation is per-
fectly reconcilable with the idea of a confeder-
ation. The council of co-operation can be the
political instrument for confederal-type evo-
lution. The Polish Government's idea of a
council of co-operation can also be grafted on to
the idea already expressed some twenty years
ago by one of my predecessors, Mr. Harmel, for
a European security management body, some-
times called a European security council. The
latter title is perhaps not the best because it is
too close to a body that exists already at the level
of the United Nations which is a directorate
of great powers with veto rights. Nevertheless I
see a fairly clear convergence between the
confederal-type ideas and the ideas proposed by
the Polish Government. It is therefore certainly
a fruitful course to explore.
Third, Mr. Baumel, I spoke about the Council
of Europe in my speech but perhaps not enough,
in relation to the Europe of values. The Council
of Europe is a very valuable instrument and
essential for defending that Europe which can
extend further than more limited structures such
as twelve-power Europe. We shall be meeting in
Lisbon tomorrow and on Saturday to talk about
the enlargement of the Council of Europe. I
share your point of view, although at the presentjupcture economic convergence is far more
complex and far slower to achieve whereas con-
vergence on values and fundamental options is a
question of political determination. It can be
achieved quickly and that is what we shall try to
do in the Council of Europe whose importance
today is far greater than five or ten years ago
thanks to the historical times in which we are
living.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Ewing.
Mr. EWING (United Kingdom). 
- 
I apologise
for raising this point oforder but I am sorry that
the Minister chose to misrepresent my position
on Germany.My position 
- 
made perfectly clear
at our last Assembly in Paris 
- 
is that I am in
favour of a united Germany as part of western
institutions. The point that I was making 
- 
that
the Minister obviously had great difficulty
picking up 
- 
was that the people of a united
Germany themselves may well decide to be
neutral and no thought was being given to that.
But I will not have my position misrepre-
sented.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
but that was not a point of order. You have
perhaps managed to elucidate something of a
misunderstanding between yourself and the
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council, but this
brings us back to the task in hand.
I thank Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Oflice of
the Council, for his excellent speech and for
having so kindly answered questions.
9. Establishment of a iust, peaceful
and secure order in Europe -
prospects stemming from developments
in Central and Eostern Europe
(Praentatioa of and debate on the rcport
of the Political Committee,
Doc. 1216 and ameadments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the presentation of and
debate on the report of the Political Committee
on the establishment of a just, peaceful and
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secure order in Europe - prospects stemming
from developments in Central and Eastern
Europe, Doc. 1216 and amendments.
I call Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.
Mr. PONTILLON (France) (Translation). -
Ministers, Secretary-General, ladies and gen-
tlemen, above a certain threshold, quantitative
changes call for qualitative reforms, the philos-
opher Gaston Berger liked to recall.
This is so for our problem today. The mag-
nitude and gathering speed of developments in
the international environment and particularly
those affecting Europe require in-depth
thinking, a kind of agonising appraisal and
much creative imagination.
We are indeed witnessing the reshaping of the
strategic landscape of the last forty years. This
evolution must arouse neither excessive fear nor
demobilising euphoria. The worst would be to
wish to ignore present changes and cling to past
situations.
So what are the place, r6le and responsibilities
ofEurope and ofthe part ofEurope that is ours
in this emerging order of security and peace?
This is the principal subject of this report and
ofthe extraordinary session as our Presidentjust
recalled. The Assembly had to make its own
contribution to this collective thinking so that it
could inform the governments of Europe's
opinion on these matters and what it expects of
the WEU Council. Furthermore, it was the
Assembly's duty to do this, and to do it quickly,
in any event before the new European order
starts to emerge from the series of international
conferences planned for the months ahead.
If I may make one further comment, our search
must be seen in terms of time. There can be no
logical concept ofthe future. The very notion of
" foreseeable future " tends to diminish further
every day. Yet in security terms the foreseeable
future must necessarily include facts linked with
bi- and multilateral disarmament negotiations,
the progress of democratisation in Eastern
Europe 
- 
in that they affect the coherence of the
Warsaw Pact 
- 
and the process of unifuing the
two Germanys.
Where arms control is concerned, it seems dif-
ficult to hope for signiflrcant prog;ress in imple-
menting the process before the end of this year.
But can thought be given to implementing a new
European security system - assuming we have
clear ideas on the subject and a coherent plan -
even before an agreement is concluded in
Vienna and its first effects felt? My feeling,
therefore, is that we are condemned to a kind of
compulsory status quo. In this connection, a
British analyst spoke of a period of at least five
years, a view apparently shared by the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
I do not know whether this forecast will be
confirmed. I would merely remark that this
intermediary, or interim, period gives us plenty
of time to examine - first among Europeans,
then with our United States and Canadian allies
and finally with the Central and Eastern
European countries and the Soviet Union -
ways and means of establishing a new security
order.
I said we had plenty of time; I should say just
time, for experience has shown that moments
combining all the conditions for progress are
always short and must be seized in time.
The report that I shall now present to you was
examined twice by the Political Committee in
very meaningful discussions which finally
allowed the report to be adopted unanimously
and without further amendment.
The first part deals with developments in
Eastern Europe. It tries to be logical and
objective. It is nevertheless clear that some ques-
tions are still without an answer, particularly in
regard to relations between the Soviet Union
and the parties in power in Eastern Europe, that
is to say in regard to the influence that the
Soviet Union exercised - and still may exercise
- 
on the present reforms. This is not merely a
matter of speculation since the answer may lead
to different interpretations of the nature of
Soviet intentions and Moscow's attitude
towards organising a peaceful order in Europe.
This immediately raises the problem of the
future of the pacts mentioned just now by Mr.
Eyskens. For instance, some consider the
Warsaw Pact no longer exists. I have a more
measured view, although I hope Europe will
emerge at last freed from the bipolar yoke.
However, I think any such announcement is pre-
mature. The Warsaw Pact has certainly lost the
federating link of ideology and communist
organisation and is probably no longer the
instrument of ideological and political
oppression that it was and also the instrument of
an offensive strategy, but it can still be the place
for affirming the member countries' will for
integrity and security in their relations with
their neighbours, as in the case of Poland, and
the most appropriate framework for managing
their relations with the Soviet Union. As far as I
know, neither Romania nor Bulgaria has shown
any intention of leaving the pact, nor, moreover,
have Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although
they have called for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. In this sense, the Warsaw Pact remains
an instrument of security and can therefore con-
tribute to the organisation of peace and disarm-
ament in Europe.
Just as a cloud brings the storm, as Jaurds
said, by definition potential sources of tension
are inherent in the movement. As we have said,
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disarmament is a slow and laborious process;
and, as Mr. Eyskens rightly said, it is not an end
in itself, the end is peace; there is always a risk
of accidents along the way.
The Eastern European nations' return to
freedom is not necessarily a guarantee of
balance and peace. The awakening of nationalist
aspirations has become a serious threat to
European order. We are reminded of this today
by the incidents in Romania.
Nor can Europe ignore the threats emerging to
the south and east of the Mediterranean and we
cannot totally discard the hypothesis of a sort of
swing in the risks, with North-South antagonism
replacing East-West division.
Finally, what is true of the Warsaw Pact and
the eastern system is also true of the Atlantic
Pact. The Atlantic Alliance came into being
before the Warsaw Pact. Together with its
concern for security, it is an expression oftrans-
atlantic solidarity, which has never really been
defaulted since the outset. However, it is clear
that the alliance must evolve. The lowering of
tension in Europe, the announced dismantling
and foreseeable reduction of military systems,
political developments and particularly the pros-
pects offered by German unification justify
reflection about new security requirements, the
future of the alliances, their progressive decline
and the new assessment of certain strategic
concepts.
In fact, the problem can be summed up in
these vital questions: how can a strategic balance
be organised at a lower level of defence? How
can we move from a fractured world in which
the systems were rivals to a more open world in
which the systems are complementary or inter-
dependent?
The German question is at the heart of the
problem of European security and the organi-
sation of a new order in Europe because of the
eighty-million population of the two German
states; Germany's place in the European
economy; Germany's geopolitical situation in
the centre of Europe; the place of the two
German states in the two alliance systems; the
reactions and fears which memories of Nazism
may still justifiably arouse in Europe.
Hence it is not enough for there to be unders-
tanding between the two German states to allow
unification. There must also be agreement
between the four powers given responsibility for
the fate of German territory in 1945; agreement
between all the countries taking part in the
CSCE..
These agreements should include a guarantee
of the intangibility of the frontiers of the new
state; precise undertakings by that state in
regard to limitations on its armaments and clari-
fication of the way the new state can participate
in a collective security system.
However, it is equally clear that the new
German state will also have to reach an unders-
tanding with the Federal Republic's partners in
the various western institutions to determine
how the treaties creating them will apply to
Germany as a whole. This is foreseen for the
EEC. It will be necessary for NATO and also
WEU.
The neutralisation of Germany is unaccep
table to the West and also several Eastern
European countries. Its integration in the NATO
military structures also seems difficult to accept
for several Eastern European countries, particu-
larly the Soviet Union, whose legitimate security
requirements we cannot and must not ignore, as
the Chairman of the Council of Miiristers just
said.
A middle course must therefore be found, on
the one hand to ensure a link between unified
Germany and the western defence system and,
on the other, that is acceptable to the Soviet
Union and its allies. WEU might play this r6le,
inter alia by giving an international guarantee of
respect for Germany's undertakings not to
produce or hold certain armaments; providing ajuridical basis for the presence of forces of WEU
member countries on German territory if the
German state so wishes and, possibly, the pre-
sence of German forces on the territory of other
member countries so as to retain the deterrent
element that the presence of allied forces on its
territory gives each country; in this connection,
the suggestion by our Secretary-General, Mr.
van Eekelen, that the Franco-German concept
be Europeanised seems a positive one; helping
to guarantee the frontiers of member states and,
consequently, those of their neighbours; finally,
ensuring the link between WEU and NATO pro-
vided for in Article IV of the modified Brussels
Treaty and, hence, between unified Germany
and the Atlantic Alliance, whatever status the
armed forces of the future German state may
eventually have.
Furthermore, WEU must play an important
rdle in two stages in establishing a new peaceful
order in Europe, which can be organised only in
the framework of the CSCE.
During the transitional period, the defence
effort of the Western European countries will
have to be organised, taking into account disar-
mament agreements; the reduction in the Ame-
rican military presence in Europe; pressure by
European public opinion to reduce defence
budgets.
This diffrcult task will imply no radical change
in the course followed by WEU since 1985 but
will probably require the Council to act more
rigorously in areas where it has already set itself
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the task of developing consultations between its
members.
In order to prepare the longer term, the
Council, with the assistance of the institute,
should draw up the programme that the WEU
countries intend to support and win acceptance
for in the CSCE: for developing the threshold of
sufficiency concept on which future disarm-
ament agxeements will be based; for establishing
the elements of a broader notion of shared
security as it should be defined by the CSCE; for
developing confidence-building measures; for
working out means of arbitration.
In the medium term, the new European
security structures are not yet very clear.
However, two directions and two kinds of evo-
lution seem possible. One would favour a
formula whereby both alliances would change
from rival alliances into political alliances
co-operating with each other, thus maintaining a
system of bipolar structures. The other would be
in the framework of the CSCE and lead to the
creation of a multilateral system guaranteeing
security for the whole of Europe.
These two possibilities leave room for a whole
series of intermediary solutions, including the
idea of a new European security system that
would eventually take over from the old alli-
ances.
What will be WEU's place in this devel-
opment? We have tried to define a few possible
courses. It would be premature, and probably
too ambitious, to go any further since the mil-
itary status of Germany is still uncertain, there
may be some delay in the development of the
European Economic Community and the idea of
a European confederation is still viewed as a
goal and not as a means of solving questions of
security in Europe.
The confederation is a long-term aim which
provides every opportunity for action by institu-
tions like ours. We must seize this opportunity
and nourish it with firm proposals by helping to
promote new procedure for collective security.
In this context, is WEU to remain a purely
western organisation or should it very soon be
opened to eastern countries? I personally am
inclined to see WEU's future in an all-European
context, but everything will depend on the evo-
lution of the military pacts, and NATO in par-
ticular, the settlement of the German question,
the European Community's ability to apply a
policy of opening towards the east, the estab-
lishment by the CSCE of a European security
organisation guaranteeing stability at a lower
level of armaments and on the basis, for
instance, of minimum deterrence on both sides
which might progressively take the place of the
present alliance systems.
The recommendation submitted for your
examination and debate aims to determine what
can be done today to prepare a peaceful order
for tomorrow's Europe while maintaining, as
long as necessary, the structures which ensured
peace in yesterday's Europe. It is a matter
neither of rebuilding the world on the basis of
perestroika nor of ignoring historical divisions.
The rapid developments in Eastern Europe
compel us to be open in regard to the future and
responsible in our action today.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Rapporteur.
The debate is open.
I first call Mr. Caro.
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). 
- 
I convey
my thanks and congratulations to the Political
Committee and, in particular, Mr. Pontillon.
I shall limit myself to eight points, Mr. Pres-
ident, and the first is that the achievement of
European union has become a major necessity.
All the shilly-shallying shows how useful its exis-
tence would have been today. It does not exist,
so it is urgent. My second point is that the gov-
ernments of the member states must pursue an
active and unequivocal policy to make the tasks
of WEU and the European Community con-
verge. Third, the European Community must
speedily bring about the economic and mon-
etary union. Fourth, Western European Union
must quickly settle the institutional organisation
of European security as the political and mil-
itary pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Fifth, the
Council of Europe must develop its eminent and
institutional r6le of co-operation between
European parliamentary democracies and guar-
antee of human rights. Sixth, the CSCE remains
the framework for the peaceful and secure order
in Europe in agreement with the United States
and the Soviet Union. It cannot take the place of
existing organisations' and, in particular, the
Council of Europe. Seventh, reunified Germany,
faithful to the commitments of the Federal
Republic of Germany to which the population of
the GDR has just subscribed massively, must be
an additional chance for the European union to
accede quickly to the rank of world superpower.
Finally, my eighth and last point, but this is
perhaps just a beginning since it seems that the
Warsaw Pact is no longer a subscriber, is it not
our duty to erect a bridge in the direction of the
European countries freed from totalitarianism
which wish to be associated with European
democracy for the indispensable dialogue on
security?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Caro.
I now call Mr. Soell.
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(Translation). 
- 
I should like to thank the
Rapporteur for his very comprehensive report. I
agree with most of his assessments, but on some
points I differ from him. One of these is para-
graph 26, in which the position adopted by
German Social Democrats with reference to the
questions of bringing a united Germany into
European security structures are not correctly
described. In whatever way the majority of the
population may vote on subjects such as neu-
trality or membership of the alliance, the great
majority of the political forces in the Federal
Republic are against the neutralisation of
Germany, and this has always been the position
of the SDP as well. We have said that not for a
single moment must such a reunited Germany,
as also the previous partial German states, be
without ties to Europe and without compliance
with international obligations. But there are ties
which are unthinkable in the long term, and one
such would be that one part of Germany, the
Federal Republic, is a member of NATO and
WEU whilst the other part belongs to the
Warsaw Pact, and both alliances hold to their
military confrontation, their military options.
With events moving in the way they have been
going since last year, the people would naturally
consider it increasingly absurd for short-range
nuclear missiles to be targeted either on Dresden
or Berlin by the West or on western cities from
the East. That applies not only to the Federal
Republic; I maintain that it applies to all coun-
tries in the central area of Europe. And because
of this there must be some fresh thinking. Of
course this will not lead to an immediate disso-
lution of the alliances. There is not the slightest
doubt about that, but if we are striving to
establish a pan-European system of security, of
which both the United States and Canada and
also the USSR are members, then clearly we
ought to try to set up this system, make a first
step towards it, without the alliances being
immediately dismantled.
As regards the situation of the alliances it has
to be said that they will have to change their
nature; they must be primarily organisations for
implementing disarmament. They will never-
theless retain their political functions for a
number of years, if one thinks about all the
problems existing outside Europe, or about par-
ticular crisis spots which might influence devel-
opments in Europe. That is quite clear. But con-
frontations must be stood down and options
regarded by one side or the other as offensive
must also be discarded. In other words, the
Helsinki 2 conference, which the Soviet Pres-
ident is trying to convene for the autumn of this
yeat, must basically issue three mandates:
always assuming that the Vienna negotiations on
conventional troop reductions are successful, a
mandate for a second phase of the Vienna nego-
tiations with drastic reductions, which would
then in particular include the troops both of the
present Federal Republic and of the GDR, a
mandate for the elimination of nuclear short-
range missiles from Central Europe and a third
mandate, endeavouring to establish a security
structure on the basis of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation with the necessary
substructure and with the political negotiating
powers that are necessary for a pan-European
security system as envisaged.
I would add, and I am sure I speak for col-
leagues belonging to other groups in the Federal
Parliament as well: it is not only conceivable
but very likely that for a number of years
special security conditions will be placed upon
a united Germany. This applies of course in
particular to the extension of the ban on the
production and use of A, B and C weapons.
That is absolutely right. But it will be impos-
sible in the long run to keep a united Germany
in a completely special situation militarily. Not
only is this likely to provoke nationalism within
Germany; it would also contribute to the
appearance of a de facto neutralisation, which
all of us reject. And we do not want a return to
the bilateral alliances of the interwar period.
We want neither a Rapallo nor a renewal of the
little ententes, as all these small alliances were
called. What we want is to be bound into
Europe, and we want to create a security
structure covering the whole of Europe. Thank
you for your attention and patience.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you,
Mr. Soell.
I now call Mr. De Decker.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I wish to congratulate Mr.
Pontillon for his report and particularly for the
fact that on such a difficult and delicate subject,
and moving if I may say so, he obtained una-
nimity in committee.
For the Liberal Group, I wish to say that we
fully endorse the content of this report and in
particular because, while basically welcoming
the evolution in the East towards liberalisation
and respect for human rights, the report recalls
even so that there is still much uncertainty about
the situation in Central Europe and in the world
as a whole. In this respect, I believe it is
important to bear in mind that disarmament,
although growing closer each day, is progressing
very slowly and we must never forget that,
whatever happens and whatever may be the evo-
lution in the Soviet Union, this country adjacent
to our part of Europe is, and will always remain,
a superpower. That is why we are happy that this
report calls for the maintenance of the alliances
- 
the Atlantic Alliance in particular and WEU
which are fundamentally defensive organisa-
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tions 
- 
which, as Mr. Eyskens recalled, have
ensured and can still ensure for many years to
come stability and security in Europe. I believe
the report is also right to welcome the reunifi-
cation of Germany and to state clearly that we
do not wish the German state to be neutralised. I
believe the reunified Germany must remain in
the alliance as a whole and in WEU. We must
not show hegemony towards Germany and I
believe it is in Germany's interest to remain a
member of these alliances so as to remain also a
full partner in Europe. Clearly, neutralisation of
Germany would eventually lead to the dislo-
cation of European unity because a European
partner that no longer took part in the security
policy of the European continent would very
quickly no longer be a full European partner.
The report also refers to the delicate question of
the deployment of NATO forces in Europe and
alludes to the fact that the Brussels Treaty might
be the juridical basis for the presence of the
forces of member states on the territory of other
member states. The Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon,
mentioned the excellent idea, I believe, of the
WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van Frckelen, to
take up the idea that had already existed at the
time of the EDC to form multinational
European units which would be deployed not
only perhaps in Germany but in other countries,
Benelux, Italy and elsewhere, and which would
considerably strengthen the deterrent effect of
our armed forces.
Then comes the delicate problem of the appli-
cability of the Brussels Treaty to reunified
Germany. This problem is obviously very
complex and the report alludes in a very precise
manner to the various questions that arise. I
believe it is very important for the Chair-
manship of the Council and the Assembly here
to expiess the wish that the German Gbvern-
ments give us their views on this matter asquickly as possible. Does Germany wish this
treaty to be applied and how can this be donejuridically?
I shall conclude, Mr. President, by saying that
the Liberal Group also thinks that the first pri-
ority is to strengthen European political union.Next, it is necessary to maintain and
Europeanise the Atlantic Alliance. By this, I
mean that when you speak of the diffrculty
today of modernising short-range nuclear
weapons in view of the evolution of the coun-
tries of Central Europe which will perhaps
tomorrow be our partners in the Council of
Europe, this evolution of attitude is, I believe,
necessary in the alliance. But at the same time apolitical Europe must keep nuclear deterrence.
That is why when one speaks of Europeanising
the Atlantic Alliance, I believe it is important,
and I have already said this in the Assembly in
Paris, that particularly France and the United
Kingdom together examine a European strategic
nuclear deterrence which would be at the
service, not of states, but of the European
political structure.
WEU must then be strengthened and the
Council of Europe opened to all states, which,
day after day, struggle increasingly for human
rights and democracy and finally, going further,
the whole should be concerted in the CSCE.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. De Decker.
The debate is adjourned until after the speech
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland
this afternoon.
10. Date, time and ordon of the doy
of the nen sining
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I propose
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting
this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following
orders of the day:
l. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for
Foreign Alfairs of Poland.
2. Establishment of a just, peaceful and
secure order in Europe prospects
stemming from developments in Central
and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on
the report of the Political Committee, Doc.
1216 and amendments).
3. A44ress by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and
secure order in Europe prospects
stemming from developments in Central
and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on
the report of the Political Committee, Doc.
1216 and amendments).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to speak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)
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1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland.
Replies by Mr. Skubiszewski to questions put Dy: Mr. Jung,
Mr. Baumel, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Rathbone,
Mr. Morris.
4. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe 
- 
prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on the draft
report of the Polilical Committee, Doc. l2l6 and amend-
ments).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr.
Klejdzinski, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Mar-
tino, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Pieralli,
Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Jung, Mr. Tummers.
1. Attendance rugister
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedings'.
2. Adoption of the minutes
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In
accordance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
3. Address by Mr. Skubisaewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The first
order of the day is the address by Mr.
Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Poland.
5. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Luxembourg.
6. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs of ltaly.
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Caro,
Mr. Jessel.
Reply by Mr. Vitalone to a question put by: Mr. Jessel.
7. Establishment ofa just, peaceful and secure order in Europe
- 
prospects stemming flrom developments in Central and
Eastern Etroop (Resumed debate on the report of the
Political Commiltee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, the Earl of Kinnoull, Mr. Fioret,
Mrs. Glumac-Levakov (Obsen'er from Yugoslavia), Mr.
Cetin (Obsemer from Turkey), Mr. Biacs (Obsener from
Hungary), Mr. Fassino, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr.
Pontillon (Rapporteur).
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
Minister, our Assembly is particularly happy
to receive a member of the Polish Government
for the first time. I welcome you on behalf of all
the representatives and beg you to come to the
rostrum.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Po land) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. President,
thank you for your kind words and friendly
welcome that I appreciate very much. With your
permission, I shall now speak in English.
(The speaker continued in English)
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an
honour for me to address this Assembly and its
distinguished members at the present extraor-
dinary session.
Western European Union plays an important
r6le in the political and security infrastructure of
our continent. Our goal today is to lay founda-
tions for a new system of European security. The
process of the unification of Germany made that
task particularly urgent, but we are faced by it
irrespective of the fall of the Berlin wall. What
was decisive was the political, economic and
social change in Central and Eastern Europe.
That change modified the political map of the
continent. The beginning was made by the Soli-
darity movement in Poland in 1980.
The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. wilh Mn Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
l. See page 13.
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In the task which lies ahead of us the
Assembly of Western European Union has a sig-
nificant function to fulfil. The Assembly facili-
tates the flow ofideas and exchange ofviews ori-
ented at finding a new constitutional framework
for European security. It is a goal Poland shares
with you, and we shall try our best to contribute
to its attainment.
My presence here is a sign of the disappearing
division of Europe. It testifies to mutual opening
and rapprochement between what formerly used
to be the separated parts of one and the same
continent.
Mr. President, I have referred to the changes
in Central and Eastern Europe. They have set
Europe in a dynamic motion. They have demon-
strated the influence that freedom and
democracy exercise on inter-state relations.
Politically, the modifications that have been
brought about have opened up a possibility for
rearranging the European system in accordance
with the aspirations of all the nations of the con-
tinent. Born ten years ago in Poland, the idea of
* Solidarity " fostered this process and added toit two essential values: first, the moral
dimension, and second, the emphasis on mode-
ration in reforms without detracting from their
fundamental nature. Our approach is that of
change in stability.
As a result, the traditional dichotomy of
East-West relations, not to speak of division, has
lost its validity.
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, old
structures usually outlive the circumstances that
have led to their creation. The traditional
security mechanisms and structures which have
been inherited from the past are clearly not ade-
quate to the challenges we face today. They are
not relevant to our aspirations and to the new
situation that arose in the heart of Europe. Yet
the old structures are still in existence. We all
want to move away from Yalta and are afraid to
come back to Sarajevo. Nonetheless, the legit-
imate fear of instability should not prevent us
from working out a concept of pan-European
relations. Our effort must be accompanied by
the necessity to preserve a stable framework for
transition. That way of thinking is part of Polish
foreign policy.
We do not reject the lessons of the past from
which we draw several conclusions. But we must
concentrate on the present and especially on the
future. In building up the new system ofsecurity
we must first base ourselves on the rule of inter-
national law. In particular, I would refer to the
following principles governing the relations of
states: prohibition of the threat or use of mil-
itary force; prohibition of intervention; set-
tlement of disputes by peaceful means alone;
equality before law and in the protection
afforded by law; self-determination of peoples,
including the right of a people to establish an
independent state; respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all;
integrity of state territory and inviolability of
frontiers.
The latter principle is particularly important
in the present transition in Europe. The unifi-
cation of the two German states can take place
only within their existing frontiers and it must
be linked to the corroboration, in treaty form, of
the German-Polish frontier. Such a treaty, which
should have the status and effect of a peace set-
tlement with Germany, will have as its purpose
the elimination of any questioning of the Oder-
Neisse frontier or any discussion on its revision
at the start of unified Germany and thereafter.
In the moment of German unification, which is
part of the process of unifying our continent,
European relations and especially Central
European relations at a vital geostrategic point
cannot and should not be burdened with a
frontier issue of that dimension. The final set-
tlement, arrived at now, lies in the interest of the
whole of Europe and is an imperative of
European statemanship.
Mr. President, from the Polish perspective,
the new security system should reflect the
concept of a single Europe and the values of
democracy, pluralism and humanism. We want
to close the chapter ofthe rule offorce, political
dictate and * limited sovereignty ", we wish to
overcome the syndrome of zones of influence
and to banish the concept of security as a " zero-
end " game.
The new system cannot, of course, limit itself
to a mere negation of what was, until recently,
wrong in Central and Eastern Europe. It should
give everybody such a sense of security and sta-
bility as to render every allianceJike security
arrangement no longer necessary.
The new system of European security will be
based on the elimination of the domination by a
state or states over another state or states. The
prohibition of the use of force is an obvious
element of the scheme. But we know all too well
that respect for state sovereignty and equality
does not automatically remove conflicts. The
future system should contain crisis-management
and confl ict-prevention mechanisms.
The function of all alliances, and especially
multilateral alliances, in Europe is another
problem. Their r6le is changing. The Warsaw
alliance, of which Poland is a member, has lostits ideological colour. It is no longer an
instrument of political satellitism. It remains an
agreement on collective self-defence in
accordance with Article 5l of the United
Nations Charter. In the process of building up
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European unity it will lose much of its signifi-
cance. It will be dissolved the moment an all-
European system of security becomes a reality.
As to the other multilateral alliances, we
believe that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation and Western European Union
fulfil a stabilising function.
The alliances continue to exist but their
nature is changing. Since their creation they
have been regarded as mutually opposed. From
our perspective we want them to lose that
nature. We wish them to acquire a non-
confrontational and co-operative character.
By remaining in the Warsaw alliance, Poland
does not pursue any ideological or political
objectives that could make it differ from the
ideas represented by the members of NATO and
Western European Union. We do not regard our
membership of the Warsaw treaty as an obstacle
to developing relations with the West. Sover-
eignty is the governing principle of our military
doctrine and its practical implementation. That
doctrine is not directed against any western
alliance, but against any aggressor whoever he
might be. In its history Poland knew aggressors,
and aggressions, coming from different geo-
graphical directions. Our membership in the
Warsaw alliance does not imply any
involvement in the global big-power rivalry.
The multilateral alliances should become
more transparent. They will thus emphasise that
they have no hostile intentions with regard to
each other.
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, disarm-
ament is the key element of the new security
order in Europe. To be effective it has to be
politically and conceptually in line with the
vision of a united Europe.
We focus our attention on the Vienna con-
ference and on the elaboration of a treaty on
conventional forces. While we already know
what the main elements of the treaty are, we still
have to ask the question whether the treaty can
meet everyone's expectations. That is a legit-
imate issue to raise as the treaty's concept was
designed long before the present developments
in Europe. My answer is that the on-going
changes should not delay the conclusion of the
treaty. The heart of the matter is deep and
stabilising cuts and that requires no modifi-
cation. Later on, there should be a follow-up and
a second stage of negotiations. In any case, we
press for the early conclusion of the treaty.
The treaty will not solve all the problems and,
therefore, one should make it flexible enough to
include additional affangements. In particular,
such arrangements may become necessary as a
result of the unification of Germany.
We should start thinking about the agenda
for Vienna II. It should bring deeper cuts, espe-
cially in all the sensitive areas of Europe.
Reductions of new weapons and equipment
should be considered. There is need for the
restructuring of armed forces and putting them
into a clearly defensive posture, and one should
further limit the offensive capabilities by
placing constraints on logistics and deployment
of forces. Vienna II should solve the problem of
the destabilising nature of new technologies
and the qualitative anns race. It should create
guarantees against rapid reconversion of the
industrial potential to military purposes and
mobilisation of resources for offensive pur-
poses. It should further develop the sufficiency
rule and deal with the problem of forces sta-
tioned on foreign territory. The next phase
should be based on a negotiated settlement in
which all states will act as fully sovereign and
independent participants.
The first agreement reached in Vienna will
provide, I hope, an impetus for other disarm-
ament efforts which would strengthen its
security-building effect. I am referring, first of
all, to the problem of tactical nuclear
weapons.
European security is also linked to the
presence of the two superpowers. The Soviet
rOle stems from its geopolitical position in
Europe. The United States' involvement has
proved to be of a stabilising nature and that r6le
may increase with the unification of Germany.
Eurasia, and consequently Europe, has always
constituted the central priority of the American-
Soviet contest. American-Soviet relations seem
now to evolve from contest to co-operation. This
may have, we hope and wish, its effect on
Europe in the sense of gradually decreasing the
intensity of the collision of the superpower
interests on our continent. That, in fact, should
be one of the main goals of establishing a new
system of security in Europe: we should all make
an effort to turn the presence of the two super-
powers in Europe into a factor that supports and
fosters European security, while at the same
time Europe should lose in importance as an
area of superpower rivalry. President
Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation
has many facets, one of them being related, I
think, to this aspect. The reduction of super-
power contest in Europe and the transition to
superpower co-operation is of primary impor-
tance for finding a solution to the most difficult
problem of German unification, which is the
political and military status of the unified
German state. That state must be fully inte-
grated into what now is called the new archi-
iecture of Europe. A segment of that archi-
tecture is the Council of European Co-operation
proposed by Poland.
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Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe
is now facing important decisions which will
shape its image for a long time to come. If
democracy is to be the cornerstone of European
relations, the preparation of decisions must be
based on democratic rules. Each state must have
a say in the discussion of matters of comr.oon
interest and of those concerning its particular
interests. Poland attaches great importance to
the CSCE summit to be held this year.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to repeat
my sincere thanks for the opportunity to address
the Assembly and to add my modest voice to
this important debate on the political strategy of
Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thankyou,
Minister. Would you agree to answer any ques-
tions that members of our Assembly may wish
to put?
(The Minister indicated his assent)
I call Mr. Jung to put the first question.
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). 
- 
I wish to
thank you for your speech and say how much we
appreciated hearing your views. I am a friend of
Poland, together with many others in this
chamber. I admire the example the Polish
people has given to the countries of the East.
If I may be frank, there is one problem,
however, of concern to me. I am very impressed
by the interest you attach to the treaties, to a
frontier. I wish to ask you whether you do not
believe that the evolution of the European Com-
munity for the joint defence of Europe is a much
greater guarantee than certain treaties for I had
the impression that in the last few weeks you
were somewhat reticent about German unifi-
cation which, since 1954, has been one of the
strong points in the formal undertakings of the
United States, the United Kingdom and France.
Personally, I have noted that, because of the
evolution in Europe, the Rhine frontier between
France and Germany almost no longer exists in
practice and I hope that developments in
Europe will also allow far less importance to be
grven to the frontier between Germany and
Poland and will be an additional guarant6e. Do
you not believe that that is the true direction in
which we must move and that we must all
remain attached to this development in
Europe?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for ForeignAlfairs of Poland)(Translation). 
- 
T[ank you for
yogr kild words about my country. Why is
Poland insisting on a treaty? It is because of con-
ventional arrangements reached, moreover,
without Poland's participation. It was the
Potsdam agreement concluded by the three great
powers that introduced the question of this
frontier as a peace settlement and therefore a
conventional settlement. Then there was the
treaty between the three western powers and
Federal Germany, the so-called " Deutschland
Vertrag" of 1952, amended in 1954, which
again reviewed the question of frontiers as a
peace settlement. It is specifically in Federal
Germany that it has always been emphasised
that the question was not finally solved before
the conclusion of a treaty. We are therefore
responding to these requirements.
For us, the frontier question does not exist. Itis a frontier established and recognised in
Europe and practically the whole world. But
since from time to time we are told that we must
take this additional legal step and conclude a
peace treaty or a peace settlement, we answer
that we are prepared to do so. I fully agree with
you that there are other far more stable and per-
manent guarantees and European integration is
one of them. I believe one does not exclude the
other, but at the start of unification we want this
problem of frontiers to be removed from the dis-
cussions between Poland and Germany, since
Poland wants the best possible relationship with
unified Germany. I personally am a firm sup.porter of a Polish-German community of
interests, but we must clear away this problem
which from time to time preoccupies public
opinion, although not so much in my country.
Those are the reasons for my position.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Baumel.
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). 
- 
Min-
ister, in your speech you said that the Warsaw
Pact had lost its ideological and political value.
Since, moreover, a number of countries have
asked for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
their territory 
- 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and,
in your country, Mr. Walesa 
- 
and consequently
the Warsaw Pact has lost much of its military
value, I wish to ask you what you think will be
the r6le of the Warsaw Pact tomorrow, in which
the USSR will have six other partners who will
no longer be communists in a few months'or a
few years' time. This is a problem of great
concern to us.
-Furthermore, at the last consultative meetingof the seven Warsaw Pact countries in Prague,
there were serious divergences and even major
opposition between the members of the alliance
over the status of the future Germany: some fol-
lowed the USSR in favour of a policy of
neutralisation, others, including your country,
did not agree with this formula. I therefore wish
to put a second question: what is your position
and that of your government towards reunited
Germany belonging to NATO?
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland) (Translation). 
- 
On the first
part of your question concerning the raison
d'gre of the Warsaw Pact, there is no doubt that
t)tfis pact is experiencing a crisis, but it still
/exists: there is the joint command of the armed
forces of this pact 
- 
with restricted responsibil-
ities, moreover 
- 
which has the task of planning.
You are right about political co-operation,
however. It is a problem to be solved and I do
not yet know the answer. We shall see in the
near future if this pact can be a platform for
political co-operation between the member
countries. In any case, so far it has provided a
platform for consultation and this was indeed
the sense and aim of the last meeting of min-
isters for foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact
member countries in Prague on lTth March. I
believe we had fruitful consultations and a good
exchange of views in Prague on the German
problem.
There were inevitably differences of opinion
at a time when the pact lost its intervention r6le,
its ideological r6le, its r6le in unifying the posi-
tions of the member countries, but in any case
these countries havejoint interests and so far 
- 
I
do not know what will happen tomorrow 
- 
the
pact offers a certain framework for this
co-operation. I do not wish to exaggerate the
importance of this framework for there are also
other contacts between these countries. Per-
sonally I believe the bilateral contacts between
Warsaw and Moscow are more important than
the arrangements we have concluded with
Moscow through this pact.
Now for your second question about Poland's
views on unified Germany belonging to NATO.
Like certain other countries of the Warsaw Pact,
Poland does not accept the idea of neutrality or
neutralisation for Germany. These two terms
are used although each one means something
else, but this is not important in our present
debate. We are against neutralisation because we
believe it contains dangers about the future
development of unified Germany. Since these
dangers are well known to this Assembly, there
is no need to speak further about them.
By rejecting neutrality, one automatically
accepts that this country may belong to an
alliance. For unified Germany, its membership
of NATO should, in my opinion, be accom-
panied by certain guarantees. I believe a balance
is necessary in Europe. Certain guarantees are
necessary since Eastern Germany is or will no
longer be an ally of the Soviet Union, which thus
loses the collaboration of Eastern Germany's
armed forces which were fairly sizeable until
quite recently.
We must find solutions to balance the situ-
ation. I feel there has not been sufficient intel-
lectual and political effort in this direction and
this problem must be studied. There has been
mention of the possibility of limiting NATO's
military presence in reunified Germany along
the line which is now the frontier between the
two Germanys. This is one solution, but I feel it
is inadequate. Mention has also been made of
the temporary presence of Soviet troops in
Eastern Germany; temporary presence may also
prove to be inadequate and in any case I believe
the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern
Germany could lead to complications after
reunification, and we wish to avoid all possible
complications. We therefore have to seek other
solutions.
Is it possible to disarm or demilitarise part of
the territory of Eastern Germany? This has to be
examined, but we also had the experience, after
the first world war, of the demilitarisation of the
left bank of the Rhine. This solution produced
no results. Personally, I am looking towards
more modest solutions, such as stationing, in
Eastern Germany, units, yet to be created, of a
German territorial army without offensive capa-
bility. Following the example of the Franco-
German brigade, thought may also be given to
creating such brigades on the eastern frontiers of
Germany: German-Polish brigade, German-
Czechoslovak brigade.
These are still vague ideas, but the most
important thing is to create a new security
system in Europe. That, I believe, is the
solution. It is my conviction, Mr. President, that
we are not doing enough to build this system. I
believe we Europeans are not up to the mark in
terms of ideas and from the intellectual point of
view at a time when events in Germany are
gathering speed and even going too quickly in
certain respects, but they are facts that have to
be accepted.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Jessel.
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). - Mr. Pre-
sident, could I please ask the Foreign Minister of
Poland if he minds if I ask him to enlarge still
further on this question of the Warsaw Pact and
security in Europe, because obviously the
purpose ofany pact is to protect the country or
countries concerned from domination or
invasion from any side and we are all very much
aware in this Assembly of Poland's history of
being invaded or dominated alternately from the
East and from the West. In fact, my country, the
United Kingdom, of course went to war on the
occasion of the invasion of Poland from the
West in 1939 and so could I ask him, as clearly
the Warsaw Pact might or might not protect
Poland from domination from the West, but
that is what it would be there for, could he
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foresee some system by which Poland could be
protected from domination or invasion either
from the East or from the West and can he
enlarge on how this might develop in the
future?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Alfairs of Poland). 
- 
Thank you for your contri-
bution. I do not think the question of domi-
nation over Poland is a problem for us today.
Fortunately enough, perhaps I am an optimist
by saying this, but we do not fear any domi-
nation from the West, even after unification of
Germany, because we believe Germany will be
integrated into the European system of various
organisations and arrangements and this is why
we insist on such involvement of unified
Germany. As to the East, we have now stabilised
our relations with the Soviet Union as relations
between sovereign states, and on the basis of
equality.
The phenomenon of " satellitism' which pre-
vailed so long in Polish-Soviet relations after the
second world war has now disappeared so domi-
nation is not our fear today. But perhaps I
should follow you and not concentrate myself on
today's problems. Is domination for us and also
for some other European countries a problem
for tomorrow or for the day after tomorrow?
That may be so. There is always the danger of a
revival of the imperialist idea and this is why we
all in this room and beyond it insist on the cre-
ation of a European security system.'Not alli-
ances but co-operation and integration are our
goal and our best guarantee. With your per-
mission, Mr. President, I would like to add that
Poland, in its long-term policy, is interested injoining the European Community, if that is pos-
sible. For the time being we are concentrating on
working out a treaty for our association with the
Community, but in the long run we think of
membership. Then I think our security will be
fully guaranteed.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Klejdzinski.
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. Minister, thank
you very much for the very constructive way in
which you have described the reunification of
Germany and its integration into the pact
systems. As a German, I must make this obser-
vation. May I just preface my question by saying
that when the war finished I was eleven years
old, that my mother comes from Allenstein, and
that for me the Oder-Neisse border is the per-
manent border. But at the same time I often
have the impression that in 1945 Poland was
shifted by a third to the West, and I would
advance reasons of history for this. If now
Poland's western frontier comes under dis-
cussion, is its eastern frontier not also indirectly
under discussion, or why is this not mentioned,
or are there special sensibilities there which
inhibit discussion?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Alfairs of Poland). (Translation). 
- 
Thank you. I
would say that these two border problems, the
western frontier and the eastern frontier, are
quite separate problems. You were right to say
that after the second world war the territory of
Poland was shifted to the West. That happened
as a result of the policies of the great powers.
That is a situation, a fact, which we accept. I
consider that the whole debate in recent months
about the German-Polish border has been
unnecessary, and has done much damage. But
for me this debate was not an opening of the dis-
cussion ofthe course ofour eastern frontier, i.e.
our frontier with the Soviet Union. This frontier
was altered after the second world war. In 1945
Poland ratified a treaty with the Soviet Union
concerning the line of this frontier, and all that
is now absolutely settled. And Poland is not
interested in a revision of its eastern frontier.
This frontier remains as it is, and so it should
remain. We want to have good relations with the
Soviet Union. We have no territorial problems
with the Soviet Union. We want to have good
relations with the nations that live together with
us along the eastern frontier. I am thinking of
the people of Lithuania, of the Byelorussian
nation, of the Ukraine. There is no problem of
the eastern frontier in Poland.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Rathbone.
Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom). 
- 
Mr.
President, like Mr. Jung, I speak as a friend of
Poland and welcome the Minister here. I believe
that we have heard a very important speech and
had a very important discussion in this
Assembly this afternoon. Could I extend further
the questions put by my colleagues, Mr. Baumel
and Mr. Jessel, and ask the Minister if he could
conject further as to how he sees the relationship
between the Warsaw Pact and Western
European Union and NATO developing and
whether he sees that as indicating a possibility of
drawing them both together in order to provide
mutual protection and security?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
t call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Poland). 
- 
Thank you for your friendly
words as to the relationship between the Warsaw
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Pact, on the one hand, and NATO and Western
European Union on the other. I would say that
relations now are practically non-existent. They
are at an initial stage and they should develop.Of course, much depends on the future
coherence of the Warsaw Pact because here you
may face an asymmetrical relation, so I am not
quite certain how these relationships will
develop. First steps were made with regard to
NATO. I, for one, paid a visit to the Secretary-
General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation yesterday in Brussels and, as you
know, this was not the first visit by the repre-
sentative of a country which belongs to the
Warsaw treaty.
Until now there were practically no relations
with Western European Union. Today, we tried
to take the first steps and this is why I am so
happy to be here and I repeat my thanks to you,
Mr. President, and to all the members of this
Assembly for the invitation. As to the nature or
countenance of the relationship, I would see
much room for co-operation in disarmament
matters, but not much room for creating a
security system in Europe. That system I think
should not be created by the existing alliances.
They make a stabilising contribution, that is
true, but the effort of creating a European
system should be made by all the European
states and this includes also countries which do
not belong to any alliances, but disarmament is
a good subject for discussion and activities
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Morris.
Mr. MORRIS (United Kingdom). 
- 
Minister, I
have a large and distinguished Polish com-
munity in Northampton and indeed a future
mayor or burgomaster of Northampton will be a
Pole. I think all of us here are aware that Soli-
darity was in many ways the catalyst for change
in Eastern and Central Europe and yet, as we
look at the news as it unfolds, we are aware that
Eastern Germany looks in a sense to be saved by
its integration with Western Germany, that
Czechoslovakia and Hungary look to be able to
stand on their own feet and one does wonder a
little bit about Poland, the catalyst for change
and yet probably the country that faces the
greatest economic problems. I therefore wonder
whether you would share with us your aspira-
tions of how you see Poland five years from
now, and particularly Poland within the context
of the whole of Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Minister.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Alfairs of Poland). 
- 
Probably you asked me the
most difficult question I heard today because it
requires the qualifications of a prophet whom I
am not. What will Poland be like five years from
now? Being an optimist, I think that in view of
our political development we will become, much
earlier than five years from now, a parlia-
mentary democracy. There are already strong
elements of such a political system in Poland
today.
Let me refer to the municipal elections which
will take place in Poland in a few weeks'time,
exactly on 27th May, elections which will be
totally free, open to all political groupings or
parties, however weak and however bizarre,
and have a look at the development in the
Polish Diet, the lower chamber of our par-
liament to which elections were held last year.
They were not fully free; only a certain per-
centage of seats was subject to free voting. The
majority was, in a sense, divided among
political groupings of the past communist
r6gime. And yet, there was an evolution in that
house, which was in favour of parliamentary
democracy. Much change was brought about in
a factual way, so I think within the next five
years there should not be much difference
between Poland and any other democratic
Western European country.
The economic problem which you raised is
much more difficult. We now have a radical pro-
gramme of reform. I shall not discuss the details
of it because we have not time for it, but during
the present year, I would say by June or July, we
will have the first proof of whether that pro-
gramme is, or was, a working froposition or not.
Already there are some positive signs such as
freeing prices, beginning a free-market economy,
abolishing monopolies, stabilising Polish cur-
rency, its internal convertibility, but there are
also negative facts such as a drop in production
by nationalised enterprises, various difficulties
in re-privatisation. Re-privatisation is always a
long process. The important fact in our eco-
nomic development is that the present budget of
the country is a balanced one. It is a budget
which does not include any deficit. This was a
very radical measure. That is why the pro-
gramme is very difficult for the population. How
long the population will be tolerant with us, that
is, the government, it is diffrcult to say, but until
now it was, and still is, because there is a general
feeling in the country that there is no other eco-
nomic road to be followed.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister, for answering so many questions so
clearly. To be quite frank, I was impressed by
your linguistic abilities as much as by your
political talent. Congratulations. I also thank
you for staying for the continuation of our
debate on the report by Mr. Pontillon.
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peaceful and serure order in Europe 
-
prospects stemming frum dcvelopments
in Central and fustern Eurup
(Raumed debate oa the ruport
of the Political Committee,
Doc. 1216 and anuadmcnts)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The debate
is resumed.
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). 
-I might start by saying 'follow that act ". That
was one of the most moving and stimulating
speeches I have heard in any Assembly for very
many years and we are most gfateful to you for
giving that facet which enables us to put into
context the Pontillon report. Secondly, I would
like to compliment Mr. Pontillon on his report.
I want to deal though with one issue in the
Pontillon report and that is the future of the
CSCE. It is at present a wholly undemocratic
organisation. It is unaccountable to anyone
other than ministers and it has no democratic
parliamentary oversight. There was a choice of
setting up a new permanent body which would
be welcomed by the civil services in every one of
the thirty-five countries. There will be ajockeying for the Secretary-Generalship, the
Deputy Secretary-Generalship and the 740 other
members of the staff, but that is not, I suggest,
what we, as democrats, want, and, I venture to
suggest, it is not what many of the foreign min-
isters want. The trouble with ministers 
- 
those
of us who have been ministers know this 
- 
is
that they are subjected to very strong advice
from the civil service and they occasionally have
to recognise that that advice may be slightly
slanted towards their interests, rather than to
anything else. In the matter of a career structure,
it is understandable, but I want to say here that I
believe that this parliamentary Assembly would
want to say to its ministers in all its countries
that that is not on. So, what is the choice, what is
the alternative? The alternative is quite a simple
one, in my view, provided we are prepared to
say we want it, and that we do not say, oh, there
are thirty-seven difficulties. Because there are
difficulties, but again I can remember that, whenI had one of the junior jobs in the 'right to
buy " legislation which we brought in in my
country in 1979, on at least two occasions civil
servants came to me and said: " Minister, we do
not think that can be done. " and I said: * I did
not ask you that, I asked you to say how it can be
done. " And they came back and said how it
could be done.
There are three baskets in the CSCE. The first
is human rights and there is no place better
suited for human rights than the Council of
Europe. All the other organisations talking about
it really do not have the practical experience or
the ability to do the job. We have the Court in
Strasbourg, we have the Commission in Stras-
bourg, we have the organisation in Strasbourg,
and we are European. So that is point one. Then
there is the economic basket, and here again I
believe that the probable basis for future use of
the economic basket is OECD, and I will tell you
why. Because OECD is subject to parliamentary
scrutiny and debate by the Council of Europe.
To those debates we invite Japan, America, Aus-
tralia and others, all of whom are interested
partners. So that is a possibility. Then there is
the third basket, security. Now I say at once that
there would be a need every two or three years
for the umbrella of the CSCE to have a con-
ference, but that does not mean the need for cre-
ating a permanent staff, one country can do it
and the cost can be shared amongst the others.
Perfectly simple for the conference, but the
security aspects, the defence aspects, which are
very important, can be covered by a form of
association with this organisation, WEU. We
were created to deal with what I would call at
this stage the European pillar of the alliance and
we now need to recognise that in the future we
have to find a way of associating the Soviet
Union, North America, Canada. They have to
feel they have a voice and a place in which they
can feel secure when they are seeing these issues
actually debated.
So that, Mr. President, is my proposal and I
believe it is one we have to recognise can be
taken forward if we have the will, but it is up to
us. We will not find it easy, as I have said, but I
think that if we can raise these issues in our own
parliaments, if we can talk to our own ministers,
I believe that at this stage, before the proposals
become set in concrete, it is possible.
Let me end by saying this. Again, colleagues
will know this, we have a system in the United
Kingdom called green papers, which are when
the government floats an idea without saying
what it necessarily approves. That is eventually
translated into a white paper, and once it is a
white paper it is very diflicult to change. Let us
treat this as the green paper stage, let us get the
message home and I believe we can satisfy those
in the East and the Soviet Union who are genu-
inely worrying about the future. It will help our
friends in countries like Poland, Hungary, etc.,
who want a place within an organisation where
they can feel at home and we can associate
America and Canada which are our natural
partners in this as well. That is what I believe we
need to do, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Klejdzinski.
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). 
- 
Ladies and gen-
tlemen, our colleague, Mr. Pontillon, has pre-
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sented a wide-ranging report on the creation of ajust and peaceful order in Europe, very accurate
and very detailed in its treatment of the subject.
He deserves thanks for it. The changes in the
GDR and in Eastern Europe, as radical as they
were unexpected, confront us with new ques-
tions. Questions about the organisation of our
security, questions about co-operation, in eco-
nomic matters as well, and here I should like to
refer in particular to the Cocom list and the
important question how we should support this
progress of democratisation without at the same
time adopting a patronising attitude.
The differing paths chosen by the two
Germanys after the end of the war have led
Germans living under different ideological
systems to have different views on many an
intellectual and moral standard. That has now to
be corrected. Yet we have remained one nation,
and are currently taking steps to regain our
identity, an identity which we wish to be
embedded in European unity. Certainly this is
not the time to make fundamental changes in
the system of alliances or the stationing of
troops which for forty years have guaranteed the
security of the West. But one thing is certain; the
alliances must rethink and make changes to the
confrontational and offensive elements in their
strategic doctrine and military options, in order
to serve the needs of all Europeans and of the
USSR for security. To this extent I fully share
the position of Polish Foreign Minister
Skubiszewski that the alliances must change in
such a way that confrontation is progressively
removed and co-operative forms of security
installed.
I have noted with great interest recommen-
dation ll (i) in the report, which states that one
of the main objectives of the aims established in
the WEU member countries in 1954 was to
welcome the reunification of the German people
in a unified political system. It is of course true
that all countries are affected by the creation of
a new state in the heart of Europe. We Germans
should consciously take note of that and make
strenuous efforts to take seriously the concern
felt by all countries in Europe. However, the
right of self-determination as a basic democratic
right must also apply to us. Only the people of
the Federal Republic and the GDR can decide
in free elections or an equivalent democratic
process, such as a referendum, whether a con-
federation or a more far-reaching union, such as
the unification of the two states, is an appro-
priate solution. The determination of our
national self-understanding must reflect contem-
porary political realities and must satisfy peo-
ple's current value judgments.
I do not regard the frontier question, Poland's
western border, as a subject for discussion. It is
one of the results of the second world war. In
speaking about Germany's eastern frontier the
Rapporteur made a very just and necessary
observation, found in paragraphs 63 and 69 (ii).
Anybody who discusses Poland's western
frontier, and I mentioned this earlier in my
question to the Polish Foreign Minister, should
be aware that he is implicitly talking about
Poland's eastern frontier, which affects the
essential security interests of the Soviet
Union.
I also share the view of the Belgian Foreign
Minister, Mr. Eyskens, who spoke on this
subject this morning. I also agree with him on
one point when he touched on the problems of
ethnic minorities in European countries. It is
not right for language and cultural independence
to be suppressed by administrative means - ajudgment which applies in Western European
countries as much as in Eastern European ones.
The creation of a lasting peaceful order in
Europe requires that all countries should be
included as equal partners. This peaceful order
must be a system which guarantees stability and
internationality.
I share the concern of those who take the view
that the geographical situation and the strength
of a German state make it undesirable for this
state to be neutral. All the same, the retention of
options, such as the current nuclear option, even
by individual members of WEU, does not make
it any easier to find positions which both take
account of the current security situation and
give hope of future progress. That too is a
reality. The continuance of military aid on the
conditions laid down in Section III.4 of The
Hague platform and the establishment of the
frontiers which are binding upon member states
for the future, in order to contribute to the
defence of Germany, are only of value if in the
event of the reuniting of the two German states
even on a federative basis the external frontiers
of those states are recognised. To that extent I
emphasise the recommendation of the
Rapporteur to the Council in part lll.2 (a).
Most public discussion revolves around the
Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. I believe
we should use WEU as an instrument, a nucleus,
for a new security order in Europe. We Euro-
peans must oryanise our security interests our-
selves, and it is appropriate for the armed forces
of member states to be stationed on the territory
of other member states, insofar as their presence
helps to strengthen the peaceful order. Transi-
tional treaty arrangements should be provided
for troops from the USSR, the United States and
Canada, and the stationing of troops under this
contractual solution should not be confined tojust one WEU country. Obviously nobody has
all the answers; there must be several possible
solutions. I do not know all the answers, but I do
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know that new challenges demand fresh
responses. We should give a joint European
answer, jointly formulated by equal partners.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Sir
Dudley Smith.
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). 
- 
Mr.
President, the discussion today and the admi-
rable report of Robert Pontillon which we have
been going into in the course of our examina-
tions of the overall position should be set in the
context of the last lap which we now have of a
very turbulent century. A century, which I think
we need to remind ourselves about, of two
vicious and devastating world wars, the rise and
the decline of fascism in that time, the earlier
birth of a creed which was the very antithesis of
all that we believe in in this Assembly, and
indeed, in the free Europe, where freedom and
the higher aspirations of man were banished. We
have seen the departure of all these in our time,
the death of the latter in the last twelve months
and, of course, the emergence of a united
Europe, a European Community which, despite
the fact that it is bureaucratic, falls far short of
what many of us would hope for. It is quite
extraordinary in the overall context of what has
happened in the course of the last century and
still gives us great hope as to what might be
achieved in the future.
Mr. President, in the helter-skelter of the last
twelve months I think there are three points
which arise for us, as members of Western
European Union.
First, there is the instability which has been
created in the course of the last six to twelve
months, not least, I would remind the Assembly,
in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union is a
system bf republics which at the moment is
undergoing enormous stress and trauma and
which, if it is not handled properly, both inter-
nally and with the right kind of advice from
outside, could cause the most enorrnous ructions
in due course. We all of us, of course, welcome
the departure of hard-line communism. We
express great relief at the fact that we now have
a situation where the nuclear threat has gone
right off the boil. But the Soviet Socialist
Republics remain in a state of flux and we need
to observe them very carefully indeed in the
immediate months ahead. In addition to that,
with all our new friends who are emerging from
Eastern Europe, one does remember that there
are perhaps some old scores still to be settled
going way back to the 1920s, or earlier at the
turn of the century. Or are there going to be
nationalistic moves in that direction in due
course? Could there be something upsetting the
apple-cart in that respect? I think it is entirely
possible and again we need to be on our guard in
that respect.
Second, and perhaps the most important
point which has been mentioned today and
which will be mentioned many times in the
immediate future, is the German question. I
support totally, as I suspect most of the peoplein Western European Union do, a united
Germany but a Germany which is not of course
isolationist. A Germany which is part of the
European Community, a Germany which is part
of NATO, and I say unequivocally, having been
in politics for the last twenty-eight years, that I
support Germany, I support and trust the
German people and I think it is very insulting
indeed to the German nation today, after all
their achievements in the last thirty or forty
years, to have so many questions raised about
their ultimate integrity, whether they might still
be expansionist in European terms and whether
or not they can be trusted. I trust them, Mr.
President, I think they have proved their case
after two great follies in the earlier part of this
century and I believe that it is very important
indeed that they should be a leading and most
impressive part of the European concept.
The third point that I want to make is that we
should in fact be absolutely sure that there is a
desperate need for a NATO and WEU
framework in the new situation. The Soviets of
course have to be reassured on the German
question and that hangs on what I was just
saying a moment ago, but I think that WEU and
NATO have to be pragmatic and far more
adaptable. As for the Council of Europe, which
is now well open to membership from many of
the Eastern and Central European countries, I
believe that WEU and NATO as well must
embrace many of those countries which have
passed the test and can join in, because we are
responsible, at the end of the day, for collective
security. We have a collective responsibility 
- 
all
for one and one for all, as the Polish Minister
indicated in the course of his most impressive
speech. I think that our theme, dur aim of the
future has to be peace without anxiety for the
next fifty years. After the next fifty years,
somebody else can take the strain of it.
( Sir Geolfrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I call Mr. Kittelmann.
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). I am extremely
grateful to the Rapporteur for his report and for
the conclusions he drew, with which I am in full
agreement. And I have listened with pleasure to
what was said both by the Chairman-in-Office of
the Council and by the Polish Foreign Minister,
because I observed that those speeches too
struck the same note, and it is one with which
we, the majority of politicians in Germany, can
agree.
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May I also, as a German member of par-
liament, say how pleased I am that last weekend
elections took place in the other part of
Germany with a vote for democracy, and the
current president was also present as an observer
for the Council of Europe. These elections were
a splendid demonstration of the maturity of a
population which was taking part in its first free
elections for fifty-two years. One would have to
be eighty years old in East Germany to have
taken part previously in a free election. At a
time when week after week each sensation is
swiftly followed by another, many people antici-
pated these elections with a certain fearfulness.
For might there not have been, as we have for
years been told, too many communists over
there, because they had been indoctrinated from
the cradle, at school and university?
This event has shown that such fears were
unfounded; instead, the power of freedom and
of human rights preserved carried the day - as
was also shown, as the Polish Foreign Minister
mentioned, by the power of Solidarity in Poland
and the events in Hungary and elsewhere. Per-
sonally I often feel that we are not always suffi-
ciently proud of the fact that in the last resort it
was our political will, the will of the western
democracies, that gave an example to the
oppressed peoples who after the war had the
miifortune to be the pawns in the partition of
East and West. We managed to offer them an
example of how democracy worked, and I think
that the results of this example are now being
seen in developments in Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and, I venture to say, even ifthe
Soviet Union is not yet ready to admit it, in that
country as well. We in Germany have followed
with interest the discussions about the Oder-
Neisse border, and it is essential to realise that
the great majority of all political parties in the
Federal German Republic have declared
unequivocally that the Oder-Neisse line should
be recognised. After the elections in the GDR
there is no longer any obstacle to the necessary
resolutions being passed in the German Bun-
destag and the Volkskammer as a declaration of
intent for a future all-German parliament. I
therefore appreciate the reticence the Polish
Foreign Minister has displayed on this question,
because I believe that recent events have been
artificially dramatised and made into issues.
Ladies and gentlemen, Germany does not
wish to be neutral. Neither people in the GDR
nor we in the West wish to be neutral. The vast
majority of Germans want to be integrated into
a united Europe and to belong to the NATO
alliance which for more than forty years has
ensured the freedom of Western Europe. NATO
has never been an offensive alliance - always a
defensive one. Therefore the discussion, also
found in this report, that it is desired that
Germany should not be neutral, is not an issue
with Germans. We Germans know where we
belong. I am also sure that if Germany is united
as we hope 
- 
the Christian Democrats and, as I
also believe, the Liberals - under Article 23, and
with all reservations we must work out in the
two plus four meetings, this will prove to be the
case. So I say deliberately that the policy ofthe
Federal German Republic in the last thirty years
was a personal task of sovereignty, in order to
advance a common Europe, and we want to con-
tinue this policy with you too, together in a
united Europe.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
I call Mr. Martino.
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation).
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should
like to begin by repeating my approval previ-
ously expressed elsewhere and to urge the
Assembly to recognise unanimously Mr.
Pontillon's thorough, intelligent contribution.
Thank you, Mr. Pontillon.
Mr. President, the peoples really seem to be
moving well ahead of their institutions. Their
political leaders involved in this work have not
only swept away the legendary Berlin wall but
are also creating problems for all the contractual
structures which, after being laboriously put
together for the sake of protecting peace and
security, at the cost of painful sacrifices and lim-
itations affecting sovereignty and independence,
now have to be rethought and restructured in
response to the historic changes of our century.
This is perhaps a Copernican revolution on a
world scale which has already recognised the
changes, the developments and, in some cases,
the disappearance of strategic defence systems,
closer to and further from our countries, systems
which have covered vast areas, sectors and zones
of the world 
- 
including ANZUS, CENTO,
SEATO and NATO itself. Everything has been
or is now being severely tested and we may
perhaps have to create new dimensions and
restructure in various ways to meet the new cir-
cumstances which the future and our peoples
really demand.
WEU is perhaps the institution most closely
involved in the future of security and defence.
Even some of its weaknesses, stemming from
lack of institutions, unclear aims, some
vagueness and its gradual growth, may fit it
better to deal with the demands of European
and world events. Mr. Pontillon's report is defi-
nitely a milestone on the road to be followed
towards the goals of peace and security. As we
know, problems regarding peace and security are
emerging first in Germany but may possibly
extend later to the countries of Eastern Europe
and to some countries which from time to time
and almost from day to day are urging their right
to be included in WEU's security Europe. This
is one of the directions WEU should set for itself
and consider from all angles, without forgetting
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that its own expansion, by the inclusion of Spain
and Portugal, with Greece and Turkey still
waiting in the wings, already sets out in the
clearest terms the problems of peace, security
andjustice, in the countries ofsouthern Europe,
to the south of the WEU countries, which are
already involved in the Mediterranean problem.
Yugoslavia may also have realised this and be
conscious therefore of a future fraught with
questions to which we must give firm answerc
on the basis of what has seemed to be estab-
lished fact up till now. Irt us today approve Mr.
Pontillon's report and the associated recommen-
dations which form a serious and reasonable
proposal for hard political work, involving
duties and sacrifices of responsibility which, we
all realise, we must curb and check the legit-
imate enthusiasm and pressing expectations.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
The next speaker is Sir
Russell Johnston.
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). 
-I would first also add my congratulations to
Mr. Pontillon for an excellent report which pre
vides an admirable frame within which to
conduct this wide-ranging debate. Five minutes
only gives really very little time for the shortest
comments, and I would wish to make four, from
my British liberal and, I hope, European liberal
standpoint.
First, even if the current negotiations between
East and West are wholly successful, and things
look good, we will still be left with the need to
have some peaceful means of resolving border
and minority disputes. Mr. Pontillon quotes
Mr. Genscher's speech of 3lst January on an
agenda for the CSCE conference which will
finalise things and I recommend this. Mr.
Genscher, at point 2, refers to a European insti-
tution to guarantee human rights and, at point
10, a European centre for settling conflicts.
Iooking at events in Transylvania with horror,
at events in Albania, in Yugoslavia and poten-
tially in Czechoslovakia, I have no doubt that we
will need some kind of court, like the existing
court in Strasbourg which deals with individual
human rights, to deal with communal rights,
language, culture, education, employment, rep-
resentation rights, and this in turn will require
the backing of an integrated European security
force, as the Polish Foreign Minister said, in the
formation of which I am sure WEU will have a
very important part, and that will have internal
as well as external responsibilities.
Second, on the reunification of Germany, as
my friend Armand De Decker has already said,
liberals have not been troubled by reservations
or doubts about this. The Federal Republic has
an impeccably democratic record since its
inception and now sets an example in many
fields to countries, even such as my own. The
DDR election was well-conducted. The idea of a
neutral Germany in my idea is old-fashioned
nonsense. The other side of nationalism of
which I spoke a moment ago, to which President
Goerens also referred, is the development of a
European identity, which I think in less than two
generations would dramatically reduce the sig-
nificance of nationalism in decision-making in
Europe. The secalled German problem, the
French problem, the British problem, will wither
away and what Mr. Ahrens says, to take Karl
Ahrens as an example, will relate much more to
his being a socialist than to his being a German
and what Iouis Jung, who was just a moment
ago sitting beside me, says will relate less to him
being French than to him being a christian dem-
ocrat.
It is in this connection, and this is my.third
point, that I lend the strongest support to
Mr. Eyskens, the Foreign Minister of Belgium,
in pressing strongly, as indeed has President
Mitterrand, for much more vigour and urgencyin pushing forward economic and monetary
union in the European Community. In my
opinion, the $eatest assurance of a just,
peaceful and secure order in Europe is an inte-
grated and united European Community with
which the countries of the Council of Europe
will develop a steady relationship and will
provide a root which will give an opportunity
for Eastern European countries to become easy
in relations with Western European countries to
which they were once opposed.
My fourth and last point is that this very
much includes the Soviet Union itself. I believe
that western countries must recognise that the
logic that has led them to give help to Poland
and Hungary and the DDR and the others must
lead us in turn to help the USSR itself, not in the
triumphalist way, but to make a contribution to
Mr. Gorbachev for creating the circumstances
which relieve us more and more of the need to
defend ourselves against him. At the time of the
French revolution, Wordsworth wrote: * Bliss
was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young
was very heaven. " 57 is still young enough,Mr. President, to feel the uplift and the
excitement and the hope of these events. I feel
honoured to have been enabled to make even a
small contribution to this debate.
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Stegagnini.
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). 
-Mr. President, I too wish to congratulate Mr.
Pontillon most warmly for his major report,
introduced by a look at the history of our
organisation,'the events which led up to its cre-
ation and its past and possible future r6le.
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I should like to link Mr. Pontillon's report,
and specifically the third paragraph of the rec-
ommendation, with the most excellent speech
made by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs
a short time ago. He urged us to go ahead and to
take a more imaginative and understanding
view of the likely future of peace in Europe,
based on collaboration and understanding, and,
in particular, to make a new contribution to the
problem of German reunification.
To start with the third point of the recommen-
dation, Mr. Pontillon urges that the modified
Brussels Treaty be used as the legal basis for the
stationing of member states' forces on the ter-
ritory of other member states, thus helping to
strengthen peace in Europe. In other words, Mr.
Pontillon suggests that WEU might have forces
capable of operating within the boundaries of
the countries of our union in order to reinforce
peace and enhance collaboration.
Following ori from this important idea, I won-
dered whether it might not be possible to
combine it with the request made by the Polish
Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the possi-
bility of stationing various forces on the ter-
ritory of the present GDR in order to ensure a
stable presence, perhaps a more European
presence, and not simply a separate presence of
NATO or the Federal Republic of Germany
alone. Some experts, and I believe the Secretary-
General, think it might be possible to form
European units to strengthen the European
pillar of the alliance, as has been requested not
only by the Americans but also, for example, by
the French Defence Minister, Mr. Chevd-
nement. Clearly, therefore, if a European force
were available under WEU auspices, it could be
stationed in the GDR, thus resolving the many
problems which the absence of NATO forces or
forces of other European countries would pose
by guaranteeing the sovereignty of the GDR, the
Atlantic Alliance and the western countries.
I think that this idea goes some way to meet
the request made a short time ago, looking to the
possibility that units from Czechoslovakia,
Germany and other European countries might
be stationed together with the existing Soviet
forces in the GDR. As regards the other pro-
posals in the recommendation, I am very
pleased that Mr. Pontillon recalls the proposal in
paragraph 7 of part III that WEU should
commit itself to looking into the possibility of
setting up a European satellite agency for arms
control, observation and verification of disarm-
ament. We shall undoubtedly be giving a great
deal more consideration to these points in Rome
next week and here again I feel that we must
congratulate Mr. Pontillon on this initiative
which he proposes should become a major
feature of WEU's work in the coming months.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Pieralli.
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish to
congratulate Mr. Pontillon for his excellent
report. The very few amendments my colleague,
Mr. Benassi, and I myself have tabled must be
considered as being additional and supple-
mentary to a draft recommendation for which I
have already voted in the Political Committee.
Central to future arrangements in Europe is
the way in which the reunification of Germany
will be achieved. The elections in the German
Democratic Republic last Sunday with the
victory of the 
.christian democratic coalition
were an unequivocal sign of the wish of the
people to proieed as swiftly as possible with the
process of reunification. I would add that I con-
sider it extraordinary and positive that in a
country emerging from more than forty years of
so-called true socialism the left-wing parties
obtained about 400/o of the vote. That in itself is
an expression of a need for social protection as
the unknown consequences of the introduction
of a market economy draw close. This concerns
both the policy to be decided upon by the gov-
ernments of Germany and the decisions of the
European Community concerning the single
market and the formation of the European
union.
The acceleration of German reunification
does not diminish, on the contrary, it increases
the political requirement for the necessary con-
tractual guarantees to ensure that the reunifi-
cation of Germany will not be a subject of
anxiety for any other European nation. We
Italian communists have listed the necessary
national guarantees in four points. First, final
recognition in a peace treaty or in another doc-
ument of equal value of the frontiers endorsed
by the Helsinki agreements. Straightaway after-
wards, the economic and political integration of
a united Germany in the European Community
and European union. Third, the establishment
of the German armed forces in a purely
defensive posture, totally excluding nuclear
weapons in the framework of the progressive
demilitarisation of intra-European relations.
Finally, the collocation of Germany in a single,joint security system for the whole of Europe
offering equal guarantees to all its states. The
shape of the all-European security system will be
the result of a gladual process but at its con-
clusion Germany will be neither neutral nor
member of NATO.
All that will obviously take time and transi-
tional solutions must be found immediately to
avoid any destabilisation of existing balances.
This excludes the neutralisation of Germany
and the movement of NATO frontiers towards
the East.
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In the future, the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe may become a per-
manent institution with a parliamentary
assembly and be developed to the point where
pres€nt military alliances are absorbed in the
new all-European security system with thefull participation of the United States and
Canada.
For the time being, 1990, like 1989, must be
unforgettable for the signing of American-
Soviet-European agreements, for the reduction
of all kinds of conventional and nuclear arrna-
ments, for banning the production of chemical
weapons and for opening new negotiations on
short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
WEU can play an extraordinary rOle of pro-
motion and political initiative to ensure a new,
peaceful and secure order in Europe as set out in
the report by Mr. Pontillon.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Baumel.
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation).
Mr. President, at this extraordinary session we
are holding in Luxembourg, we must first ask
ourselves one thing. Does this session, with its
wealth of Mr. Eyskens's very remarkable speech
this morning, the speech by the Polish Minister
for Foreign Affairs and the excellent report by
Mr. Pontillon, truly respond to the extraor-
dinary and historical nature of the situation in
Europe today? Do we feel we are offering an
appropriate answer to this immense upheaval all
round us? I do not think so and I must say that
all that leaves us a little unsatisfied.
Admittedly, WEU has a long-standing tra-
dition of modesty in its policy and in its deci-
sions. It is unfortunately a too well-known phe-
nomenon that WEU in the past has not been
able to build this European security pillar
everyone talks about but for which very few
make an effort. Shall we continue in this vein at
a time when absolutely everything around us
gives WEU greater responsibility? I find it
striking to note the fundamental contradiction
between the main lines of Mr. Pontillon's report
which defines the responsibilities, obligations
and aims of WEU and, in conclusion, offers very
few specific proposals. I must say, however, that
he is in no way responsible for that. He presents
and ponders over the situation facing us.
Since I do not wish to speak at too great
length, I shall address myself to the Secretary-
General, Mr. van Eekelen, whose considerable
ability and personal values we all know so well.
We must try to find a few solutions and first and
foremost to give this Assembly the feeling that it
is not powerless. We are to vote on a report, our
umpteenth, and it will probably end up in the
same way as the others, in our respective
drawers. It will be received politely by the
Council of Ministers, it will meet with glacial
silence in the international press and will come
to nought. I must say that we must really have a
very sad view of ourselves.
Second, there has always been talk of
Europeanising western defence and this is very
necessary at a time when, one way or another,
the indispensable American presence will be
weakened. What are we proposing? Very appro-
priately, Mr. Pontillon speaks of various pos-
sible solutions. The follow-up of the platform of
The Hague. What has become of the Rome dec-
laration? What have we done since? Words,
words, words. Admittedly, an institute has been
created. A research institute which will be
extremely useful, particularly since it will be
directed by a very respectable person. Agreed,
we are making proposals for a space agency, for
using satellites, but we are advancing desper-
ately slowly in a world being stirred up by an
earthquake.
I therefore wish to make you concentrate on
the responsibilities that can be given to WEU. It
is the only European defence organisation. It
offers a possibility for Europeans to assume
their responsibilities in the framework of the
alliance with greater strength and authority in
matters that concern them directly.
I ask Mr. van Eekelen to make a real effort to
improve our Assembly's relations with the
Council of Ministers and with the administra-
tions. A great deal must be done to inform
public opinion. Our words are lost in the desert,
no one listens to us although we perhaps
obtained reactions from a few political or geo-
political experts or advisers and that is all. Evenin our parliaments we obtain no serious
response to our proposals or recommendations.
I believe the situation is serious enough for us to
examine what should be done.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Wilkinson.
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). 
- 
Mr.
President, to his credit, Mr. Pontillon has
created a magnum opus. A work in which there
are scores of potential texts for a speech. We
have had a timely debate, illumined by a most
distinguished contribution by His Excellency,
the Polish Foreign Minister. With him and his
people, we share the common goal of laying the
basis for European security.
In that regard, WEU is a critically important
forum, in which we can concert, among the West
European democracies, a common position. I
am not myself, in my brief remarks, going to dig
myself deep in the quicksands of political con-jecture and futurology. I shall stick to the firm
ground of established principle. That firm
ground was well-enunciated in the platform at
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The Hague in 1987. Defence of the borders,
mutual security, and, of course, the criteria for
enlargement were all laid down on that
occaslon.
I took heart, in particular, at the sanguine
comments of the Polish Foreign Minister
towards the possibility of his country and others
developing fruitful relations with wEU. We are
a free association of democratic states, bound
together by common values. Spain and Portugal
in recent days have set a precedent towards
which I at least hope that genuine democracies
in Central Europe can aspire. I hope, Mr. Pres-
ident, that Germany will achieve unification by
implementation of Article 23 of the Federal
Republic's constitution, whereby reconstituted
L6nder can accede physically to the Federal
German Republic and, of course, to the concom-
itant alliances and treaty agreements of the
Federal Republic such as the European Com-
munity, NATO and WEU.
Our clear goal in this organisation must be to
provide the concerted diplomatic impetus to
secure the total withdrawal of all Soviet troops
from what is now the German Democratic
Republic and, thereafter, not just from German
soil, but from all other European nations which
have expressed such a wish through their
democratically-elected governments.
At this time, Sir, when the desire for freedom
of the brave Lithuanian people is on our minds
and on our consciences, I believe that we should
boldly reiterate that self-determination should
not end at the Oder-Neisse line nor the frontiers
of the Soviet Union. Any security gains which
we may achieve through such Soviet disen-
gagement will of course have to be matched by
willingness to reciprocate on our part and will-
ingness to accommodate to the Soviet Union's
own security considerations. This may in the
process somewhat marginalise United States
forces geographically, though not politically, in
Europe and may necessitate imaginative redis-
tributions of troops on our part. If so, well and
good. WEU has a critical r6le to play in this
process. Let us rise to the challenge and make
our organisation work. Thank you, Sir.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
Mr. Jung.
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, ladies and gentlemen, [ first wish to con-
gratulate the Rapporteur, who !4s made an
extraordinary effort at a very difficult time. I
agree with Mr. Baumel that we must well realise
that we are living in historical times and we
must draw every possible conclusion while the
whole of Europe is still in the process of change.
I believe this report is of very great value and we
must congratulate him on it.
I personally believe that we should have no
illusions. From what I hear I sometimes fear
that people believe the problems are solved
when this is not at all the case. I am convinced
that part of Europe is now on the move and no
one can say what will be the situation tomorrow.
We have a formal obligation and this is WEU's
great responsibility. We must increase co--
operation. We must make an even gf,eater effort
than before because the problems exist but are
different. The whole strategic posture must be
reviewed. There are problems and threats
outside our continent and when I turn my gaze
south and in other directions, I see the full
extent of our obligations.
In my view, the reunification of Germany is
something extraordinary. This is something we
have been shouting for for years. We must not
consider this as a problem, since I believe it is
something natural, normal. Above all, however,
in terms of military co-operation, we have a very
great responsibility in the framework of WEU to
co-operate in the teeth of all threats which may
arise and, in particular, to guarantee the future
because, with the changes in Europe and the
problems we can discern in the south and
certain other directions, in the east, for instance,
I must emphasise that here we have responsi-
bility. It is my wish that everyone and particu-
larly our ministers should be well aware that
co-operation must be increased and not the con-
ttary.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Tummers.
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation).
- 
I congratulate Mr. Pontillon on the tenor of
his report. The most important part of this
report begins with Chapter IV, * Towards a new
European order". But I feel the review that pre-
cedes it should have included a section clearly
indicating the two strategies under which the
efforts to achieve peace and security after the
second world war took shape and the rela-
tionship between these two strategies.
In chronological order there was Western
European Union, which from the outset sought
to focus on the problem of the possible threats to
peace and security posed by disastrous socio-
economic conditions. The parties to the treaty
were also rightly intent on preventing a revival
of militarism in any form. The section of the
alliance treaties which concerned the principle
of " anyone who attacks one of us will face us
all " was included in the Brussels Treaty and
given a wider social base, because it was realised
that one of the factors that had led to the out-
break of war was the economic and cultural
crisis of the 1930s.
The second instrument is NATO. This
organisation took the view that security must be
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achieved through deterrence. Deterrence is
bound to mean the renewal of the deterrent
weapon and the production of new deterrent
weapons. Othenrise it is impossible to maintain
this deterrence. This again gives rise to the
concept of the arms race, resulting in imbalance
of the burdens and investments in the various
national budgets, which, of course, cover more
than just military expenditure.
The two treaties, which basically pursue the
same objective, have become opposites. The
burden of maintaining the strategy of deterrence
affected the balanced structure of social provi-
sions. In a structure of social provisions as
referred to in the founding text of Western
European Union, there is no place for the cre-
ation and presenation of a concept of an enemy
or, therefore, for arms production which is
geared to deterrence and so stimulates the arms
race. In this mutual relationship between the
two treaties, there was a need for change when
the socio-economic and cultural spheres, for
example, were transferred to the Council of
Europe. The eroded WEU could then be slowly
but surely NATO-ised, WEU as a pillar in itself
in the fagade of the old North Atlantic order.
I have not unfortunately come across this
image in the outline of the new peaceful and
secure order in Europe. Unfortunately. Why
unfortunately? Because knowledge of this
package is one of the vital premises for going
down the road 'towards a new European
order ". Is what we are experiencing now not
very similar to the situation that inipired the
establishment of Western European Union?
What is more, if there was a threat that justified
a strategy of deterrence, it has now diminished
to such an extent that we can go right back to the
concept of the original Western European
Union, though brought up to date, of course.
The members of the delegation from the
Supreme Soviet that visited our Assembly last
summer showed that they had a far more
accurate picture of the difference between
NATO and Western European Union than quite
a few of the WEU parliamentarians who had
discussions with them on that occasion. I am
therefore surprised that a Russian source
recently hinted that the Soviet Union's political
leaders are seriously thinking of joining NATO
as a means of overcoming the old structures of
the military power blocs. This settlement is
undoubtedly an example of clear progress dia-
lectics, but it also indicates that, wiih Soviet
guests in our midst, we are just in time with this
discussion on the best way to develop peace and
security in Europe as a whole, againit-the back-
ground, of course, of the ideas set out in the
original Western European Union treaties.
I hope, Mr. President, that the Institute for
Security Studies has the financial and mental
capacity to reconsider and update these original
WEU ideas and to offer them for the implemen-
tation of a new policy of peace and security.
Chapter lY (b) of Mr. Pontillon's report is
entitled " The European economic area'.
Would it not have been better if the Rapporteur
had not confined himself to economic matters
but also considered the relationship between
Western European Union and the Council of
Europe with respect to the tasks which were
once transferred from Western European Union
to the Council of Europe? Has anyone ever
checked to see whether the Council of Europe
has performed these tasks once in a while in a
way that actively promotes peace and security? I
say this, Mr. President, because I hope this
speech will be taken into account if there is a
" re+xamination of its founding text'. What is
Egre, I hope the Rapporteur will help to bring
this about.
Paragraph 135 says various things about veri-
fication. As I see it, there is more to verify thanjust arms reductions. The way to a new peaceful
order is not just via an arsenal through the
market and via the economy and the EEC house
of twelve. No, this way surely leads to the
common house, and that is a complete house,
not a bunker with a letter-box for the EEC and
an alarm system for NATO. Because of the time-
limit, Mr. President, that is all I will say. But I
expect what I have said makes it sufficiently
clear what I think of other parts of the report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The debate
is adjourned.
5, Address by Mn Poos,
Minister for Forcigt Affain of Lurembourg
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the address by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
Minister, may I remind you that we recall
with pleasure your Chairmanship-in-Office of
the Council and I wish to take this opportunity
to extend our thanks to your collaborators, Mr.
Castle, Political Director, and our former col-
league, Mr. Linster.
I now invite Mr. Poos to come to the rostrum
and address the Assembly.
_ 
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. Piesideni
ladies and gentlemen, what an upheaval since
June 1987, when I last spoke to your
Assembly!
Events in recent months have profoundly
changed the political landscape of Central and
Eastern Europe and shaken the order that
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characterised post-war Europe. Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and
Romania are striving to lay the moral, political
and economic foundations of a new state
structure.
In all the countries I have just mentioned,
foreign policy matters, and even more so
external security matters, have been overtaken
by internal economic problems.
Indeed, in defence questions, the new leaders
are often content to call for disarmament or
even demilitarisation. They are insisting on the
withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory
and cutting their defence budgets.
The military alliances which are a feature of
post-war history, sometimes even outside
Europe, are of no great interest to them. They
often see them merely as obstacles to demo-
cratisation and the restoration of their sover-
eignty.
Conversely, the Soviet Union, which domi-
nated the eastern part of Europe in the last forty
years, is far more cautious. As a great power, it
fears the possible destabilising effects of a rapid
disintegSation of the politico-military structures
of its sphere of influence in Europe.
These fears of instability are also to be found
among most of the western actors. Fourteen
Western European countries have managed to
guarantee their security thanks to the alliance
witn tne United States and Canada, to which
they are still linked by common values and fun-
damental convictions. However, in Western
Europe there is optimism because of the disap-
pearance of the political and human barriers
which they have steadfastly striven to remove
and because of the prospects of co-operation at
every economic and social level. Nevertheless,
all the allies wish this new quality of life in
Europe to be guaranteed by satisfactory political
and strategic stability.
What r6le can Western European Union play
in this context?
Before trying to offer a brief answer to this
question, it is perhaps useful to glance back-
wards and see what WEU has accomplished
since it was revitalised, or relaunched, and what
is its present situation.
On its accomplishments, I will confine myselfto quoting four: the platform of security
interests, action in the Persian Gulf,
enlargement to include the Iberian peninsula
and the creation of an Institute for Security
Studies.
I speak with particular pleasure of the
platform adopted in The Hague in autumn 1988
because it was under Luxembourg chairmanship
that most of the preparatory work was carried
out. Some of you will perhaps recall the twelve
points summing up the fundamental security
interests of Europeans that I had the privilege of
describing to you in Paris in June 1987.
In any event, this platform started the defi-
nition of a European security identity. It is not
at all surprising that key elements of the
platform were taken up in NATO documents
and statements such as the global concept. It
thus served to bring viewpoints closer together
and to consolidate links between the Atlantic
partners. This is certainly not negligible.
However, the evolution we have just witnessed
has already made it necessary to revise certain
aspects of the charter. It will therefore have to be
reshaped.
The joint action in the Persian Gulf initiated
by the Netherlands chairmanship proved that
WEU can be of very great operational value,
particularly in areas where the Atlantic Alliance
cannot be active. This action helped to tone
down many doubts about the reasons for our
organisation's existence.
The enlargement of the organisation to
include Portugal and Spain, which, like you,
Luxembourg wanted to be completed as soon as
possible, has now been achieved in spite of hesi-
tations in most member states. Because of the
strategic importance of the Mediterranean
region, the presence of these two partners and
allies is essential to the credibility of the
organisation.
These achievements and accomplishments
must not, however, conceal another reality: the
European Community will be able to lead to a
real European union only if it takes account of
the security dimension. However, until such
time as the Community reaches this future goal
- 
and provided it is the wish of all its members -
WEU has a valuable, even irreplaceable, r6le to
play.
It is WEU which, in the immediate future, can
provide Europeans with a framework for con-
certing their approach to the most delicate
problems and those which are the most urgent
for their security, and it is for WEU to seek that
European consensus which must subsequently
become an integral part of an Atlantic con-
sensus.
The Twelve now have an adequate framework
for conducting a regular political dialogue with
the United States. This is due in particular to
recent initiatives by the Irish Prime Minister,
Mr. Haughey.
Furthermore, the Commission has close rela-
tions with the great transatlantic partner in trade
and industrial policy.
There remains the security dimension: would
it upset the harmonious operation of NATO to
propose to our WEU partners, and to our
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American ally, that the traditional dinner for
four held prior to ministerial meetings of the
Council of the alliance be enlarged to include all
the members of our organisation? Now that we
have to go beyond the question of burden-
sharing in the alliance and address that of the
future r6le to be assumed by the European and
transatlantic allies, I believe such a dialogue
structure is desirable.
Conversely, retaining a four-power dialogue, a
legacy of the cold war, is no longer justified. It
might, on the contrary, undermine the cohesion
of the Atlantic Alliance and the spirit of defence
of the other members and could have repercus-
sions on Atlantic solidarity.
So much for the immediate future.
Since WEU is a fairly flexible structure, it will
have to give tangible form to its potential and
inherent forces. The fact that it has always been
far more political than military may serve it well
in the future tasks that seem to be becoming pri-
marily political in the situation today.
If WEU really wishes, eventually, to play this
r6le in the organisation of Europe's security, it
will not be able to confine itself to following and
commenting on events but will have, on the con-
trary, to take the initiative, push ahead and lead
the way.
In this context, I have proposed to the Belgian
chairmanship and to our Secretary-General that
they try to keep a watch on the new governments
stemming from the elections which have been or
are to be held in the next few weeks in Central
and Eastern Europe.
In the past, your Assembly has unceasingly
urged the Council to do its utmost to increase
WEU's r6le and to make it a choice instrument
for our security. It has never failed to support
the executive in all its efforts in this sense.
In fact, it is not here, before you, honourable
parliamentarians, that I have to affirm that it is
now or never that WEU will have to justify its
existence.
Mr. President, as I come to the conclusion of
this brief address, allow me to convey to you all
our appreciation for the exemplary manner in
which you have carried out your tasks at the
head of the Assembly.
Far more than the Council, very timorous
moreover when it has to show itself on the
political stage, the Assembly has, through your
action during your mandate, reminded our
former adversaries of the existence of WEU and
its legitimate interest in the security of Euro-
peans.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister. Allow me to return the compliments
you just made to me and all members of the
Assembly and of the Oflice of the Clerk who
have assisted me most efficiently in the accom-
plishment of my duties. Thank you, too, for
your words of encouragement and thoughts with
which you have just enriched our debates. I
hope the Council will draw inspiration from
these new thoughts you have just developed in
this Assembly. Thank you again.
6. Address by Mr. Yitalone,
Minister of State for Foreign Affain of Italy
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the address by Mr. Vitalone,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of ltaly.
I now call Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs of ltaly.
Mr. VITALONE (Minister of State for Foreign
Alfairs of ltaly) (Translation). 
- Mr. President,
the extraordinary times through which we are
passing make meetings such as this essential in
order to reach a common mind on how we are to
respond to the great changes taking place contin-
uously before our eyes.
This session of WEU is all the more signif-
icant because it is taking place immediately after
the elections in the German Democratic
Republic, which constitute not only a decisive
step along the road to the unification of the two
Germanys, but also a clear indication that reuni-
fication, if it is to satisfy aspirations too long
stifled, must come about more quickly than we
had anticipated.
It is useful to recall here that WEU came into
being partly in order to involve a divided
Germany in the heart of Europe in the western
security system. And membership of WEU was
one of the most important steps in the entry of
the Federal Republic into the network of soli-
darity that was formed shortly after the second
world war. The reunion of the two Germanys is
bound to enhance the influence of Western
Europe and its institutions, which already hold
an important place in international life.
Today we are witnessing what amounts to the
end ofa conflict, even ifvictory has gone not to
a military group but to a system of values, of
rules for governing the economy and society, of
which the members of WEU form the most
homogeneous group, a fact which places special
responsibilities upon them. The cold war has
ended, as an ideological confrontation, as an
armed peace between two systems in strategic
balance. The threat which for more than forty
years weakened the web of international rela-
tions is receding, with the prospect of drastic
reductions in conventional arms in Europe; the
superiority of the Warsaw Pact, with its
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attendant risks of domination without occu-
pation, of hegemony without annexation. The
array of short-range missiles was the ultimate
expression of a security based on recourse to
armaments. Now that they have begun to be dis-
mantled, we know that the trend has changed
with far-reaching consequences.
I am quite sure that one factor - perhaps the
most important one 
- 
leading to the collapse of
so many despotisms in Eastern Europe has been
precisely the attractiveness, not only of our
pattern of social organisation, but also of the
system of international links based on dialogue,
consensus and standing together, beginning with
WEU and the values it represents.
Thus a new era in international relations is
beginning, an era which must determine the
political, economic and strategic dispositions in
iesponse to the peaceful revolution that began in
the second half of 1989 and which, following the
significant election results in East Germany, will
receive further sweeping endorsements in other
elections shortly to be held. An era which must
consolidate the achievement of democracy and
of pluralism in a Europe freed from the thrall of
distrust and confrontation and at last restored to
the full responsibilities of free choice.
This then is the new part that our institutions
now have to play: to act generously and wisely so
that the great changes now under way in Eastern
Europe, including the unification of Germany,
do not in any way lead to destabilisation. This
will call for a considerable effort of imagination,
political will and economic commitment on the
part of all of us. We are leaving behind a
post-war situation marked by balances based
upon mistrust, hostility and rigidly opposed
positions; a peace that often seemed to be only a
fragile truce. We have no wish to see the return
of the misunderstandings that disfigured the
climate of international relations in Europe in
the inter-war Period.
We believe that a new stability can be
achieved only through clear choices in a harmo-
nious plan for the integration of Europe, without
allowing ourselves to be thrown or overtaken by
events. The priority accorded to the processes of
European integration, also involving the matter
of security, is one of the fundamental choices of
this strategy. For we believe that if during the
next few years the integration of Western
Europe (and by this I mean not only the single
market but also political and military inte-
gration) does not proceed atapace and intensity
dictated by the new developments, we shall not
have the instrument we need to master the dif-
ficult transitional phase.
It is the duty of WEU to put in hand a recon-
sideration by the Nine of the future political and
military balances, stability and disarmament.It is
our duty to advance step by step our thinking
about the new alignments in the security systems
in a Europe which will from now on be so dif-
ferent from the Europe into which our organ-
isation was born - and also so different from
Europe as it was in the autumn of 1987 when we
agreed the lines of a joint defence platform.
It is our duty to reflect on how our security
needs can be met in areas other than Central
Europe which for decades has borne the main
weight of the threat, as far as Northern Europe
and in general as far as the Mediterranean area
whose " strength " is a vital interest of the whole
continent.
All this, then, should lead us to engage in dia-
logue and reflection, unafraid of what is new,
keeping pace with the rapid developments in the
international situation, which are restoring to
Europe the centrality which it had long since
lost.
The Europe of the Nine must not only give
thought to how it is to unify its own defences
and how to co-ordinate this objective question
of political union pursued in the wider context
of the Twelve. This Europe must also contribute
towards re-examining the rOle of the institution
that, with the irreplaceable and indispensable
contribution of the United States and of
Canada, has guaranteed our security for more
than forty yeani.
That is the question now being asked in
Europe, especially in Western Europe, in the
light of events in the East: the question about
the tasks of the Atlantic Alliance and about what
is going to happen in view of the possible fading
away, or at any rate the lessening, of the military
threat.
Our thinking on this iubject must take
account of a complex requirement: the main-
tenance of the Atlantic Alliance in a changing
environment not only with reference to the new
situation but also to those that may finally
emerge from the entire process of European
security.
Were NATO to be dissolved or even were its
political r6le to be weakened, this would not
bring us nearer to a more stable and predictable
world; on the contrary, it would distance us
from such a world. In the new Europe the
alliance must serve to keep the political and mil-
itary transatlantic link with the United States
and Canada in being and to strengthen it. The
history of the conflicts of which Europe has been
in thii century the theatre and the victim warn
against any rapprochement that is not at the
same time a reduction of the strategic distances
between the two shores of the Atlantic.
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Today prospects ofjoint European defence or
rather of a common security for Western Europe
are once more emerging: this is something which
in the past we were unable to achieve but which
before long will be an indispensable achieve-
ment of political union. But we shall not be able
to build the common European house or succeed
in entering into constructive relationships with
our former adversaries unless we keep our link
with America strong. Europe must no longer be
a place where rivalries flourish, or revert to
instability.
Therefore the Nine have a duty to reflect not
about disbanding the alliance, but about pro-
gressively adapting it to developments in
Europe. Much thought has to be given to
NATO's own strategy resulting from the force
reductions and from the broadening of the mil-
itary subjects under discussion at Vienna until a
security system based on entirely new premises
is achieved. WEU will play a more importantpart and bear increased responsibility, also
because the requirements and views of our coun-
tries do not always entirely coincide. No real
balance in Europe could emerge from reversion
to national military policies by countries which,
after all, will in future have to provide jointly for
their own security. The strength of the European
pillar of the alliance itself must be built on a
growing convergence of the Nine regarding
future arrangements in Europe, in particular
security arrangements. Consultations will be
needed on the political nature of the alliance, on
the sharing of tasks within it, on its r6le within a
security system which, through the CSCE, is
bound to take on increasingly well-defined and
indispensable characteristics in the context of
the continent.
This is the third subject or, if you prefer, the
largest of the concentric circles in which
European security revolves, after WEU and
NATO: it is the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Special thought needs to be given to this third
dynamic too within the framework of WEU. For
it is destined to be more important than might
have been thought until yesterday, since it holds
within itself the promise of what has already
been called a single European security system, in
other words the context within which economic,
social and political integration at European level
has to be built. This context will not cancel out
the other two levels, those of Western Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance; indeed these must
form integral, essential parts of it.
This Assembly must also play its part in
strengthening security within the framework of
the new Helsinki process, new as regards the
process described in the Final Act and its con-
tinuation, namely a system of principles and
rules elaborated as a framework within which a
Europe now divided and at odds can live
together in security.
The conclusion of the Vienna military negoti-
ations will lay the groundwork for starting a
fresh round of negotiations between the Thirty-
Five, beginning with the conference to be con-
vened within the year, and this could include
negotiations on security. With this timetable in
mind, we should hold consultations in WEU
about the possibility of moving towards truly
defensive systems of security, with effective
measures of verification and control. The con-
vergence of the respective military doctrines,
but above all transparency based on expenditure
comparisons, will not only release considerable
resources but will also increase mutual trust, in a
continent until recently divided by a threatening
line of confrontation.
During the phase of transition and rebuilding,
the existing western groupings must be
strengthened.
WEU will also be called upon to enhance the
r6le of our countries and make Western Europe
into the entity capable of influencing the future
course of events not only in our continent. A
cycle is closing which in the present century had
made of Europe not only the theatre of unending
conflict, locking up enormous energies, both
material and moral, in a political and ideological
confrontation in an atmosphere of riristrust and
the threat of apocalyptic destruction. If this con-
frontation has ended, we do not want to return
to a balance which is no more than just the tem-
porary inability of one power to prevail over the
other.
The experience of this post-war era teaches us
that we should rather place our trust in the inter-
national instruments of dialogue, above all
between countries giving allegiance to the same
values of peace, freedom and democracy.
Within its own field WEU has acquitted itself
of this exceedingly delicate task up to the
present. Our wish is that it should continue to
realise and defend our hopes no longer held
asunder by conflicting utopias.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister.
Would you be prepared to answer any ques-
tions?...
(The Minister indicated his assent)
I call Mr. Caro who wishes to put a question
to Mr. Poos.
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, I first wish to voice my pleasure at hearingtwo quite remarkable speeches from two
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members of government of member states whichI am convinced will continue to inspire our
debates.
With your permission, I wish to put my
question to Mr. Poos, whom I am happy to see
amongst us, and I wish once again to pay tribute
to the work he, together with the Luxembourg
Government, accomplished so remarkably for
the future of WEU and a clear concept of
European security. This is the spirit in which I
wish to put my question. It relates to the central
part of the European pillar we are trying to
build.
When we succeeded in having defence min-
isters in the Council of Ministers of WEU, we
started to handle these questions seriously in an
institutional manner. This excellent result corre-
sponds to a very specific recommendation from
the Assembly. If we finally become the pillar of
European security in the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance establishing, as I sincerely
hope, this partnership in an institutional
manner, i.e. a European-American bilateralism
established by treaty, burden-sharing will no
longer be a problem and perhaps very quickly
the problem of responsibility-sharing in security
matters will be solved too.
Insofar as there will be changes in the
presence of American armed forces on the con-
tinent of Europe in view of the evolution and the
needs of unification and European identity,
could the Minister redefine and bring up to date
WEU's European security doctrine and speak
further about WEU's responsibility as a partner
in the alliance and in military matters too,
which would be tantamount to reverting to
WEU's original task?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Luxembourg) (Translation). - Mr. President, I
thank Mr. Caro, particularly for his very pos-
itive and very flattering assessment of the work
of the Luxembourg chairmanship during which
the WEU charter was first outlined.
When we speak of WEU as a European pillar,
we are obviously thinking of the strengthening
of the political r6le of our organisation. The
purpose of the proposal I have just made and
which I will communicate to the other member
states for preparing, on a nine-power basis,
meetings to be held amongst the Sixteen, would
be to bring out the political aspect of WEU and
at the same time force it to reach a consensus
among the Nine vis-i-vis their European and
American partners.
I am thinking of WEU but also of the Com-
munity because in my mind the developments I
hope will take shape in the years to come will
have to lead to the twelve-power Community
dealing with overall defence and security
problems. It is in this intermediary stage, i.e.
pending political co-operation being extended to
areas which it does not yet cover, that I see the
r6le of WEU. I believe we should all, parliamen-
tarians and we who have political responsibil-
ities, work in the Community bodies of which we
are also members for political cooperation to be
strengthened and extended to security questions.
I believe that corresponds to the wishes that your
Assembly has expressed repeatedly.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Poos.
I now invite Mr. Jessel to put a question to
Mr. Vitalone.
Mr. JESSEL (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, I first congratulate Minister Poos and
Minister Vitalone on really excellent and most
informative and interesting speeches. My
question to Signor Vitalone is this: he said the
cold war is over, yet Mr. Pontillon in his report
which we are debating wrote " the Soviet Union
is, and will for a long time, be a very great mil-
itary power with considerable conventional and
nuclear means " 
- 
he means weapons 
- 
and in
the light of that, can the Italian Minister say how
we can prevent a dangerous complacency in the
minds of the peoples of our countries?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. VITALONE (Minrster of Statefor Foreign
Affairs of haly) (Translation). 
- 
I do not think it
is in any way dangerous to recognise honestly
what has really changed in the scenario of world
security. We have, I believe, talked responsibly
of the need to enhance the alliance's political
r6le, we have stressed that the alliance must take
a completely new look at itself, not forgetting
what it has achieved over the last forty years in
guaranteeing stability and peace in Europe and
the r6le it still has to play in this extremely del-
icate transitional stage. Obviously, it will have
to up-date its tasks appropriately as they can no
longer be those which we defended so stub-
bornly and at such great cost at a different time
when dialogue was confrontation, when disarm-
ament was the logic of protecting military super-
iority, when security was military rather than
political and when the guarantee of peace was
linked with the threat of apocalyptic
destruction.
We are not forgetting all this but we believe
that it is now time to redefine security strategy
and to set it in the wider context of the CSCE; to
create a defence structure taking account of the
expectations now emerying as facts in Europe
which will involve far-reaching changes and
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taking on and overcoming very diflicult
problems, such as some aspects of reunification
in the two Germanys. I am sure that no one
wishes to play down these facts.
I said a little earlier that anyone who thinks of
surrendering the structures, resources and
political strength of the Atlantic Alliance would
certainly not be furthering the cause of peace
and stability in Europe, but we cannot pretend
that nothing has happened in the world.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Jessel.
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). 
- 
Mr. Pres-
ident, may I ask a brief supplementary
question?
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
A very short question.
Mr. JESSEL (Uniled Kingdom). 
- 
As the
Minister did not reply to my question, which is
how we could avoid a dangerous complacency in
the minds of the peoples of our countries, can he
please now answer my question, or does he think
the people are right to be complacent? Will he
answer please?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call the
Minister.
Mr. VITALONE (Minister of Statefor Foreign
Affairs of ltaly) (Translation). 
- 
I flatter myself,
Mr. President, that I have given, if not a per-
suasive, at least a complete reply and, if not a
convincing, at least a convinced answer. It is a
matter not of suggesting scenarios to encourage
a political choice or to influence judgments but
rather of finding the right answer to problems
concerning the redefinition of Atlantic Alliance
strategies. I believe that we, in particular, must
contribute by constructive proposals to rede-
fining what the Atlantic Alliance's r6le should
be, with forceful and decisive emphasis on its
function as a focus of great political cohesion
which has undoubtedly been a leading factor in
the great process of attraction which, to echo the
words of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has done a
great deal to keep free Europe in the eye ofthe
Germanys.
We know that in this context the Atlantic
Alliance has played a vital part which we recall
and reaffirm cannot be abandoned but I believe
that it must be stressed that the Atlantic Alliance
is called upon to define a new overall security
strategy for Europe within the CSCE. When we
speak of Helsinki II we must also look at this
absolute priority. If this reference satisfies the
curiosity underlying some courteous polemical
pressure I shall not add further to my reply.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Do you
wish to add anything, Mr. Poos?
Mr. POOS (Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Luxembourg) (Translation). If I may,
Mr. President, I wish to emphasise that there is
no contradiction between what the Minister of
State said about the cold war being terminated,
on the one hand, and Mr. Pontillon's affrr-
mation that the Soviet Union is still a great mil-
itary power. The first affrrmation is true, the
second also. Every day we see clear signs that the
cold war is at an end. The destruction of the
Berlin wall is the most spectacular sign. Demo'
cratic elections in the GDR, democratic elec-
tions in the next few weeks in other countries of
the East, the slow disintegration of the Warsaw
Pact and many other signals point in this
direction.
On the other hand, we know, the ministers of
defence and the sixteen know that the military
arsenal of the Soviet Union as a great conven-
tional and military power has remained practi-
cally intact. It is therefore for the negotiations
now being held in Vienna and the negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union
on strategic weapons to reduce this potential as a
consequence of the political events that havejust occurred. I therefore see no contradiction in
the two affrrmations and we must now bring the
present negotiations to a conclusion as quickly
as possible so as to reap the rewards of ddtente
at the level of forces and armaments.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
This brings
us to the conclusion ofa very interesting debate.
I thank very sincerely Mr. Vitalone, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, and Mr. Poos,'
Minister for Foreign Alfairs of Luxembourg.
7. Establishment of a just,
peaceful and secure order in Europe 
-
pnospocts stemming fmm developments
in Central ard Eostera Eumpe
(Resumod dcbate oa the rcport
of the Political Committee,
Doc. 1216 aad anendmeats)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The next
order of the day is the establishment of a just,
peaceful and secure order in Europe 
- 
prospects
stemming from developments in Central and
Eastern Europe, resumed debate on the report of
the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amend-
ments.
The debate is resumed.
I call the Earl of Kinnoull.
The Earl of KINNOULL (United Kingdom). 
-
Mr. President, I am sure all colleagues will agree
that this debate has been heightened by three
notable interventions: the Foreign Secretary of
Poland spoke with great clarity and, I believe, a
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hopeful message from his point of view; the
Foreign Secretary of Italy was equally sup-
portive and, as ex-member delegate, his wise
words were of a quality we would expect from
an ex-member delegate; and, Mr. President, the
Foreign Secretary ofBelgium gave a strong clear
message about the future r6le of WEU and, as
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council, his encour-
aging remarks will be a comfort to us and give us
a spirit of confidence in our deliberations
despite my colleague Mr. Baumel's feeling of
disenchantment.
Mr. President, this debate on Mr. Pontillon's
excellent report, and I would add my warmest
congratulations to him, both on the report and
the clarity with which he presented it this
morning, comes obviously at a very timely
moment in the challenging and historical
chapter of our European history. The report
describes vividly the frightening speed of events
that took off last year like an Australian bush
fire, and one which we all hope will not spread
out of control.
Now the architect of the change in Eastern
Europe, of course, is Mr. Gorbachev, and I am
glad to see he was firmly readopted last week as
the leader of the Soviet Union. He will need the
wisdom of Solomon and the brave support of his
colleagues if he is to keep his policies on the
rails. A serious challenge has already confronted
him, even this week, in Lithuania, as my col-
league Mr. Wilkinson has said, and we will all be
watching with some anxiety to see how the
fiercely independent spirit of Lithuania and the
policies of the Soviet Union can be settled
without military force.
Mr. President, I would remind the Assembly
of this only to demonstrate how fragile the
climate of change is at present. Whilst we need
to gasp the opportunities of creating the goal of
pan-European unity, it will not happen over-
night nor, indeed, will it happen without a lot of
good work.
Our distinguished visitor, the Polish Foreign
Secretary, spoke with refreshing clarity about
the future unity of Europe, as seen from Poland.
I was glad he also saw the value of WEU and
indeed the future work of WEU. Perhaps it is
not to his surprise that I do as well.
The Assembly has infallible maturity. As an
Assembly, it has a potential beyond its present
framework and I believe it needs a widened
membership. Without a doubt, it needs to
instigate policies, as the Foreign Secretary for
Belgium has said, and not just comment on
events. I am greatly encouraged by the Foreign
Secretary of Belgium's comments on the future.
Mr. President, the great change and success, I
believe, of what will happen in Europe in the
future is that at the present time we have this
political will on all sides. The political will to
achieve unity. That will was born from the dawn
of hope of millions of Europeans over forty
years ago and now it is becoming a dream that
can be realised. But that dream will take time to
become a secure reality. Time is needed to
create the right framework and, equally
important, the right trust. Mr. President, I have
no doubt it will be achieved and when history is
written, WEU will have proved to have played
an important and riehtful r6le in that
achievement. Thank you, Mr. President.
(Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call
Senator Fioret.
Mr. FIORET (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, the extraor-
dinary events now taking place in the eastern
countries are described most excellently in
Mr. Pontillon's report. It calls for a realistic
overall assessment of the situation in order to
establish a clear picture of the present and what
is likely to happen in future. Assessment of the
present position indicates that the changes in the
eastern countries are shifting the security
systems from a unilateral concession to a
mutual, balanced security concession.
The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs
acknowleged in his excellent speech a short time
ago that stability had changed. A new basis for
security will have to be established, bearing
clearly in mind that, throughout the years of
most acute tension, peace was safeguarded by
the existence of an adequate western deterrent
capability. If the outcome is a co-operative
initead of an antagonistic security system, it will
all be the result of the realisation that an
unending anns race, particularly for sophisti-
cated weapons, would further weaken the Soviet
economy and that of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, which is not the least cause
of the present break-up of the Soviet bloc.
But even if the long-standing threat from the
East is diminishing, this does not mean the dis-
appearance of every threat. For all peoples and
most especially for peace-loving peoples,
security is a fact of life which ignores the mere
probability of threats and regards it as a per-
manent deterrent to potential aggressors. The
hoped-for development of the Atlantic Alliance
towards more specifically political aims will
require greater co-operation and cohesion in
defence matters between Europeans and the
future security system will have to become pro-
gressively more pan-European to prevent the
ie-emergence of old antagonisms and mistrust
which we would like to think have gone for ever.
In present circumstances, however, it would be
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wrong to expect any faster Europeanisation of
defence.
The objectives to be pursued are still those set
out in The Hague platform of 1987, which calls
for gradual pragmatic measures designed to
adapt the existing institutions to the new state of
affairs. This common European security
platform also provides for concerted action on
the problems of outside areas so that I do not
think it out of place in this discussion on the
Pontillon report to point out the strategic link
between the central and the southern region,
seeing that Southern Europe and the Mediter-
ranean are nerve centres of contact between
Europe, Asia and Africa.
It is both urgent and necessary that WEU
should formulate an overall concept of
European security including the Mediterranean
dimension. This is true both politically and from
the standpoint of safeguarding peace, because
the Mediterranean is now the area with the
E;reatest inequalities of living standards in the
world and risks becoming the most critical
frontier in North-South confrontation. WEU
can, therefore, adopt a package of measures
directed to both East-West relations and North-
South problems. Practical steps should be taken
to adapt institutions faster with the consequent
positive effect on the strengthening of the
European pillar. To that end, WEU could
encourage preventive stabilising measures and
consider jointly with the Community institu-
tions development aid policies for the emerging
countries with a view to a more precise formu-
lation of security objectives.
For lovers of peace like myself, it would be
self-delusion to congratulate ourselves on the
gradual disappearance of the threat from the
East and be indifferent to the dangerous ten-
sions building up for economic, demographic,
ethnic, social and religious reasons around the
Mediterranean, which will inevitably affect the
security of the whole of Europe as Mr. Vitalone
stressed in his speech. WEU has the opportunity
to lead the way effectively in defusing these dan-
gerous threats if it commits itself with the
authority it enjoys from the fact of having been,
ever since 1954, the organiser of peace andjustice for peoples who want to control their
own destiny.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mrs. Glumac kvakov, observer from Yugo-
slavia.
Mrs. GLUMAC LEVAKOY (Obsemer from
Yugoslavia). 
- 
We consider our participation in
this Assembly of European parliamentarians to
be useful and we should like to thank our col-
leagues in the Assembly of Western European
Union for their initiative which came at a most
propitious moment and which will certainly
enhance the European dialogue which is so
essential.
The processes that have taken the European
continent by storm indicate that Europe is awak-
ening and discovering its common all-European
identity. These processes are characterised by
the orientation towards integration, coexistence
and interdependence. At the same time, these
trends are attended by certain contradictions
which are manifesting themselves in particular
with respect to global, regional and sub-regional
interests. Consequently, the European processes
can no longer be viewed solely in terms of
East-West relations but also in North-South
terms, in the context of the peaceful devel-
opment of the continent and the sustained
g5owth of all the countries and regions belonging
to it. In that sense, the present balance offorcesin Europe needs to be replaced with a new
balance 
- 
a balance of interests.
In the channelling of current trends in Europe,
a key rOle, in our opinion, should be played by
the Council of Europe and especially the CSCE
which should evolve from a process into a
system with a corresponding organisation and
set-up to enable the intensified development of
co-operation within each of the three baskets.
Let me now say a few words about Yugoslavia
in the context of the report of Mr. Pontillon.
Yugoslavia is a multinational community in
which none of the nations has the absolute
majority in the overall country's population.
Therefore, Yugoslavia is determined to carry
out substantive reforms in society geared
towards increasing economic efliciency and
political democracy. A pluralism of ownership
forms, political pluralism, the aflirmation of
human freedoms and civil rights and the consti-
tution of a modern legal state that will enhance
these processes provide the basis of the in-depth
transformation of Yugoslavia into a country
with a market economy, political pluralism and
democracy.
The Assembly of Yugoslavia has started a pro-
cedure for changing the present constitution of
Yugoslavia, with the objective of creating a
democratic, legal state, the abolition of the
political monopoly of the League of Commu-
nists and introducing the multi-party system of
parliamentary democracy.
All these processes, about whose ultimate pos
itive outcome we have.no doubts, are evolving
with some difficulty at this stage. A particularly
grave problem is the attempt by the separatist
movement in Kosovo 
- 
which does not enjoy
the support of the majority in Kosovo or in
Yugoslavia 
- 
to instigate ethnic strife and
achieve ethnic Albanian purity in the region.
Notwithstanding, there is no reason to doubt
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that those attempts will be thwarted with the
affrrmation and exercise of the rule of law, the
legal state which will guarantee for each and
every citizen in Kosovo, regardless of his nation-
ality, religion or political convictions, peace,
security and the necessary conditions for a dem-
ocratic dialogue.
Yugoslavia has acceded to the important
international acts in the field of human rights
and freedoms. We are devoting special attention
to the standards set by the convention on the
protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of the Council of Europe as an
acceptable model for the development and pro-
tection of human rights.
The policy orientations and aspirations of
SFR Yugoslavia are geared towards Europe
where we historically and culturally belong. Our
intentions in that regard are contained in the
recently adopted declaration of the Assembly on
the further inclusion of Yugoslavia in the inte-
gration processes in Europe.
At the end, let me assure you that my country
is ready to be an active participant in the his-
torical endeavour to build a new European order
ofpeace, security and co-operation. Thank you,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Cetin, the observer from Turkey.
Mr. CETIN (Obsemer from Turkey). - Mr.
President, I would like to begin by expressing
my appreciation for your timely initiative to
hold this extraordinary session of WEU.
The rapid developments of the last months in
Eastern Europe indicate that we are going
through a turning-point in the history of Europe
and of the world. I am confident that your
Assembly, which has never failed to contribute
to the promotion of peace and security in
Europe, will have an important word to say in
this process. I would also like to join previous
speakers in congratulating our Rapporteur for
the excellent report he has prepared for this
meeting.
Mr. President, before starting my comments
on the main item of the agenda, I would like to
draw your attention to two points: in paragraph
49 of the report dealing with the latest incidents
in the Caucasus region of the USSR, the clashes
between Azeris and Armenians are qualified as a
" massacre of Armenians ". I would like to
remind the Assembly of the hundreds of Azeris
who lost their lives both during the conflict and
as a result of the intervention of the Soviet
armed forces. Among those there were also
many women and children. The developments
in the region started with territorial and legally
unjustified claims of the Armenians over
NagornoKarbakh and have reached a point
where Azeri blood has been shed. It is also hard
to share the view expressed in paragraph 49
regarding the religious nature of the latest
events. For instance, the People's Front is
mainly composed of nationalist elements and
only a very small portion of the Azeris are
inclined towards an lranian-style fundamen-
talism.
Secondly, I shall dwell on paragiaph 35 where
a reference has been made to the Bulgarians
residing in Turkey and it is said that the Bul-
garian Government rightly complains about the
fate of these people. I think Mr. Pontillon here
makes a reference to the Turkish minority which
emigrated in hundreds of thousands last year to
Turkey, fleeing the repressive rdgime of Mr.
Jivkov. Apart from these ethnic Turks, if we
leave out Bulgarian diplomatic mission per-
sonnel in our country, there are no resident Bul-
garians in Turkey. And if the reference is made
in the report to a Turkish minority, I shall
content myself with reminding your esteemed
Assembly of the reasons why and conditions in
which these people had to leave their lands and
take refuge in Turkey.
Mr. President, one-party r6gimes which have
stayed in power for years are disappearing one
after another. They are being replaced by parlia-
mentary democracies based on plurality of
parties, free elections and a mixed economy. It
is to be hoped that the elections in Eastern
European countries to be held this year will also
lead to the consolidation of democracy and will
improve respect for human rights and funda-
mental fr;:edoms.
After observing the rapid changes in Eastern
Europe, it may be said in a certain sense that it
is now that world war II is coming to an end.
Because it is only now, forty-five years after the
surrender of Germany, after the Soviet Union
withdrew its sovereignty over Eastern Europe,
that a pattern similar to the one before the war is
beginning to emerge.
The new pattern must, and we are sure will,
preserve the new borders formed after the war.
At the centre of this pattern will be the united
Germany formed by the reunion of East and
West Germany. German people are entitled to
shape their own destiny. We are confident that
they are of a political and social maturity and
they will continue to be an asset for the com-
munity of nations, for peace, stability and pros-
perity in Europe and in the world. For years the
Federal Republic of Germany has substantially
contributed to the preservation ofpeace and sta-
bility in Europe.
Determining Europe's future architecture calls
for creative and imaginative approaches. But the
potential risk involved in a period of rapid
political change and uncertainties about the
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future obliges us to be prepared to move ahead
with caution. In shaping Europe's future, first
there is the need to consider existing structures
and re-evaluate their relevance with a view to
responding effectively to the requirements of the
time, particularly in relation to Europe's future
security order. We have to remember that,
thanks to existing western organisations and
their ability to devise most appropriate policies,
we have been witnessing the longest period of
peace and stability in our continent.
Mr. President, as all distinguished members of
the Assembly are perfectly aware, Turkey has
played an important rOle in Western European
defence. It has been taking an active part in all
aspects ofthe European political, social and eco-
nomic integration process as a member of
NATO, the Council of Europe and the OECD.
As all the honourable members will also agree
with me, the European integration movement
can only be achieved with the realisation of its
security dimension. As a strong and stable ally
in the southern region of the alliance, Turkey
has a lot to offer in the creation of the future
European security order. Accession ofTurkey as
a full member to Western European Union will
certainly contribute to the strengthening process
of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
Therefore, I hope that Turkey will soon have the
status that it deserves within Western European
Union, commensurate with its past and present
contributions to peace and stability in Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Biacs, the observer from Hungary.
Mr. BIACS (Observer from Hungary). - There
will be elections at the end of this week in
Hungary. I am running in my constituency for
re-election together with six new candidates of
different parties from left to right, communists
and socialists, liberals and christian democrats.
This election will open a new era in the life of
the country. At the same time it means that the
new r6gime need not strive for continuity in
foreign policy. This is justified of course by the
realignments taking place in the world and par-
ticularly in Europe.
Chiefly because of the changes that have
occurred within the two main blocs, the world
will no longer be bipolar as written in Mr.
Pontillon's report. In the past hierarchic
structure, I am sure there was unity in both mil-
itary blocs, cohesion being assured by the exis-
tence of external threats for each one. It is
therefore natural that this division must stop in
Europe, just as it has ended in Germany. The
Eastern and Central European countries are
becoming increasingly identified with the demo-
cratic values of the world. The strengthening of
this trend is likely in the Soviet Union as well.
The development of parliamentary democ-
racies built on a market economy is progressing
and they are intensifying relations with the
Council of Europe and the European Commu-
nities to which they wish to adhere. These coun-
tries do not hold that security is threatened from
the West. It is a question of the consequences
the above developments will have for the
security of Europe and for our region of CentraV
Eastern Europe.
Minister Eyskens said today that real stability
could be created only in very balanced condi-
tions. The disarmament and withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Hungary is one indication of
this necessary symmetry. Will there be a
vacuum? Is there not a danger that nationalist
tendencies might grow, giving rise to uncontrol-
lable rivalry and to conflicts threatening war
among the small and medium-sized countries?
The tragic situation in Transylvania calls for
close attention, where the gfeatest ethnic
minority in Europe, three million Hungarians,
are living.
In truth, only a collective system of European
security could ensure the safety of the region.
The series of meetings of security and
co-operation in Europe offer the best possibility
for achieving this. To realise it, the need must be
seen for abolishing opposing military alliances.
A system of accords on bilateral and multilateral
security has to be formed in which the indi-
vidual states guarantee each other's security and
show their willingness to settle the problems
arising between them democratically in an all-
European framework. This presupposes the
development of a multipolar Europe, the final
phasing-out of the bloc approach, the unham-
pered course of the Helsinki process and closer
European political ties.
I highly appreciated Minister Eyskens's
message today when he said that " everyone has
his own space in Europe, even ethnic minor-
ities ". The countries leading the eastern alliance
system are weak economically, as well as mili-
tarily. They need time to consolidate a political
system and market economy. Growing natio.
nalism and conflicts between each other rep
resent a real danger, not to speak of the social
consequences of a possible economic collapse.
Regionalist tendencies are sure to gain ground in
compensation for advantages earlier gained
from hegemonic alliances and now vanishing.
But I was happy to hear today Minister Eyskens
saying * young people are not nationalistic ".
This is a human factor in restructuring military
forces which was accepted when the bill of
defence in Hungary was amended in 1989, intro
ducing civil service instead of service in armed
forces as an alternative.
I.et me emphasise that the Hungarian
National Assembly has already taken a number
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of initiatives and measures for developing
co-operation between parliamentary organi-
sations in Western Europe. In our opinion, these
organisations 
- 
Western European Union, the
Council of Europe, the European Parliament
and the North Atlantic Assembly - are playing
an essential r6le in the organisation of multi-
lateral parliamentary relations and the encour-
agement of the European security and
co-operation process. The new Hungarian par-
liament will probably likewise be open and
ready for continuing the dialogues as a result of
which Hungary may soon become a fully-fledged
member of a free, secure, peaceful and pros-
perous Europe.
In conclusion, please permit me to thank, on
behalf of our delegation, the leadership of
Western European Union for the invitation to
this important conference and for the possibility
of sharing with you some of our thoughts on the
future of our common European homeland.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call
Senator Fassino.
Mr. FASSINO (Italy) (Translation). - May I
say straight away that I agree with Mr.
Pontillon's excellent, detailed, well-documented
and complete report and may I add that many
people are also saying the same thing. A new
order is emerying in Europe and, unlike its pred-
ecessors, this new order, after so many centuries,
is being created without warfare. It is an order,
ladies and gentlemen, born out of reason two
hundred years after the French Revolution
which made reason its watchword. Today,
Europe is looking for itself in the sign of that
reason afterwards lost, in the sign of what is for
some a new democracy, but is in any case fresh
and more widespread.
It is also a fact that the relaxation of military
tension on both sides, of which we have heard
much today, will be the basis for future political
developments in our continent and new fron-
tiers 
- 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
- 
involving
the questions we are all asking ourselves, unfor-
tunately without being able to give precise
answers. But it is equally true that every relax-
ation of military tension is also based on the
opening of frontiers between East and West, the
dawning and certainly gpowing movement of
people from East to West and, not only that, but
also from South to North.
As a liberal, I must say that I believe in eco-
nomic basics and particularly in the market
economy. It certainly does not depend on us or
WEU, but a market economy will be created and
will be capable of involving all the eastern coun-
tries ifthey are brought into the orbit ofrational
and socially moderate capitalism, and if a
European investment and incentives plan can be
launched for those countries which have suf-
fered from decades ofplanning. So I believe that
today, peace, justice and security in Europe will
ultimately be established on sounder founda-
tions. In a word, I believe that priority must be
given to economic discussions which, however
difficult, should spontaneously lead on to the
political balance which is part of the lives of all
of us here today.
Recently, in Turin, a leading economist stated
the principle that shortages depend less on a lack
of primary goods than on the distortions of eco-
nomic systems incapable of guaranteeing a
minimum of efliciency because they are authori-
tarian. If this analysis is accepted together with
its comments, the various political freedoms
which are the essence of a democratic state with
regular elections, uncensored newspapers and
freedom of speech must be regarded as being the
real driving force for the elimination of the
shortages. A free and enlightened public opinion
is therefore emerging in the East and as time
goes on the preconditions for real and lasting
ddtente will also be created. I agree with the con-
clusions of the Pontillon report. No standing
down of the alliance, no winding up of treaties,
no automatic and premature extension of the
Community at least until the establishment of
democracy has been fully consolidated. But
nothing should hold Western Europe back from
giving priority to a far-reaching political and
economic commitment to the eastern countries
for the purpose of exporting to them the compet-
itive, democratic and eflicient model which
guarantees well-being and therefore freedom
and peace.
It is for WEU, the sole free and chosen
expression of European solidarity, for WEU
now reactivated as I have wanted for many
years, it is for WEU to act as spokesman in
dealings with those who can reach the necessary
decisions. Beyond military techniques, therefore
- 
and I am coming to my conclusion, Mr. Pres-
ident 
- 
and beyond the abstractions of politics,
it is the level of earnings and international trade
links which will be the surest guarantee of peace.
Poor people are generally readier to accept the
use of force; rich people are generally ready to
negotiate and to show in politics the common
sense which is the fundamental law of business.
This then is the new order in Europe. In my
opinion it can only be achieved by the extension
of modern proglessive liberalism to the eastern
countries and by the triumph of our free culture
over the culture of fear and inertia which the
communist rdgimes have imposed.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether'
lands) (Translation). 
- 
I am very surprised to be
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given the floor, because I had asked to speak
tomorrow, but I see you have completed your
list of speakers, and I am perhaps doing you a
favour by filling in time for you. All you will be
getting from me are a few disconnected
thoughts, because I had planned to sit down this
evening and write out precisely what I wanted to
say.
All the events in Eastern Europe last year, the
wall coming down, the changes in the Soviet
Union, make me think that this is an extremely
exciting and interesting period in which to live.
In the past, there have been moments when I
thought I would have preferred to live earlier or
later. But last year I found things exciting and
interesting, and I am glad I was here to witness it
all.
The changes that have occurred were probably
not so welcome to people who call themselves
experts on Eastern Europe, who are authorities
on the Soviet Union. All at once they might as
well throw all their interesting ideas, everything
they have written in the wastepaper bin or take
them to the library, because suddenly an
authority on the Soviet Union is no longer an
expert. And an expert on Europe, on Eastem
Europe is suddenly no longer the expert he had
hoped to go on being for years to come.
We now face 
- 
and I think this is one of the
important matters we have come to discuss in
this Assembly 
- 
the problem of not really
knowing what form our future and the security
of the world should take. I feel that Mr. Pon-
tillon's report at least provides a good overview
ofthe events that have occurred and ofthe things
that are about to happen. I feel that, if only
because the circumstances were bound to lead to
something of a rushed job, his recommendations
in particular present a short-term plan where the
security concept for the near future is concerned.
In one of his recommendations he says, for
example, that he can imagine the European
security concept should entail good relations with
the United States and Canada in the near future,
and I feel there should also have been a reference
to another country, a veritable continent: the
Soviet Union.
I can imagine that, not in the near future but
in the more distant future, a European security
system will emerge in one form or another,
either in the form described by Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg this afternoon or as reflected in the
ideas that have been presented today by Mr.
Skubiszewski, Poland's Foreign Minister. I
believe there must be a form of European
security in which there are close relations and
co-operation with both sides, with the United
States and with the Soviet Union. I feel it will
help the security of Europe and security in the
world if Europe becomes Greater Europe. A
security concept must therefore, as I see it, cover
the whole of Europe, a strong Europe, with
security extending to both sides and not just to
those countries which are now our NATO allies.
In a changed world, with the future in mind, I
see a completely different image of security
before me, and an image of security not only for
Europe but for the rest of the world. Those were
the few disjointed ideas I wanted to put forward.
Not a proper speech, but I have at least
tried to introduce some of my ideas into this
debate.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call
Senator Pontillon.
Mr. PONTILLON (France) (Translation). 
-
Mr. President, I am stimulated by the intelligent
comments and charm of our senator from the
Netherlands to answer immediately the question
she raised. The Soviet Union is missing from the
security system, but the reference we make
several times to an all-European security system
truly implies the participation of the Soviet
Union. The reference in the report, in the rec-
ommendation and in the introduction this
morning to a concept of shared security is effec-
tively aimed at both parts of Europe. I have
done my utmost to give you full satisfaction in
this respect.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
The debate
is adjourned.
8, Date, time otd orders of the day
of the n*t sitting
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I propose
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting
tomorrow morning, Friday,23rd March 1990, at
l0 a.m. with the following orders of the day:
1. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the Inter-
national Department of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Member of the Committee
of the Supreme Soviet responsible for
international affairs.
3. Establishment of a just, peaceful and
secure order in Europe prospects
stemming from developments in Central
and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on
the report of the Polilical Committee, Doc.
1216 and amendments).
Are there any objections?...
The orders of the day of the next sitting are
therefore agreed to.
Does anyone wish to spak?...
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.)
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Suuuerv
l. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Ministerfor Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany,
Replies by Mn Genscher io questions put by: Mr.
Skubiszewski (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland), Mn
Tummers, Mr. Soell, Mr. Baumel, Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg.
4. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of
the Supreme Soviet responsible for international
affairs.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting
is open.
1. Attendance regisler
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names
of the substitutes attending this sitting which
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended
to the minutes of proceedings'.
2. Adoption of the minutes
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In
accordance with Rule 2l of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed.
Are there any comments?...
The minutes are agreed to.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher,
Yice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The frrst
order of the day is the address by Mr. Genscher,
Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mr. Falin to questions put by: Mrs. Lentz-
Cornette, Mr. Soell, Mr. Biichner.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe - prospects stemming from developments in
Central and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on the
report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft
recommendation, Doc. l216 and amendments).
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Ahrens (Chairman of the
committee), Mr. Soell, Mr. Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg,
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman; Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Fourr6, Mr.
Mezzapesa, Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Beer, Mr.
Scovacricchi, Mr. Roseta (Observer from Portugal), Mr.
van Eekelen (Secretary-General of WEU), Mr. Pontillon
(Rapporteur), Mr. Ahrens (Chairman of the committee);
(explanation of vote): Mr. De Decker, Mr. Tummers.
6. Close of the extraordinary session.
The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.
On behalf of all representatives, I welcome the
Minister to our Assembly and ask him to come
to the rostrum.
Mr. GENSCHER (Vice-Chancellor and Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany) (Translation). - Europe is experi-
encing fundamental changes. It is faced by great
challenges and has tremendous opportunities.
No longer are enduringpeace and unity for our
sorely tried continent mere fantasies. A just and
peaceful order is a realistic aim and a chance
within our grasp. Walls have fallen and barbed
wire has been cut through. Human rights, plu-
rality and democracy are coming into their own.
Europe is again becoming conscious of itself, of
its common history and culture and of its shared
values.
The commitment to human rights and human
dignity enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act is
beginning to become a reality everywhere. The
policy of openness both domestically and exter-
nally introduced by President Gorbachev, the
restructuring of his country and the renunci-
ation of an expansionary foreign policy have
contributed to this profound change, a change
which benefits all the nations of Europe.
The progressive democratisation of Central
and Eastern Europe is a gain for the whole of
Europe and it is in the interest of us all to create
a strong framework for these processes of
peaceful change. The menacing situation has
fundamentally changed - for both sides. No
longer do they have to regard each other as al. See page 15.
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threat 
- 
even if the stockpiles of arms and the
strengths of the armed forces have not so far
been greatly influenced by the political
changes.
This makes it all the more urgent to adopt an
unequivocal policy of disarmament. The Soviet
Union too has recognised that, as an alliance of
democracies, the West has neither the intention
nor the ability to attack the East. Hence the
reason for Gorbachev's far-reaching policy of
disarmament is by no means only economic
pressures, as is often assumed in the West; it is a
realistic analysis of the West's goals and political
value judgments, and the expression of a newpolicy of the Soviet Union based on
co-operation.
There is no doubt that both West and East
have found common points of departure for
shaping the future, and this opens up far-
reaching opportunities for Europe-wide
co-operation in all spheres. The Czechoslovak
President Vaclav Havel referred to the wide
horizon of possible cmperation during the visit
by Federal President von Weizslicker to Prague
on l5th March 1990 when he said:
* We can work together for a democratic
Europe, a Europe with unity in diversity, a
Europe that does not bring war to the world
but instead radiates tolerance; a Europe that
will no longer foul Europe with poisonous
smoke and poisoned water. "
The new situation in Europe calls for fresh
thinking and responsible action on all sides. Old
questions are coming in fresh guises and new
questions are arising. All countries owe it to the
peaceful revolutions of freedom to see to it that
the process of democratisation is not endan-
gered by outdated thinking in terms of blocs, by
outworn egoism of nation states or by the power
politics of the past.
On 3lst May 1989, the summit conference of
the western alliance took the responsible,
forwardJooking decision not to modernise its
nuclear short-range missiles. Is'it conceivable
that events in Central and Eastern Europe would
have followed the same course if that decision
had gone the other way? The changes in Europe
are the natural result ofthe courageous decision
to think responsibly and act for the future.
This makes it all the more indispensable to
bring new thinking to bear on the coming phasesin the structuring of a peaceful future for
Euroqe. I am glad that the WEU Assembly is
mindful of the changes in Europe in its political
work. When, more than five years ago, I
addressed you at the historic extraordinary
session in Rome, our task was to redefine the
rOle of WEU in Western Europe. Since then,WEU has become an important forum for
the discussion of matters currently affecting
European security. It is a mark of fresh thinking
that at your session in December 1989,
impressed by the political changes taking place
in Central and Eastern Europe, you resolved to
convene another extraordinary session. This is
an impressive confirmation of the important
r6le of WEU.
In the last few days you have listened to
speeches by representatives of the Soviet Union
and Poland who are destined to play key r6les in
the creation of the future structure of European
security. By initiating exchange visits with
leaders in the Soviet Union, the WEU Assembly
has taken an early opportunity of stressing the
importance of intensifying political contacts.
Those are important steps towards the devel-
opment of pan-European security structures.
The peaceful people's revolution for freedomin East Germany has signalled to the whole
world the will of Germans to be reunited. The
unification of Germany has always been on the
agenda of history. On l8th March 1990, the
Germans in East Germany left nobody in doubt
that they were choosing freedom and unity,
democracy and the social market economy,
Europe and peace.
Back in 1967, the Harmel report correctly
stated that a durable, stable settlement in
Europe could not come about unless the
German question were solved. Now we are
about to solve that problem 
- 
not in isolation,but within a European framework. The
Germans in the GDR are just as good Euro-
peans as we are. It can now be truly said that we
Germans want to serve the cause of world peace
together and as a member of a united Europe on
a basis of equality.
Our nation cherishes a deep longing for
freedom and peace. Let the nations of Europe
know that we Germans want nothing other than
to live in freedom and peace with all our neigh-
bours. German history has never belonged only
to us Germans, neither will our future belong to
us alone. The destiny of the German nation is
indissolubly bound -up with the destiny of
Europe.
This places a grcat responsibility upon us
Germans. Not only our history but also the
weight of more than 75 million Germans in one
state in the heart of Europe add to this responsi-
bility. Ever since our state has existed, the policy
of the Federal German Republic has been, in
harmony with the meaning of our Basic Law, a
policy of responsibility. That means renouncing
the power politics of the past. The two German
states wish to become the powerhouse of devel-
opments that will overcome the division of
Europe.
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Germans both in the West and the East have
long been in agreement that " war must never
again start on German soil; peace must radiate
from that soil ". We want German reunification
to take place within the framework of the
European Community, the CSCE process, a
stabilising partnership between West and East,
the building of the common European house
and the creation of a peaceful order throughout
Europe. We do not seek to walk alone or to tread
a special German path. We want to travel on the
Euiopean road. We seek a dynamic stability for
the whole of Europe, and we call upon our
neighbours in the West and the East to open up
with us this prospect for Europe.
In such a framework of stability the process of
German unification can take place without
causing a power shift or destabilisation in
Europe. There will be no German unity without
Europe 
- 
and neither will Europe be united
without Germany. Germans in the West and the
East have committed themselves to Europe. The
growing together of the Germans in a changing_
Europe is just as important for the stability of
Europe as a stable framework for the revolu-
tionary developments in Central and Eastern
Europe.
The unification of the German states should
contribute to stability in Europe. It is the suc-
cessful outcome of a common western policy,
which was designed from the start to overcome
the tensions, to engage in dialogue and
co-operation and to achieve a political balance.
In the end the constructive response came in
President Gorbachev's concept of political
openness. What are the tasks now facing us? We
have to press ahead with the unification of
Europe in the European Community;this Com-
munity will increasingly become the stabilising
anchor for the whole ofEurope, and a beacon of
hope for the peoples of Europe.
we must press on resolutely with integration.
The single internal market is just as important
as economic and monetary union. There must
also be a conference of governments for decisive
progress in the constitutional questions. The
Economic Community is in need of greater
dynamism in the interest of the whole of
Europe. France and the Federal German
Republic should view the dynamic integration
of the European Community as an obligation
arising from their unique partnership. It
excludes nobody and it discriminates against
nobody when I state that the partnership
between Germany and France is one of the most
valuable achievements of the post-war period -
after all that has gone before.
Thomas Mann expressed the part Germany
should play in the Europe of the future h 1952
when he said: " What we want is not a German
Europe, but a European Germany. " This
European Germany wants to confront the chal-
lenges of the future in the realms of politics,
security, the economy, trade and ecology
together with its neighbours in West and East.
There is no question as to what has to be unified
in the unification of Germany. What have to be
unified are the Federal Republic of Germany,
the GDR and the whole of Berlin, and this
within the existing frontiers, no less, but no
more. Once this unification has been completed,
the references in our constitution relating to uni-
flrcation will have been discharged. In its reso'
lution passed on 8th March 1990, the German
Federal Parliament advocated that as soon as
possible after the elections in the GDR the two
freely-elected German parliaments should issue
a joint declaration in essentially the following
terms:
" We affirm to the Polish people that their
right to live within secure borders shall never
again either now or in the future be called in
question by us Germans with territorial
claims. "
We are aware that the inviolability of Poland's
western border along the Oder and Neisse is a
fundamental condition of peace in Europe.
" We " means the people in both the German
states. The two freely-elected German parlia-
ments and the governments chosen by them will
make a joint declaration to this effect.
We shall reach an agreement with our neigh-
bours in Poland as to the form and guarantee of
the inviolability of the border. Therefore it is
only logical that Poland should take part when,
under the auspices of the arrangements agreed in
Ottawa, matters particularly affecting its borders
are discussed. For us too it is beyond doubt that
German unification must take account of the
interests of all European countries in security.
In this connection there are a number of ques-
tions on which we are striving to show the
utmost possible clarity in the interest of a
credible and predictable foreign policy. By
belonging to the western alliance, a united
Germany will contribute to stability throughout
Europe. In this process it should be possible to
reach agreements in respect of the present GDR
terrritory that will be acceptable to the Soviet
Union and neighbouring countries. Much new
thinking will be called for in this connection,
thinking that transcends the West-East syn-
drome and the antagonism of the two systems
which dominated the past.
We are aware of the vital importance of
respecting the legitimate security interests of the
Soviet Union - which is now experiencing many
changes 
- 
as well. We shall be mindful of the
crucial importance of German-Soviet relations
too when fashioning the future relationship of
the united Germany to the Soviet Union. We
have no wish to see the changes in Eastern
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Europe or the process of German unification
lead to a displacement of forces in security
policy.
We do not wish to gain any one-sided advan-
tages from the changes in Central and Eastern
Europe. Security is indivisible; one side cannot
be left at a disadvantage. If Germany were to be
neutralised, this would mean that Germans
would be detached from the European context.
German neutrality would undermine the rdle
which necessarily falls to the alliances in the cre-
ation of a durable, just and peaceful order. It
would create insecurity and instability in
Central Europe, which nobody wants.
A great deal of caution and statesmanship will
be called for in dealing successfully with the
security policy issues raised by German unifi-
cation. It will be facilitated to the extent that the
need for the alliances to make the change from
an antagonistic and military stance to a political
r6le in the creation of security is understood and
accepted. When this happens, questions which
still apear insoluble will become soluble. I
should like to speak in more detail about the
change in the r6les of the alliances.
The process of German reunification will raise
complicated questions which concern others
besides ourselves. We shall discuss the external
aspects of this process in the talks which the two
German states hold with the powers that are
responsible for Germany as a whole. This
framework was agreed in Ottawa.
We wish to carry on with our allies, partners
and neighbours a continuing process of infor-
mation and discussion of all the questions
bound up with the process of German reunifi-
cation. It goes without saying that this affects
our allies in NATO and our partners in the EC
and in WEU, and the same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the other participants in the CSCE
process.
What we are striving for is that the six coun-
tries of the Ottawa process shall be able to
present to the summit meeting of the thirty-five
countries a result that is in harmony with the
Helsinki Final Act and that will be seen to
enhance stability throughout Europe. Over and
above that, we Germans are in a position to
make important contributions to stability: the
two German states can commit themselves in ajoint declaration to renounce the manufacture
and possession of nuclear, chemical and bie
logical weapons.
The discussion now taking place in the
Federal German Republic on which article of
the Basic Law is ultimately relevant to unifi-
cation is a matter of domestic policy and does
not affect the external aspects ofthe unification
of Germany. The method adopted under consti-
tutional law to reunify Germany can neither
resolve nor prejudice the questions bound up
with the external aspects of unification. Only
when these questions have been settled wiil
German unification be implemented, irre-
spective of the method chosen under constitu-
tional law.
We shall not present anybody with faits
accomplis. Nothing will be done behind other
people's backs. Even before unification takes
place, the two German states can do many
things which do not affect the external aspects o?
German unification. The growing together and
the reticulation of the political, social and eco-
nomic strengths is in full swing. Unity from
below is on the way. It is the unity of piactical
steps. The governments of the two Germanys
are faced with the task of reaching agreement on
the creation of an economic, currency and social
union and on complicated questions of the
harmonisation of laws. Much effort will have to
be devoted to protecting the environment.
Further, transport and telecommunications
infrastructures will have to be built up capable
of becoming the hub of such structures fol the
whole of Europe. The fresh start in the GDR
offers advantages which should be exploited by
others as well. Therefore our determination to
work together closely with the GDR, and to giveit assistance, which naturally arises from -the
efforts towards reunification, will not deflect usfrom co-operating with other Central and
Eastern European countries and giving them
assistance too.
Now that we are about to shape up the future
structures for Europe, and especially the future
security structures, we must work out clearly
what part the alliances are to play. Already they
are in the process of transition from confron-
tation to co-operation. Our security policy must
recognise that we are dealing with Warsaw Pact
countries which have started out on the road to
democracy. Hence the democratic revolution in
Central and Eastern Europe has prepared the
ground for a new policy on security.
The challenge now facing us is to achieve
security not in confrontation but in
co-operation. It is the challenge of co-operative
stability. As co-operation between their member
states increases, so the alliances to which they
belong gan and must likewise change.
Democratisation and the dismantling of threat-
ening attitudes go hand in hand. Bofh aliances
are called upon to define their r6les more and
more in political terms and to become linked in
lhq lgng term as an instrument of security-building co'operation.
Just now and also for the future our western
alliance is designed to ensure peace and sta-bility. It will become increasingly important
to the process of disarmament. The alliances
will play an increasingly important part in
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conflrdence-building and verifi cation. Measures
for enhancing confidence and security will prove
to play a crucial part in shaping the new political
order in Europe.
Transparency, openness and the ability cor-
rectly to assess one another are just as important
as reductions in armed forces and weapons.
They are of the essence of our future policy on
security. Confidence-building leads to a culture
of living together which leaves no room for
hegemony and threats, hate-figures or mis-
trust.
In future, the NATO and Warsaw Pact alli-
ances will have a special function of political
guidance: first the military security which the
alliances presently provide for the peoples of
Europe must be strengthened by co-operative
security structures. Then the co-operatively
structured alliances must be transmuted into ajoint collective security organisation. They are
creating new structures of security in Europe, by
which they are being increasingly overarched
and in which they can finally be subsumed.
In this time of far-reaching change in Europe,
let us muster the courage to take a long view of
security policy. In 1967 we pledged ourselves in
the Harmel report to the creation of a durable,
peaceful order in Europe. Surely it is essential to
the realisation of that vision that we be prepared
in the long run to enter a system of joint col-
lective security.
For this purpose the Basic Law of the Federal
German Republic made provision for agreeing
to the limitation of sovereign rights " which will
bring about a peaceful and durable order in
Europe and between the nations of the world,
and make it secure ". As enmity and tensions
decrease, it becomes more urgently necessary to
reduce the levels of weapons and armed forces
to the absolute minima needed for defence.
Unless this is done, the military potentials get in
the way of political progress.
This being so, we must make preparations
now for Vienna II. Disarmament is becoming
the key question for the unification of Europe
and for German reunification. The facts support
this view: the gigantic stocks of weapons, partic-
ularly on German soil, are not the cause but the
result of antagonisms and tensions. The conven-
tional disarmament negotiations of Vienna I
must be followed without delay by negotiations
about Vienna II.
The same applies to the Vienna negotatiations
about confidence-building measures. If 1990 is
to be the year of disarmament, we must have
concluded both the Vienna I agreements by the
time of the proposed CSCE summit conference
in autumn of this year. The same thing applies
to the worldwide ban on chemical weapons and
to the 50Vo reduction in strategic nuclear
weapons by the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The armed forces of the occupying powers
must also be included in the Vienna II negotia-
tions. When implementation of Vienna I com-
mences, the way will be clear for negotiations on
short-range nuclear missiles. Nuclear artillery
must also be included in disarmament. What
functions should these weapons systems retain
in the future?
Disarmament too must remain linked to
political developments. Without resolute action
on disarmament there will be no unity of Europe
or of Germany. That is undeniable. One new
task which both West and East must now tackle
is to achieve a joint reduction in armed forces
and weapons and also to address jointly the eco-
nomic, social, technological and ecological chal-
lenges of disarmament.
The breathtaking pace of developments in
Europe, not least in the relationship of the two
Germanys, is causing many people to ask what
are the basis and the framework for the develop
ments in Europe. It is the Helsinki Final Act; the
CSCE process must now produce its full effect.
The CSCE process is providing the blueprint for
an undivided Europe. The Helsinki Final Act
has given participating states a code of
behaviour for their peaceful coexistence. It has
made it possible to master the East-West conflict
and has mitigated its human consequences. Now
the CSCE process must gain a new quality and a
new dimension. Whereas in the first phase the
task was to enable the two different systems in
Europe to coexist and gradually to overcome the
division, now it is time for laying the basis and
structure of the single Europe.
The antagonism between East and West is
losing its ideological basis as Central and
Eastern Europe progxess towards democracy,
and losing its basis in power politics as disarm-
ament moves ahead. Closer infrastructure links
will bring Europe ever more closely together.
After the antagonism and after the cautious rap
prochement, the stage in which Europe dis-
covers and shapes its unity is now beginning.
The CSCE summit conference in the autumn
of 1990, at which the two *Vienna" disarm-
ament treaties are to be signed, will form the
beginning of a fresh chapter in European
history. At the 1990 CSCE summit meeting the
thirty-five states will no longer be facing one
another as adversaries. This summit will make it
possible to take specific steps towards a new and
peaceful order in Europe and to create a sound
framework for stability, a safety net for the fore-
seeable and unforeseeable developments on our
continent.
The Soviet Union must not be excluded from
this Europe; it belongs to it. Eastern Europe, not
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Western Asia, begins at the Polish border. The
United States and Canada have an equally
important part to play in the future structure of
Europe and its stability. The western alliance
links the two North American democracies to
their allies in Europe; both countries are partici-
pants in the CSCE process. But is that
enough?
The two superpowers, the United States and
the USSR, are in the process of creating a new
co-operative relationship; they no longer look
upon each other as a threat. And the Soviet
Union is reshaping its relationship with the
European Community as well. I believe it is
time for the United States and the European
Community to f,rnd a new definition of this rela-
tionship, one that will do justice to its strength,
its special nature, its closeness, and to the shared
values between them.
By solemnly reaflirming the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act the CSCE summit conference
can create fresh confidence. It can also con-
tribute to a stable partnership by deepening the
CSCE process and resolve upon steps towards
institutionalising it.
These include developing pan-European insti-
tutions under the aegis of the CSCE. As mea-
sures of co-operation in security policy, the
establishment of a European verification agency
and the creation of a conflict centre will con-
stitute a step forward in making peace more
secure. In both institutions the alliances could
take over important functions relating to their
new political tasks. Furtherrnore, giving conti-
nuity to the CSCE process might lead to the
setting up of a council of foreign ministers of
CSCE governments, which would meet at
regular intervals.
Let us create a peaceful order in Europe,
based on confidence, in which there is no longer
room for the abuse of power and power play,
because power politics have been replaced by
the politics of responsibility, and because
reliable security structures and all-round
co-operation leave no more room for attitudes
which offend against the spirit of democracy and
peace. Progress towards a better Europe must be
made irreversible, and there must be new
arrangements for ensuring that this progress
cannot be negated. No longer will this be simply
an affair between West and East on the former
lines; it will be an interest and a task of the new
Europe.
The summit conference of the CSCE should
also reach a view on the future structure of
Europe. Should Europe develop on confederal
lines and should this confederate order lead to
the development of a federal Europe in the long
term? President Mitterrand's call for a European
confederation is an important and constructive
contribution. The CSCE summit can be the
starting point for a new chapter in European
history. This requires thorough preparation,
which must begin soon; it requires the deep
ening and institutionalisation of the CSCE
process.
I call upon all countries to appreciate the
importance of this matter and constructively to
prepare for the summit. Of all the changes now
occurring in Europe, the chance of peace is the
most important. For the sake of our generation
and offuture generations, let us seize this oppor-
tunity of shaping a world which will be a
friendly association of free peoples and demo-
cratic states, in which humanity and broth-
erhood shall drive out hatred and enmity.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Minister. May I thank you on behalf of the par-
liamentary Assembly of Western European
Union for your personal contribution to more
stability and accountability and to confidence-
building measures.
Would you be prepared to answer questions
from the Assembly?...
Mr. GENSCHER (Vice-Chancellor and Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany) (Translation). 
- 
I am hurrying, so
to say, from Europe to Europe 
- 
that is, from
here to the European meeting in Lisbon, but I
think it will be important to answer questions.
May we agree that I leave your meeting at
11.15? That will give us twenty-five minutes and
I hope we can answer most of the questions in
that time.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
May we
perhaps group the questions we put for you to
answer them jointly? Could that be done? Many
thanks.
.I call Mr. Skubiszewski to make a
statement.
Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (Minister for Foreign
Alfairs ofPoland). 
- 
I am not obsessed about the
border question, but I should like to express my
satisfaction that you, Minister, have referred
expressly to the Oder-Neisse line. The general
phraseology used hitherto was not always satis-
factory and led to a lack of clarity in our rela-
tions. Not between you and me, but between
others. I wish to repeat, Mr. President, what I
said yesterday in this august Assembly, namely
that Poland is very interested in close
co-operation with united Germany. Germany
and Poland shared and still share a common
destiny. Now we have to create a community of
interests and together embody the unity of
Europe.
Like you, Minister, I too hope that we shall
together open up the European vision of which
you have spoken so convincingly. I am con-
vinced that not only Germany but all of Europe
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as well needs a strong and independent Poland
between Germany and Soviet Russia. What you
said about the CSCE process is especially
important. I wish the German people every
success on its road to unification and unified
statehood.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Does
Mr. Genscher wish to answer the declaration by
Mr. Skubiszewski?
Mr. GENSCHER (Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany) (Trans-
tation). 
- 
I should like to express my thanks for
my Polish colleague's remarks about the desire
of Germans to live in a single state. After all that
has happened in history, everybody will under-
stand what that means to Germans, coming
from a Pole. And I should like to add a hope to
his words 
- 
the hope that we can create a Europe
in which Germans no longer have the feeling
that they live between Poles and Frenchmen,
and Poles no longer have the feeling that they
live between Germans and Russians, and Span-
iards no longer have the feeling that they live
between Portugal and France, but that we all feel
that as Europeans we are at home in Europe.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose
that the questions be grouped and I shall then
invite Mr. Genscher to give a collective answer
to the Assembly's questions.
I call Mr. Tummers.
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, Minister, we talked about
various European co-operative organisations
yesterday and about their geographical range_
and political substance. Mr. Pontillon spoke of
pan-Europe, but there is no real co-operation
among the various European co-operative
organisations, between the Twenty-three, the
Twelve, the Nine and so on.
Does the Minister share my view that current
developments entail a serious risk of cultural as
well as political nationalism in Europe, that this
nationalism is being discovered like a gap in the
market of united Europe, and does he share my
view that the time has come for a fresh initiative
to be taken to consider at what time the various
European co-operative organisations can cover
the same geographical area and be so structured
as to be more closely linked politically?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Soell.
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
A few weeks ago David Owen, a
former British Foreign Minister, made a sug-
gestion that might possibly make it more
acceptable to the Soviet Union for a second
Germany to remain within the western alliances.
His proposal was that, although Germany
should remain a member of the alliances, it
should leave the integrated military structure
and the maintenance of American troops west of
the present demarcation line should be governed
by a bilateral agreement between Germany and
the United States. He further proposed that the
troops of other countries within WEU should
remain on German soil on a reciprocal basis,
with German troops correspondingly present on
the territory of other WEU member countries.
This proposal is of interest to us here in Western
European Union. How do you view it?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Baumel.
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - The
Minister spoke at length on the problems of dis-
armament and the prospects of the CSCE.
Clearly the new European architecture must
include a European security wing in view of the
weakening of the pacts, the withdrawal of Soviet
troops in the East and reductions in American
troops in the West. What r6le do you attribute to
Europeans and in which framework do you
think a strictly European security pillar is pos-
sible? In other words, should the alliance be
Europeanised instead of dis-Europeanised and,
in that context, how do you see WEU which,
emerging at last from its long hibernation, might
perhaps play a certain r6le? Again, outside
WEU, can you see a western strategy and
command structure to avoid Europe being a
dangerous vacuum subject to outside influ-
ences?
My second question is very short. What is
your opinion of the serious events which have
been occurring in Lithuania for the last two
days, how do you see this situation and how
sh6uld one react in view of the dangers of con-
frontation?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
On the question of unification, the Federal
Republic has a very strong economic position.
May we take it that the whole cost of unification
will be met by the Federal Republic and that
there will be no call on any other state in Europe
to bear a financial burden and ifnot, why not?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before
inviting you to answer, Mr. Genscher, I wish to
welcomothe presence of Mr. Poos, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
I call Mr. Genscher.
Mr. GENSCHER (Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germanyl (Trans-
lition). 
- 
I will begin with the last question,
because it is obviously about money. It seems to
me that all the discussion about Europe, whether
relating to military, economic or political
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matters, is rather hampered by the constraints of
outmoded thinking. People talk about what is
going to happen in the European Community,
how the Germans and the Spaniards and the
British and the French are getting on in it. Do
we not want to create a single internal market?
At least, I thought so. Do we not want to create
an economic and monetary union? I thought we
did. So where are the interests that could be
defined in terms of today's national state bound-
aries? Shall we not be talking about regions,
adapting transnational structures? Shall we not
be talking about ecological questions, about dif-
fering intensities of investment in different parts
of Europe? In other words, the question
whether, as it were, German reunification will
be paid for by the Germans?
I might turn the question round. Does Britain
want to gain from German reunification or does
it not? I can tell you in advance that the unifr-
cation of Germany with the present territory of
the GDR will become the growth area in the
European Community. lnvestors will be com-.
peting to invest in the GDR. So I would hesitate
to ask whether there will be participation. Of
course we shall bear these burdens when it
comes to creating the monetary, economic and
social unity of Germany. In fact, we do not
regard it as a burden, rather as a gain, and we
know that in the long term it will be a gain not
only for the Germans in the GDR and the
Germans in the Federal Republic, but for the
whole European Community. So cost is the last
aspect of the question of unification I would
consider. Of course there will be costs to be
borne.
Now I should like to deal with the possible
cultural questions, the nationalisms that might
surface and the task ofthe organisations that are
in Europe. I think it is very creditable that in the
Europe of the past many organisations of the
most varied kinds 
- 
I am a guest of one of them
today 
- 
have striven to promote and strengthen
the European idea and to create structures, at
least for those parts of Europe in which that
could be done by the free decision of the
peoples, their parliaments and governments.
Now we shall have to set about bringing these
organisations into some kind of harmony.
I forecast that the European Community will
be one of the most important elements in that
structure. And the European Community must
be open to accept new members; I say that in full
awareness of the fact that there will be others
who see. things differently. We cannot build an
economic iron curtain across Europe; the
European Community must be open to the
accession of European democracies which are in
a position to join, otherwise there would be a
question mark over its name and its definition,
for it is called the European Community, notjust the West European Community. That was
the intention.
Furthermore, we shall have to pay much
attention to the CSCE process, which I regard
as the major pan-European framework for sta-
bility. It is in nobody's interest for a balkan-
isation of relationships between states to come
about in parts of Europe. Nobody can wish us to
regress to the l9l3 era in Europe or parts of
Europe; on the contrary, we must pursue
European co-operation and retain what should
be retained. So we have to extend and develop;
and for that there is only one framework cov-
ering the whole of Europe the CSCE
framework. I repeat, we must now school our-
selves to transcend West-East thinking 
- 
which
was always a political concept, not a geo-
graphical one. And if now Central and Eastern
Europe become democracies, the ideological
reason for this partial understanding of Europe
has disappeared, as has the power-political
reason if disarmament is carried through. So let
us proceed to create one Europe with the
summit conference in the autumn 
- 
the CSCE
summit conference.
I now come to the weakening of the alliances
and to the question who should do what 
- 
the
question of a European command structure. I
believe that the western alliance has proved its
worth as a structure. I would not say that the
western alliance is weakening. Only somebody
who has regarded the alliance as a purely mil-
itary organisation could believe that its r6le was
diminishing. Such reasoning would lead to the
logically correct but factually incorrect con-
clusion that the more soldiers the alliance has
the stronger it is, and vice versa. Rightly under-
stood, however, the task of the alliance was to
guarantee peace in Europe; that is what I have
thought, and therefore we have always said that
a defence capability, armaments control and dis-
armament were integral components of our
alliance. Both of them! So the alliance cannot be
said to be weakening when a greater degree of
security is being brought about in Europe
through a comprehensive process of disarm-
ament. On the contrary it is becoming stronger,
because it is able to fulfil its purpose of making
peace secure even better than in the past. In
other words, if the alliance plays a stronger part'
in the disarmament process, a more political
r6le, it is playing a more significant part. And
strength is not only military strength, it is eco-
nomic strength, political strength, but
pre-eminently in this tormented continent the
peace-building power of organisation. That is
how I would judge it. What does it do towards
securing peace, democracy and freedom? That is
the criterion of its power and importance.
Now I come to what my friend David Owen
said. I have often thought about that during the
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last few days, because I was in Windhoek for
Namibia's independence celebrations and he
was a member of the contact group which
drafted Resolution 435. I recalled our visit to
Windhoek, attended then by David Owen in his
capacity as Foreign Minister, and we had to
engage in difficult discussions, for it was no easy
matter. One thing I learned from that process
that we can carry over to Europe, namely that
confidence-building is the starting point for any
attempt to legislate for the future. And
confidence-building was an important part of
the peace process. Now I come to his proposals.
I believe the integration of the armed forces of
the Federal German Republic into the western
alliance to be an important stabilising factor in
Europe. Therefore I should not wish to advocate
disintegration, for I think that the integration of
the German armed forces, after all that has gone
before, represents an important confidence-
building measure for all our neighbours. Nor do
I believe that the presence of American troops,
which in my opinion will continue to be
essential to stability in Europe, should be
enshrined in a treaty between Germany and
America. We Germans have always been against
regarding the western alliance as a German-
American alliance in which others also had a
small part. The western alliance is by its very
nature an alliance of North American and West
European democracies and this nature should
remain unaltered. David Owen floated the idea
of reciprocal stationing and, if I have correctly
understood or correctly read in the press, my
esteemed Polish colleague yesterday put forward
similar ideas for certain parts of Europe.
Such questions merit consideration, but this is
not primarily a question to us Germans; we pass
it on to others. What we do not want is a special
status for ourselves. We do not want the special
status of neutralisation, nor do we want an
opposite status.
I believe our thoughts must be turned towards
how the security interests of the Soviet Union
are looked after. I am pleased that the legitimate
security interests of the Soviet Union are being
discussed in a western forum, because that is a
sign of new thinking. It was not always thus; I
can remember discussions that were dominated
by the analysis ofthreats, and the question as to
the security interests of the other side was more
likely to be misinterpreted as a weakening of
western positions. I welcome the fact that we
understand there can be security only when
everybody is secure. Security gained at the
expense of others is a false security. So it is right
for us to consider how the security of the Soviet
Union can be safeguarded in the light of the
changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In my
opinion the Soviet Union must first of all have a
say in the matter and let us know what it thinks.
That will be the subject-matter of the talks we
are to hold. I was talking to Mr. Shevardnadze
about it yesterday in Windhoek.
May I just interject something here. What
happened in Windhoek yesterday shows how
quickly events are moving. If just one year ago
somebody had prophesied that the Soviet and
German Foreign Ministers would meet in
Windhoek on the occasion of Namibia's inde-
pendence to discuss matters arising from the
reuniflrcation of Germany, he would have been
discredited for three different reasons, and that
shows how very dramatic have been the devel-
opments to which we have to accommodate our-
selves. It shows the pace of events.
I believe it is still true that disarmament is at
the heart of the unity of Europe and of
Germany. It is a complete illusion to imagine
that Europe's security problems can be solved
co-operatively with such a high level of arma-
ments as exists today. Therefore Vienna II must
be both dimensionally and qualitatively a new
kind of disarmament agreement, one that really
creates defensive structures all over Europe.
That will then make it easier to answer the
question as to the security interests of all partici-
pants in the process of German unification, the
countries affected by that process, including the
Germans themselves. I repeat, the disarmament
process is the nub of the unification of Europe
and of Germany. And the CSCE process is the
indispensable framework for future develop-
ments in Europe. We must achieve that during
this year. It is a gigantic programme of work
facing us this year, because in 1990 we have to
work out the guidelines for future developments
in Europe, and then we have to go to the summit
meeting in the autumn and reach agreement on
these guidelines. That is how I answer this
question. And I believe that much that seems
unthinkable to us now will then be just as
thinkable as the fact that I was talking to Mr.
Shevardnadze about German unity in
Windhoek yesterday.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Genscher. This concludes a very interesting
debate. You will always be very welcome to our
Assembly, perhaps in June or later.
4. Address by Mr. Falin,
Director of the International Department
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Member of the Committee
of the Supreme Soviet responsible
for interaational affairs
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the address by Mr. Falin,
Director of the International Department of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of
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the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of
the Supreme Soviet responsible for international
affairs.
I call Mr. Falin.
Mr. FALIN (Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member
of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet respon-
sible for international affairs) (Translation). -
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, so that it
is clear what we are talking about, I should like
to speak in German, especially since it will make
our interpreters' job easier as I do not wish to
put them in the difficult situation of having to
interpret from Russian into one set of languages
and relay them into others.
I should like to thank you above all for
allowing me to talk to you informally and I am
very pleased to have had the opportunity over
the last two days of hearing diverse opinions and
a wealth of different ideas expressed, even
though I may disagree with much of what has
been said, as was to be expected. Yet such an
experience prompts us to reflect further, to
analyse the difficult subject at issue, to convince
ourselves anew about where we stand because
today's decisions will determine what sort of
Europe and what sort of world we shall all be
living in tomorrow, as well as the conditions
governing our bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions with various countries not only in this but
in other continents as well.
I think the words of Mr. Eyskens and Pres-
ident Goerens, the tenor of the report by Mr.
Pontillon and the views of many speakers here
have given us suflicient food for further thought
although, in a number of respects, they reflect
the old school of ideas so closely that I have to
ponder on additional questions that occur to
me. It is a pity Mr. Genscher is no longer here as
I would have liked to thank him. Having heard
what he had to say, I am given to understand
that it has been a grcat mistake in Soviet foreign
policy over the last forty years for us not to have
considered NATO as a particularly friendly
organisation with an impressive concern for our
security as this could certainly have spared us,
had we known it at the right time, agreat deal of
effort and energy. Unfortunately, in the words of
an Armenian poet, reality and dreams do not
coincide, the difference between them being that
reality lasts longer than a dream.
As I am speaking in German, I should like to
say that we are in fact talking about the German
question in its full context. True, my thoughts
expressed in German may sound slightly more
factual and abrupt than they would in the soft
tones of Russian. But because the hour of truth
has struck, because this is not the time to
exchange pleasantries but to identify what is
actually possible in everybody's interest and notjust in the interest of any one party, what should
be done, what has been neglected in past
decades, what has today become not only pos-
sible as a result of the qualitative change in the
situation but vitally important, because of all
these things we must be clear as to why every-
thing happened as it did, why we find ourselves
in a Europe bristling with dozens of times the
number of weapons as the other continents, and
also because life has been particularly dangerous
up till now.
I would point out that this is not the first time
Europe has had the chance to alter the course of
events so that a stable peace does not become a
mere dream.
Current events, however, bear the hallmark of
a new quality. Nations have acquired a genuine
right, that of making their views known and
their voices heard. Sometimes, and not infre-
quently, it is precisely such a right that deter-
mines the content and pace of processes. Yet
one question, and a disturbing one at that, keeps
bothering me. In the end, will the results suit the
conditions as they should or, as has already hap-
pened on several occasions, will we again be
unable to see the wood for the trees? Is there not
a danger that in the final analysis economic con-
siderations will win the day over long-term
arrangements and be given preference?
Hegel once said that to understand a subject
or concept properly, it had to be tackled from
the opposite direction. Yesterday and today we
have heard many flattering things about NATO
and much about the shortcomings and mistakes
of the Warsaw Pact. Hegel was certainly not
thinking about opposites of this type. If we
follow that philosopher's advice and try to
establish whether there was an inherent link
between NATO and the division of Germany,
the situation does in fact take on another
dimension. This will provide yet more food for
thought and some questions, which would
appear to belong to history, will prove to be of
great topical significance even now, forty years
on. Let me remind you of a few facts and ask
you to consider them according to Hegel's phi-
losophy.
It was close on forty years ago that ideas and
initiatives such as these were envisaged: first,
re-establishment of Germany as a single state
within the boundaries decided in Potsdam;
second, Germany's self-imposed obligation not
to join any coalition or military alliance working
against any state that had deployed its armed
forces in the war against Hitler's Germany;
third, withdrawal of all occupying troops no
later than one year after the entry into force of
the peace treaty, with an all-German gov-
ernment participating in the preparations;
fourth, Germany to be allowed to have its own
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national arrny, air force and navy as necessary
for its defence; fifth, organisation of arms pro-
duction in Germany to provide weapons for
these forces; sixth, no restrictions ofany kind on
peacetime economy, trade, navigation and
access to world markets; seventh, freedom of
action for democratic parties and organisations;
and, finally, eighth, equal rights of participation
for all former members of the army and for
Nazis, except war criminals, in the construction
of a peace-loving, democratic Germany.
These conditions were repeated subsequently
with considerable additions and changes. Two
or three years later came the proposal to hold
free elections. But all this was turned down. It
did not reach the point of serious discussion in
which opposing views might not have deviated
so greatly. However, in itself this unhappy
chapter is not of particular interest. What I am
interested in is what the train of thought was
and how the politicians, who had little trouble in
convincing themselves, came to the conclusion
that a dead end was the best solution.
Allow me to read out, from what were at the
time secret documents, the major arguments
that are sometimes invoked even today not only
by the parties involved then but by contempo-
raries as well. In short, and I would repeat that
these were not papers intended for the general
public, it is clear that they were analyses done in
foreign ministries and government departments,
etc., in the West.
, Up till 1953-55, the United States and the
United Kingdom and France even more so were
strongly opposed to a reunified Germany. A
confidential Foreign Office memorandum of
22nd June 1953 reads:
" Germany is a key to peace in Europe. A
divided Europe means a divided Germany.
The reunification of Germany, if feasible, is a
dangerous prospect for everyone as long as
Europe remains divided. This is why we all,
Dr. Adenauer, the Russians, the Americans,
the French and we ourselves, feel at the
bottom of our hearts that a divided Germany
is safer for the time being but none of us dares
say so openly because ofthe repercussions this
would have on public opinion in Germany.
That is why we all support the idea of a united
Germany in public because of its own condi-
tions. "
Such were the words used by Selwyn Lloyd,
the former British Foreign Secretary, to try to
restrain Churchill in the line he was taking on
the German question regarding which he was
trying to be less insular than he had been previ-
ously. In early 1953, Churchill was arguing -
and this is important - that the West's concept
of the German question should be considered
anew. He was the first within NATO to
recognise in public the Soviet Union's security
interests and he referred to the Treaty of
Locarno as a possible way of reaching under-
standing. In so doing, he did not exclude the
possibility of a neutral, unified Germany as part
of an overall settlement. The Foreign Oflice's
reaction was a categoric and emphatic " NO ".
This is an extract from its document:
" A neutralised Germany, which is what the
Soviet Union would like to see, would signify
a fundamental change in the policy applied by
the allies since 1947. Our long-term objective,
as it stands at present and to which Adenauer
has also said he subscribes, i.e. to create a
bond between the Federal Republic - and sub-
sequently a reunified Germany - and the
West is incompatible with what was decided
in Potsdam and since then publicly rejected
by us, ofthe four powers having control over a
neutralised Germany. The price we would
have to pay for solving the German problem
quickly with the Soviet Union would be the
renunciation of our policy. "
In the same document written by the British
Foreign Secretary, there is a reference to other
risks:
" All foreign troops would have to be with-
drawn from Germany and all bases shut
down. NATO would have to abandon its plans
because they are based first on a forward
defende strategy using German territory and
secondly on a German contribution to such
defence. The withdrawal of all American
troops to France or the Netherlands, if not out
of Europe altogether, would have unfore-
seeable consequences for the future of NATO.
A neutralised Germany would no longer be
able to take part in the West's unification
policy and, worse still, in the end a Germany
ihat had not rearrned or had been neutralised
would not be subject to the very considerable
economic, financial, manpower and other
defence-related pressures which would conse-
quently weigh more heavily on the United
Kingdom and its allies. German economic
competitiveness, which is already a major
problem, would become a serious and
increasing danger. On balance, rearmament of
the Federal Republic, its integration in
Western Europe, the joint defence strategy
and the European unification movement are
important parts of a comprehensive policy.
The other option would be for Germany to
lean towards the Soviet Union. "
I do not want to waste your time and quote
further from similar documents. One thing is
clear: what prevailed all those years ago was not
the balance of legitimate interests but, as Dulles
put it, a balancing act on a knife edge between
war and peace, i.e. a power policy which
accounted for everything that happened and
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gave rise to all the difficult circumstances that
we, you and other countries have had to contend
with in these dark decades of European history.
What I want to know is what weight do these
considerations, recorded so starkly almost forty
years ago in internal documents of official
western ministries, carry today? From some of
what I have heard, I must infer that the phi-
losophy that prevailed at that time is still not
entirely alien in some quarters today although
certain aspects of it have become more flexible
and are not described in such provocative terms
as they were then.
Now we hear talk of Europe's willingness to
take the Soviet Union's legitimate interests into
consideration and even, and this is a grcat
improvement, the absence of any Soviet danger.
The accent now is on avoiding the dangers
which, you may believe, are inherent in the
neutralisation, the military neutralisation, of
Germany. If that is how the formal logic, which
has become inevitable, goes, then, if such
dangers cannot be avoided, we should opt for a
lesser evil, less secure for the West and more
secure for the Soviet Union. Today's copy of
Die Welt has an interview with the German
Federal President, Richard von Weizsiicker. At
one point in answer to a question, he says very
seriously:
" Without being dramatic,I would say that for
the German people this comprehensive
European security process is indivisibly
bound up with our achieving unity as a state.
The two things succeed together or not at all. "
I can certainly go along with that last
comment and would probably add something
else the President said:
'The idea of bringing Germany into NATO
must not be based on justified concern about
misguided German ideas of going it alone, in
other words there must be no doubt what-
soever about German predictability. It is the
United States and the Soviet Union that are
the main framework for the new security and
co-operation arrangements and we Germans
must show that a united Germany is the result
and first direct proof of a changed system. "
The Soviet Union's attitude on the question
of reunification is very clear. We are in favour of
settling the German issue once and for all, not
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow but today.
However, like a coin, there are two sides to the
problem. The Germans must decide for them-
selves what type of state a united Germany is to
be. They cannot avoid the issue and musl fu[y
respect the interests and rights of other coun-
tries. They must not bow to the temptation to
present the community of nations with a fait
accompli, for to do so in the modern world
would amount to the German nation running
amok.
It is said, and we have heard it said today, that
the Germans and Germany should not be placed
in a special situation. I fully agree. And yet the
German nation and the two German states
actually are in a special situation. Do not let us
forget that there is still no peace treaty and, as
long as this is the case, the rights and obligations
of the four powers are valid under international
law. As long as there is no peace treaty, the
Germans' right to self-determination is some-
what restricted. If the situation were not so, it
would not conform to the law. In our view there
should be a peace treaty. Without one, it would
be virtually impossible to consider the second
world war over and done with, and that is nec-
essary, and it would also probably prove
extremely diflicult to do the same for the cold
war, which in our opinion is one of the most
important tasks.
Moreover, since the war we have created
various provisional structures over the last forty
or so yeani. Now we are at last faced with the
task of thinking about building a durable 
- 
as far
as anything in life can be durable 
- 
but in any
case a long-term structure, providing greater
security for us, for you and for Europe as a
whole. Would it be possible, on the basis of the
customary considerations, to set goals for
achieving results? Do you not see a discrepancy
between what is objective fact 
- 
the reality 
- 
and
the arguments developed by politicians in order
to circumvent reality again? What do I mean by
that?
You and we know very well that the last war
in Europe finished a long time ago. Another war
in Europe, irrespective of whether conventional
or nuclear weapons were used, would mean the
end of Europe, for ever. If war is impossible,
then why, I ask you, do we need so many
weapons in Europe and dozens the number of
weapons in Germany as is the case today?
Against whom are these weapons to be
deployed?
Back in the last century Bismarck said that
one penny spent on an unused army was a waste
of money. Today for an unused arny, indeed for
many unused armies, we are paying not just
pennies but thousands of millions every year.
What for? If these national defence arrange-
ments have been overtaken by events, if all
international defence structures are not allowed
to and cannot play the rOle they probably played
previously, then we can legitimately ask whether
we could not perhaps live without them and
replace them with pan-European systems in
which the interests of each country, irrespective
of its size, would be treated equally.
lt is our view, and I think I can prove to you
beyond any doubt, that in spite ofwhat has been
said here today, the division of Germany was
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due to military considerations and we do not
think that weapons arrived in Europe only after
political confrontations following which the
great powers were unable to find a common lan-
guage. But let us reflect on this and ask our-
selves: what is NATO? Is it a European
organisation only or something more? Is it part
of the balance of European power, of European
interests or of international interests as a whole?
If you are honest with yourselves, then you will
answer this by saying that changes and move-
ments in this respect would lead to shifts in the
global balance of power, and the Soviet Union
cannot ignore that.
Indeed, we put down proposals a long time
ago and long before the dynamic events we are
witnessing, Our proposal thirty or more years
ago was that if we agreed to disband all blocs, we
could set up a pan-European defence organ-
isation. At that time this proved impossible. I
agree that the necessary conditions were
probably lacking. But now, when we are trying
to separate what happened from what is to
happen, it is probably better to look forward not
back, develop more new ideas and try to come
up with an arrangement that is not a gift or a
guarantee from NATO as regards our security
interests.
We shall not disregard your defence rights.
Looking at things the other way round, why are
you not in favour of a unified Germany
becoming a member of the Warsaw Pact and
giving guarantees to countries that belong to
NATO? This would be no worse. You would
regard that as totally unacceptable and when the
matter is looked at from that angle, you can
understand why we too are concerned.
If what we want is to allay concern that a
unified Germany, a powerful state with pow-
erful capabilities, will not pose a threat or make
life uncomfortable for anyone, then could you
explain to me why it is necessary, in a united
Germany, to station nuclear weapons on the ter-
ritory of what is currently the Federal Republic?
Are you prepared to use these weapons against
the Germans if they do not behave as you expect
them to do? If we are not perfectly clear about
all this and do not lay all our cards on the table,
we shall continue to play the same old game and
will not have the mutual understanding nec-
essary for arriving at the best solution.
I can see that this is hardly possible to achieve
overnight and that fairly lengthy transitional
phases will most likely be necessary. Technical
disarmament in Europe will take at least three to
five years followed by a similar period for
reshaping NATO and the Warsaw Pact and
bringing the two organisations and their struc-
tures closer together. About the same time will
also be needed to set up a new pan-European
defence organisation and new authorities but we
must decide on a common objective towards
which our own and your policies are to be
directed. If we move closer to one another on
ideas such as this, we shall be able to overcome
much of the past as well as the present diffi-
culties and we shall be in a position to ward off
the dangers that might be threatening even now.
What is meant by the neutralisation of
Germany? I should like to stress in particular
that the issue is not about obtaining any special
conditions for Germany or about its political
and economic neutralisation. The only thing
that matters is what was stipulated at Potsdam,
namely that no new danger must be allowed to
threaten other countries from German territory
regardless of whether such danger stems from
the Germans themselves or from other nations.
No more, no less. Do you find that unaccep-
table? Is it unacceptable for non-European coun-
tries? If we really believe what we are saying, I
think we are in a position to reach under-
standing on this point.
And something else 
- 
if we are thinking about
setting up a pan-European defence system and if
such a collective security arrangement is pref-
erable to present arrangements, it would
probably be a good idea for the two Germanys
to set an example by showing how this matter
can be resolved and what steps can be envisaged
to that end. It is being realistic to suggest that
Germany provide the impetus for a positive,
creative and constructive continental devel-
opment as it would mean that the attitude of all
countries towards the Germans would be one of
gratitude alone, leaving 
- 
I am sure - no room
for suspicion and fears. This would not be dis-
crimination against Germany but merely a sign
of our confidence, our willingness to count on it
during the process of change. I can for instance
envisage that, on the basis of the German
example, verification procedures could be com-
pleted and subsequently applied throughout the
continent. Similarly, the Germans will apply
verification procedures to us and, as we see it, it
will probably be necessary for some such proce-
dures to be applied not only to Germany but to
other European countries as well.
Finally, the Soviet Union has made a con-
siderable contribution to making the current
changes in Europe possible. It has done every-
thing to ensure that each country in Central and
Eastern Europe exercises its right to make a
choice according to its national character and
historical traditions. It is our actions not our
words that have demonstrated that we are
willing to see a fresh start, a better Europe and
a better world. But we also believe that
co-operation between partners and mutual
respect of the fundamental interests of all parties
constitute the only possible way forward if we
are to attain our objective, because the time for
trial and error is over and none ofus in Europe
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and the rest of the world can afford to make any
more mistakes.
I am sure that the opinions occasionally
voiced here, according to which the Soviet
Union's situation is such that it cannot exercise
its rights and fulfil its obligations, are not seri-
ously held views. They are in part provocative
comments which should get no better answer
than they deserve. One thing is clear: we con-
sider ourselves to be part of Europe and would
not want to be excluded from the processes
which we ourselves, as I have said, have moti-
vated and to which we have made such a huge
contribution, only to become mere statistics as
some politicians in certain quarters would wish.
In fact that would be impossible. Yesterday it
was stressed several times that the Soviet Union
will remain an objective and influential party in
international relations. The Soviet Union will
do all it can to help find a constructive solution
to all the problems facing Europe and the rest of
the world. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mrs.
Lentz-Cornette to put a question to Mr. Falin.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (Luxembourg)
(Translation). 
- 
I should like to ask a question,
Mr. Falin. You just said that the Soviet Union
has demonstrated that it acknowledges the right
of every nation to find and determine its own
way. Mr. Gorbachev has often said that he is in
favour of the right of self-determination for
nations, and we are seeing what has been hap-
pening in the East. He has also said that an addi-
tional protocol regarding the Baltic states 
- 
an
additional protocol to the Hitler-Stalin pact 
-
was a mistake, if I remember correctly.
On l2th March I attended the opening of the
Supreme Soviet in Moscow, and I was surprised
to hear Mr. Gorbachev say " I am alarmed ",
according to the French translation, or
" frightened ", in English, about the news he was
receiving from Lithuania. I should like to ask
you how it can be that we read every day on the
front pages of our newspapers that Lithuania is
exposed to threats, and that there are troop
movements there. For us, and for all the coun-
tries represented here, the Baltic states have
remained independent states for the last fifty
years. How do you see events developing? Will
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as indicated by
elections freely held there, also obtain indepen-
dence and be able to realise their dream, which
here and there is longer than life? You said
earlier that dreams did not last as long as life; I
think that the dream of freedom in the Baltic
states is a long dream which has outlasted many
lives.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I call Mr.
Falin.
Mr. FALIN (Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member
of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet respon-
sible for international affair| (Translation). - I
believe, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, that a distinction
has to be made between international relations
and internal affairs in any country. If that is so,
several models are needed in order to settle
problems that have arisen, and in the case of the
Baltic states in the Soviet Union the procedures
that prevail in our domestic affairs, or the laws
that are being drafted, should be used.
It is stated in our constitution that every
nation in the Soviet Union has the right to reg-
ulate its life on the basis of self-determination,
and if it so wishes, to leave the federation. This
choice has to be made in proper legal form and
not in the way that many politicians and many
populists in the Soviet Union are trying to do it.
To effect it, many questions have to be solved
and above all the true opinion of the majority
has to be ascertained. Under the law that will be
passed in the next few weeks it is provided that a
referendum has to be held in any state that pro-
poses to secede from the Soviet Union, and if a
qualified majority, i.e. two thirds, votes for it,
the secession procedure is initiated. During this
process all the questions have to be settled, eco-
nomic questions, defence questions, questions
of a demographic nature and others, because the
republics concerned were an integral part ofthe
Soviet Union. The links in the various sectors
are very strong and intensive. I do not know
what will be the final decision in Lithuania.
The Sajudis, which is initiating these events in
Lithuania, received 31 9o ofthe vote at the last
elections. And Sajudis is against a referendum,
the opinion of the people has been ascertained
through these elections and no further surveys or
referenda are needed. The unfortunate fact is
that through various manipulations of the votes,
through cheating in polling districts, 3l 9o ofthe
votes gave the Sajudis the majority in the
Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic. But
that is no substitute for these procedures.
You should also bear in mind how Lithuania
gained its independence at the time. This hap-
pened during the first world war in an
agreement between the occupation troops of the
German Reich and persons chosen and
appointed by that Reich. It took place before the
October revolution. This document was drawn
up in l9l5 and signed in September 1917, that
is before the October revolution, and all docu-
ments that in l9l8 and thereafter regulated
questions of independence were based on these
agreements between the High Command of the
German Reich and this group of Lithuanian sep
aratists. This and other agreements stipulated
that Lithuania should be separated from Russia
and should become a protectorate of the
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German Reich and should perform military,
economic and other services for the Reich.
At that time, as you know, there was a Brest-
Litovsk peace treaty signed between us and the
Germans, and the Germans compelled us to
recognise this independence in that treaty. Later
on the treaty was cancelled, after the November
l9l8 revolution in Germany, but some rem-
nants of these arrangements remained, because
there were German troops on the territories of
these three republics until 1920. Even after that,
the German troops were still there on the orders
of the allies, i.e. Great Britain, France and the
United States carried out their own special tasks
there. And if you do not take that into account,
you will not have an accurate view of what it
was and will be about.
Finally, let me say that we lived through the
year 1939. That was indeed a glorious chapter in
our diplomacy and our politics as regards secret
protocols. The language in which those protocols
were couched was not peculiar to Russia; it was
an imperialistic language adopted by Germany
then, but there was no de jure connection
between the contents of these protocols and the
events of the year 1940 when these three
republics became members of the Soviet Union.
lndeed, after these republics had been incorpo-
rated into the Soviet Union, Hitler pondered
whether to declare war on the Soviet Union in
1940. And this was just the pretext he wanted to
use for war. There are authentic documents
proving this.
I do not want to delve further into history, I
would only say this: national questions like this
have to be handled skilfully, and I can assure
you that President Gorbachev and the gov-
ernment bring a large fund of goodwill to the
matter, and we shall do everything in our power
to avoid complications, but we too need
goodwill from the politicians in Lithuania who
are now taking unlawful decisions and are
harming the security and other interests of the
Soviet Union as a whole.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
Mr. Soell.
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. Falin, as a historian who
has studied very intensively the history of inter-
national relations, and particularly those
between Germany and Soviet Russia in the
present century, I was of course very interested
to hear what you said about Soviet efforts to
bring about a restoration of German unity. I do
not wish to go into detail about this; I would
only add to Mr. Genscher's remarks that the
dispute between West and East was not only a
conflict of power policy but of course also a deep
ideological one.
I am bound to add that concepts such as the
restoration of a democratic, peaceful Germany
are viewed with a degree of scepticism, because
under Stalin 
- 
and not only in the decades after
1945 
- 
a murderous conflict was waged with
what was known as social democracy with the
result that after 1945 the social democratic
parties were suppressed in most East European
countries. This was not only the work of the
national communist parties locally, but precisely
because of the fact that the Red Army had
occupied those territories, and this is what
caused the distrust.
If we lay our cards, historically as well, on the
table, we cannot deny this. And there is some-
thing else too, connected with our present-day
problems. The western powers, France, the
Benelux countries and other countries in
Western Europe, have also learned the lessons of
the interwar period, that this Germany is not to
be neutralised 
- 
irrespective of whether it is just
the Federal Republic or a united Germany, so
that it is not tempted to repeat the policy of the
interwar period, right up to Rapallo. Proposals
made by the social democrats in the 1950s had
to take account of this point. We proposed a
European security system then, long before the
Soviet Union, a system to include all parts of
Europe, and in which the reunited Germany
should be embedded. So much by way of pre-
amble.
Now to my question: since we still uphold this
position and take the view that in the long run a
common Europe must not be built without or
against the Soviet Union, we naturally have to
ask whether in practice we can integrate the
Soviet Union to the Urals and beyond as far as
Madivostok, or how should integration of the
Soviet Union in the different areas 
- 
I am now
speaking of the long term 
- 
be effected? How do
Soviet policymakers themselves see their mem-
bership of Europe? Should this be confined to
the western republics, and does not this pre-
suppose a true federalisation of the Soviet
Union itself, not only at state level but on the
level of political powers and social powers? That
is my question.
Mr. FALIN (Director of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member
of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet respon-
sible for international affairs) (Translation). -
This is a question which is perhaps not alto-
gether a question. I would reply as follows: first,
as regards your observation about social
democracy, there is material for a lengthy dis-
cussion, into which I do not wish to enter just
now.
As regards your second observation as to how
far the Soviet Union can be integrated into the
European economic system, I note that you here
in Europe already cook your meals with natural
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gas from Siberia, and that is one sign of such
economic integration. The Soviet Union as a
unitary structure, especially in the economic
sense, does not go as far as the Urals and then
continue in another fashion beyond the Urals.
Everything goes on in a more or less homoge-
neous way, and I hope that we are not the only
ones who think there can be increased
co-operation in the interest of all, and a more
efficient usage of the natural resources here in
Europe and in Asia, which would also be envi-
ronmentally beneficial to Europe.
We think it not only possible but very
desirable. It must, however, be remembered that
such co-operation also requires large capital
investments, because it costs approximately
twice as much to build a house in Moscow as in
Paris and, owing to climatic conditions, three
times as much in Yakutsk as in Moscow. Conse-
quently, much of what we produce in the East is
more expensive from the outset than under
better climatic conditions, say anywhere in
Europe, Africa or Latin America. But we do it
for ourselves. We are prepared to be less egoistic
in this sphere as well. If there is economics-
driven interest here in the West, that could be
discussed on a basis of partnership, and I am
sure that, once we have overcome our present
problems, we shall be much more open to such
desirable prospects than ever before.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Biichner.
Mr. BUCHNER (Federal Republic of
Germany) (Translation). 
- 
You were right to
ask, Mr. Falin, what have weapons and armies
to do in Europe, now that there can be no more
war, because that would be the end of our con-
tinent. You also said that if this realisation were
to be translated into action, the mechanics of
disarmament alone would take some three to
five years, and the same period would be needed
for restructuring the two pacts; and it would
undoubtedly take just as long to build up an
order of security in Europe. I also well under-
stand the great emphasis you laid on the respon-
sibility of the Four for the whole of Germany,
and you called for a peace treaty that would
finally draw a line under the past.
Well, elections were held in the GDR last
Sunday, and whatever conclusions are drawn
from the results of those elections there can
surely be no doubt that most people there ear-
nestly desire to see Germany reunited as soon as
possible. So should the government that is
formed following these elections take the
decision on reunification, or should the Uinder
that are to be reconstituted later on in the GDR
take that decision or should the two German
states do so in a separate process? What validity
would such a decision have for the Soviet
Union? And, Mr. Falin, how would such a
decision relate to your call for a peace treaty? Do
you consider a peace treaty to be the indispen-
sable precondition of German unity or can
German unity be consummated before a peace
treaty is concluded?
Mr. FALIN (Director of the International
Department of the Cental Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member
of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet respon-
sible for international alfairs)(Translation). - I
believe we have here more apparent contradic-
tions. As we understand the situation, there is a
will to unite the two German states, as was again
evidenced by the elections on l8th March. We
recognise this will, and we approve these pro-
cesses. We are in favour of voting in this
meeting of the two plus four on the conse-
quences that arise for the forms and content of
this reunification, and our decisions are to be
taken into account by the two German states in
order that the legitimate interests of the other
nations are not disregarded or neglected. I am
sure that this two plus four instrument provides
such an opportunity, that everything that
happens is properly synchronised, and that we
can formulate principles which can later be
enshrined in a peace treaty which, as far as the
Germans are concerned, will be signed by a gov-
ernment of all the Germans.
As regards frontier questions, these should be
incorporated into a peace treaty, and not only
the German-Polish frontier, but all the frontiers.
As regards such obligations as the renunciation
of ABC weapons, there are still a few important
points which should receive legitimation in such
a treaty, not in the conventional manner but in
the light of the facts, and only then will the
Soviet Union be prepared to renounce its rights
which, I repeat, until today remain valid in
international law.
I would particularly emphasise that we in the
Soviet Union do not regard such a peace treaty
with Germany as a document of the traditional
kind, which punishes the loser in a war. That is
not our intention. We understand such a peace
as truly an invitation to a fresh start with quali-
tatively new relationships and therefore, as these
words imply, the treaty should not discriminate
against Germany or offend the feelings of the
German nation. It should be a document for the
distant future, a basis for co.operative, equal,
good-neighbourly relations between Germans,
the Soviet Union and other nations in Europe.
That is the idea. Therefore the very expression
" peace treaty ", traditional though it may
sound, should not be confused with our
position. We understand that, in the forty-five
years that have elapsed since the end ofthe war,
many things have changed and this should be
taken into account.
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Falin. This concludes a very interesting
debate.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful
and secure order in Europe -
prospects stemming from developments
in Central and Eastern Europe
(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Comminee
ond vote on the draft recommendatioa,
Doc. 1216 aad amendments)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next
order of the day is the resumed debate on the
report of the Political Committee on the estab-
lishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe 
- 
prospects stemming from develop
ments in Central and Eastern Europe, Doc-
ument 1216 and amendments.
We still have to hear one speaker on the report
by Mr. Pontillon and the Secretary-General of
WEU wishes to make a brief declaration. At the
conclusion of the debate, we have to examine 18
amendments and I feel that it will not therefore
be possible to terminate our session this
morning as many members would wish.
However, I believe the Chairman of the com-
mittee wishes to make a proposal.
I call Mr. Ahrens.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, may I first on behalf of the committee
thank the Rapporteur and the secretariat very
warmly for producing this difficult report. The
main difficulty was that events backstage were
often developing more quickly than those on
stage and hence we were not able to hold our
final meeting until 12th March. Because of that,
we have received a whole host of amendments,
some as recently as yesterday morning, and for
that reason I am unable to give you the commit-
tee's recommendations on the individual
amendments. I would therefore propose, Mr.
President, that those who have tabled amend-
ments should agree to withdraw them and that
we treat them as g"reen papers and revert to them
at the earliest opportunity. Events are in such a
flux that in my opinion we would not help
matters by voting on these amendments this
afternoon, piecemeal at breakneck speed, with
what majorities and which participants I know
not.
PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr.
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
Mr. President, since I together
with others, especially members of the German
group, am the author of a number of these
amendments and, as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg said
yesterday during the debate, we are still at the
green paper stage, that is to say, in a situation in
which many proposals have to be discussed
simultaneously and nobody should insist dog-
matically upon a proposal, for instance about
pan-European security structures, I believe we
should pass these amendments on to the
Political Committee as material for further dis-
cussion, and apart from that put the draft rec-
ommendation, as passed by the Political Com-
mittee, unchanged to the vote here.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. Soell. Do you intend to maintain your
amendments if other authors of amendments
refuse to withdraw them?
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
On condition that other people
withdraw their amendments as well, I am pre-
pared to do so.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
What is the
view of the authors of the other amendments?
I call Mr. Pieralli.
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). I
accept Mr. Ahrens's proposal to withdraw the
amendments provided everyone does likewise.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg.
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
If I have understood what Mr. Ahrens has said,
he found that there has been no consultation
with the bureau of the committee, which would
have been the courteous thing, and that it is
most unusual not to do so. What I want to make
clear is that Mr. Soell actually misquoted me. I
was not saying we should treat this document as
a green paper. What I would suggest is that I
support what Mr. Ahrens has said, together with
what Mr. Soell said, that, if all the amendments
are withdrawn, we may then put the report with
its recommendation to the vote without the
amendments and then there can be a second
document in due course.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs.
Baarveld-Schlaman.
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (Nether-
lands) (Translation). - The terms green paper
and white paper were introduced here yesterday.
From the last discussion I conclude that this has
again given rise to a misunderstanding. May I
ask you the following question in my own words,
without using these terms? Amendments have
been tabled. They were to have been put to the
Assembly at 3 o'clock this afternoon. It is news
to me that the sitting is not to continue at 3
o'clock. But that, it seems, is what has been
agreed. You obviously intend to close the sitting
now. And that means the amendments will not
be discussed, partly because they have not been
considered by the Political Committee. My
objection to this is that this Assembly will be
approving a document which might have been
The
Soell.
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open to at least some comments and some
changes. Am I to understand from your proposal
that, even if the document is approved by the
Assembly, it will nonetheless be reconsidered by
the Political Committee and that the amend-
ments which have been tabled will then be taken
into account?
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I think
there is some misunderstanding. The document
to be voted upon today will be a Western
European Union document and if I understand
correctly the proposals just made, this report
will be brought up to date in another report
later. I believe this is a wise proposal in view of
the present evolution. If I called Mr. Ahrens to
make this proposal, it is because I am respon-
sible for organising the work and if the authors
of the amendments are prepared to withdraw
them it would allow me to close the session at
the end of this morning. If the amendments are
withdrawn, therefore, they will not have to be
debated. I have not yet received Mr. De
Decker's agreement, but I will ask for his
opinion as soon as he comes into the chamber.
In the meantime, I propose that the debate be
continued.
I call Mr. Malfatti.
Mr. MALFATTI (Italy) (Translation). 
- 
I
should like to thank Mr. Pontillon for his hard
work.
Ladies and gentlemen, it would be para-
doxical for anyone to conceive the European
order that we all want to establish as an oppor-
tunity for the delayed implementation of
Stalin's policy of the fifties, that is the
neutralisation and not the reunification of
Germany 
- 
or for the final application in
practice of one of the silliest political slogans we
ever heard in the past 
- 
* Yankees go home ".
Instead, the real problem is to use every
opportunity offered by the extraordinary times
in which we are living, following the end of the
cold war and the division of Europe, to take
serious action to build a better pan-European
order to be achieved by dialogue and collabo-
ration and not world confrontation. The oppor-
tunity is now here thanks in large measure to
the brave political decisions taken by Mr.
Gorbachev and the ending of the dictatorial
rdgimes now in progress in Central and Eastern
Europe.
In the few minutes available to me, I wish to
stress the importance, at an early date, of further
force reductions to the lowest possible level onboth sides and to emphasise the strictly
defensive nature ofthe forces deployed on either
side 
- 
defensive defence as Mr. Eyskens said
yesterday, with the appropriate addition of
defensive deterrence. We attach great impor-
tance to the negotiations on arms reductions and
on further confidence-building measures and
therefore to the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe and its follow-up, as the
best place for enlarging, as we would like, all
areas of co.operation between European coun-
tries and for negotiations on further force reduc-
tions. That conference, with the United States
and Canada taking a full part, endorses the prin-
ciple that for the foreseeable future an American
presence, including armed forces, will be needed
in Europe in order to maintain the balance.
As my third point, I should like to emphasise
that there is no equivalence and can therefore be
no parallel between the Warsaw Pact and the
Atlantic Alliance, so that it is untrue that the
dissolution of the pact involves the disap
pearance of the alliance. I would add that the
mistaken theory of parallelism limits to some
extent the full freedom of judgment and action,
which are the sole responsibility and free choice
of the individual countries belonging to each
alliance.
I think we all agree that the Atlantic Alliance,
including unified Germany, is no obstacle at all
to the creation ofthe new European order and is
not contrary to the legitimate security needs of
all European countries and first of all the Soviet
Union. In my view, therefore, the r6le of the
alliance in the present circumstances is not of an
interim or transitional nature and I consider in
fact that such ideas may give doubts among our
peoples.
Moreover, we must in future be very careful
not to further what I would look upon as the
completely negative process of renationalising
our military and security policies. The new
European order is not an alternative to the
alliance, nor is WEU, whose reactivation is still
on the agenda. As for the European Community,
it must strengthen its political dimension in the
next few months. In the present circumstances,
stagnation or any move back would be a disaster
for everyone. And, finally, this stronger Com-
munity must open its doors for more vigorous
and friendly collaboration with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe that deserve our
fullest support of which I should like to assure
our German colleagues in the warmest terms at
a time, started by the crumbling of the Berlin
wall, of such significance for the history of
Germany and Europe as a whole.
(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair)
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you very much,
Mr. Malfatti.
The next speaker is Mr. Fourr6.
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation).
Recent events in Central Europe induced the
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West to reassess its co-operation and ponder on
its responsibility. From this point of view, the
Pontillon report comes at an appropriate time to
examine together what can be done in the near
future to meet the requirements created by this
transformation. The examination, country by
country, of this evolution in Central and Eastern
Europe offers much hope for the future but also
fears. For instance, the progress of these coun-
tries towards democracy must not make us
forget the danger of local conflicts attributable
mainly to nationalist movements. Above all, we
must respond with specific solutions to create a
new peaceful and secure order in Europe.
I believe this new European order must first
be established on the need to maintain the alli-
ances. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are still
indispensable instruments for maintaining
shared security, the corollary of which is the
maintenance of a minimum threshold of
security and deterrence. The maintenance of the
Atlantic Alliance is still necessary today. Indeed,
the alliance is a framework for negotiations on
disarmament and security in Europe and on
confidence-building measures. Above all, this
new European order must be based on the
stren$hening of WEU.
Mr. Baker's proposal to extend the alliance
action to political matters overlooks the fact that
the Council of Europe or WEU would be in a
better position to pursue this action, at least in
certain fields. WEU has a r6le to play where the
alliance's action is insufficient, in the Mediter-
ranean, and for co-ordinating the action of
member states outside the North Atlantic Treaty
area. WEU has a r6le to play in verification.
WEU is the only European organisation that can
draw on the unique experience of its Agency for
the Control of Armaments to secure the partici-
pation of the member states: data bank, pro-
cessing of data, training of inspectors and, pos-
sibly, the use of satellites.
The Belgian proposal to create an early
warning system in the event of emergencies
linking the countries of Western and Eastern
Europb must also be examined in this
framework. WEU must respond to develop-
ments and new requirements and try to antic-
ipate them by constant exchanges of views
between its members.
In agreement with NATO, WEU must explain
its position on possible requests to join made by
trufu democratic and independent countries of
the East. Proposals may also be made to these
countries since it is particularly important to
integrate them in an international order at a
time when, in the teeth of serious economic and
political problems, they are at risk of reverting
-o dangerous nationalist positions. They can also
be associated with think-tanks examining the
disarmament process and also new strategic
data, verification, etc. WEU thus appears to be
the only European body to examine defence
matters. It is also normal for it to assume
responsibilities vis-i-vis the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
On the question of the German Democratic
Republic being reunited with the Federal
Republic of Germany, the neutrality solution
would raise major diffrculties for the disarm-
ament process. What solution then for this
reunified Germany to reconcile its western soli-
darity, the necessary maintenance of the alli-
ancei and the strong expression of its people in
favour of a position of neutrality? Several ideas
have been put forward this morning. I would
add one: as a first stage would it not be possible
for reunified Germany to have a status similar
to that of France, member of WEU and of the
alliance, but not part of the NATO integrated
command structure? This is the question I raise.
The r6le of WEU in the verification process is to
be reaffirmed. The proposed European satellite
agency is also to be discussed in Rome. I am
happy that my proposal will be part of a dis-
cussion on the verification of armaments. That
may also be a means of introducing confidence-
building measures and special measures of
co-operation with the countries of the East
which have shown proof of democratic progress
in the western sense of the term.
In this way, Mr. President, in parallel with
promoting confederation, WEU would play its
i6le of opening to other European countries to
strengthen co-operation in the same way as the
Council of Europe would affirm its rOle of par-
liament for this European confederation.
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much,
Mr. Fourr6.
May I inform the Assembly that Mr. De
Decker has agreed to withdraw his amendment
so all the amendments will now not be taken?
The next speaker is Mr. MezzaPesa.
Mr. MEZZAPESA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr.
President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Pontillon
has produced an excellent report, which takes a
detailed overall look at the new situation created
in Europe by the startling changes in the East.
WithouC the understandable emotion of the flrrst
days and without the quite legitimate expression
of satisfaction by European democrats who have
witnessed a swift succession of events resulting
in moves towards democracy in countries so
long under the heel of tyrannical r6gimes, the
report, for which I too would like to thank
Mi. Pontillon, helps us to take a very careful
look at the radical changes now taking place,
because it cannot yet be said that everything is
clear, as some of this morning's speeches have
shown.
83
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES THIRD SITTING
Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)
Mr. Pontillon is right in saying that there are
still many uncertainties about the future and
about the stability of the eastern countries,
although it cannot be denied that a clearly dem-
ocratiC and pluralistic tendency is gaihering
strength as confirmed by events after the
drafting of the report, such as the very recent
elections in East Germany.
The point to be stressed above all is that the
main significance of the amazing changes in the
East is that Europe has regained its central
position, as has been recognised by many
speakers, starting with Mr. Genscher.
The lure of a united Europe created the basic
conditions for the changes, and encouraged
them to a pace faster than even the greatest opti-
mists could have imagined. It is clearly our duty
to ensure that this attraction continues to act as
a positive force.
Basically, it is the Europe of Helsinki which is
producing its effects because Helsinki was the
turning point towards a new overall European
policy which gives equal importance to human
rights, which are the cornerstone of the Council
of Europe's political action, economic co-oper-
ation, which is the special province of the Com-
munity, and military security, which is the basic
concern of our WEU. Helsinki saw the emer-
gence and consolidation ofthe idea that, beyond
geographical confrnes, the United States and
Canada are also Europe, so that the presence of
300 000 American soldiers on European soil no
longer means, as it did after the war, the
presence offoreign occupiers but oftroops doing
the same job as European troops in safeguarding
the peace.
Here, Europe has io convince itself that what
is happening within its boundaries cannot be
managed by others but has to be managed
together with others. This is the purpose of the
alliances and the need for them. Woe betide us if
the disarmament negotiations were conducted
by the individual countries and not by the alli-
ances. I think back to the alarm expressed by the
French newspaper Le Monde at the end of
January, in response to some dangerous signs of
a tendency towards unilateral disarmament.
Referring to the Vienna negotiations, the article
said that they remain the only means of man-
aging the changes on the old continent and
maintaining stability. This view is confirmed in
Mr. Pontillon's report. The alliances are a factor
for peace and order until such time as a new
security order has been established and consoli-
dated throughout Europe.
This is the background to the problem of the
reunification of the German people into a singlepolitical system that was one of the basic aims
which the signatories to the modified Brussels
Treaty set for themselves in 1954. Conse-
quently, progress on the important political
problem concerns not only the two existing
German states plus the four occupying powers
but also all the European countries, as Mr.
Genscher acknowledged an hour ago, and in par-
ticular the members of NATO and WEU. As
Mr. Pontillon noted, the WEU countries have
the right to know whether or not united
Germany will maintain the commitments
entered into by the Federal Republic of
Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty.
The PRESIDENT. 
- 
Thank you very much,
Mr. Mezzapesa.
The next speaker is Sir William Shelton.
Sir William SHELTON (United Kingdom). 
-Mr. President and colleagues. First, like
everyone who has spoken, I wish to congratulate
the Rapporteur out of sincerity and not just for
form's sake and for two or three minutes I want
to make three points.
The first one is this. Having read the report
and listened to the distinguished Rappporteur
the other day, I do not entirely agree with what
he has said about the relevance of the Warsaw
Pact and NATO. I do not regard them as alli-
ances of equal stature. I think there is a signif-
icant difference between them. For instance, the
Warsaw Pact is a Soviet-dominated, military
organisation imposed on Eastern European
countries against their will in many cases, while
NATO is a free alliance of independent, demo-
cratic countries. Consequently, I would suggestit is not for us in the West to say that the
Warsaw Pact should, or indeed should not, con-
tinue. It is not for us to give any support, tacit or
otherwise, to the Warsaw Pact. It is for the East
Europeans themselves to decide for themselves
whether they wish it to continue or whether they
wish to remain in it.
Secondly, a quick point. Paragraph 86 men-
tions the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary,Mr. Hurd, in Bonn last February who is
reported as saying that some of Germany's allies
are not prepared to let a united Germany asso-
ciate the present forces of the two states, nor to
break away from the Federal Republic's renun-
ciations in regard to armaments or the
deployment of its forces. I am authorised to say
that in fact this is not an accurate report of his
discussions.
The third point I wish to make is the very
interesting speech by the German Foreign Min-
ister, Mr. Genscher, when he spoke of a vision
for European security and he spoke ofa cutback
in weapons and manpower to minimum levels. I
would suggest, as I have suggested before, that
first, before one can agree on European security
and minimum levels, one must assess the level
of threat and type of threat that might face us in
Europe. I would suggest to colleagues that we
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cannot decide what should be a minimum level
without f,rrst assessing what sort of attack may
face us. For instance, terrorism. Yes, I expect
that will continue to face us for too long. Sec-
ondly, Balkanisation has been mentioned. Civil
unrest, war between European countries - I do
not know, but I hope this is not possible.
Thirdly, for instance, a rogue dictator in some
country, not necessarily in Europe, who perhaps
is producing germ warfare or perhaps has access
to nuclear weapons. Well, that again would need
to be'considered before one could decide what
are minimum levels. Consequently, I welcome
very much part III, paragraph l, of Mr. Pon-
tillon's recommendation that we can explore the
possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for
assessing possible threats to member countries.
This I welcome and I think that this could be a
very important and useful r6le as a base on
which one could decide what the security system
should be for our great continent.
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair)
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
Mrs. Beer.
Mrs. BEER (Federal Republic of Germany)(Translation). 
- 
Ladies and gentlemen, I too
have read the very wide-ranging report with
great interest, but I think that ifjustice is to be
done to it, it is regrettable that proposed amend-
ments to the final recommendation should be
withdrawn in order to leave open the prospects
of the current very rapid developments in
Europe, for this demands that the facts as they
are should be actually addressed, even if there
are some differences of content.
I should like to refer to the debate we have
held and to say something about neutrality,
because of course we West Germans have a
special responsibility in this matter. I agree with
other speakers that neutrality cannot be a status
for a reunited Germany, but I should like to add
a further thought and to ask you, neutrality
between whom? For neutrality implies the con-
tinued existence of two blocs, and I am con-
vinced that the Warsaw Pact, which is still rep-
resented here as being equal, is no longer the
same entity as before. That is abundantly clear
from current events in Europe.
I should also like to say something about
responsibility and about self-determination. Ijust want to put some questions to you, perhaps
for your consideration. [s not the right of self-
determination, which we accord to all, also the
responsibility to allow this self-determination to
increase? Is it not the right of a state which is
still that of East Germany, which for forty years
was unable to practise this right, to decide upon
the course it will follow, participatively, with a
little more patience, a little more time? And
does the confidence, for example, of this
Assembly that it has always acted well and
chosen the right option, confer the right to
support such a rapid process, to emphasise its
own importance and to justify it for the future?
I myself think that the European bodies as at
present existing also merit much criticism and I
believe, as does our Foreign Minister Genscher,
that the CSCE is the only body that at the
present time leaves enough democratic room for
manoeuvre for building true participation and
co-determination of all the European partners.
I should like to tell you why I am not alone,
but one of very many in the Federal Republic,
who view the existence and the consolidation of
WEU with considerable scepticism, in the light
of the thought advanced by Mr. Dregger in
France. He says that France should make its
nuclear strategy available within the European
framework and for the strengthening of WEU.
This policy arouses fresh fears; it could not
command a majority in the Federal Republic
and is an obstacle to what we want to achieve,
which is the dissolution of the blocs in a gradual
process in which all states are answerable.
In conclusion, I should just like to say that we
hope that this Assembly, and the others as well,
will succeed in formulating in the near future
what is meant by this common, collective
Europe. For my part I can only say that we are
striving for a system of collective security, long
term; that is not a new definition, but it implies
demilitarisation. I believe that German history
would make it very fitting for Germany to begin
building confidence. We want the ideology of
deterrence to be dismantled, because it is an
obstacle to partnership with equality of rights.
We want the Federal Republic, and reunited
Germany, to set a good example to all countries
by ceding its sovereignty to European bodies -
something for which the CSCE could certainly
form a basis. Above all we want a collective
system of this kind, that will put an end to
mutual threats, to come about through the
linking together with equal status of the states
now bound by pacts.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
Mr. Scovacricchi.
Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am sub-
stantially in agreement with Mr. Pontillon's
report and the line it takes, except for some
updating which I would have liked to see, but
this quite understandably means that events are
moving faster than us and we can never keep up.
This is an extraordinary session of Western
European Union which I believe provides very
useful material for reflection on its r6le and
raison d'Otre. I believe that many of us, of you,
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have come to the conclusion that we must move
ahead to new models and strategies to replace
those which have been too unchanging and
repetitive and must look further afield without
of course dismantling defences until Europe is at
peace, which I frankly do not yet believe to be
the case.
But while we reinforce these political and mil-
itary institutions, I believe that we must pay
more attention to the Mediterranean. I think the
Italian Minister of State, Mr. Vitalone, said the
same thing yesterday when he stressed the size
and importance of the Mediterranean in the new
European picture because it harbours threats of
potential dangers which must be watched very
closely.
Today we are all worried about what is hap
pening in the Baltic republics. I have to say
frankly 
- 
perhaps I did not understand com-
pletely 
- 
that I cannot agree with everything said
by the Soviet representative who made what was
more than anything an officialese speech. We
have expressed no offrcial view on the matter
but we would have the right to do so, because
who, more than us, as a political and military
alliance, should be concerned about what is hap-
pening in Baltic Europe, where we hope that the
right to self-determination will prevail? There
can be no doubt about that and my feeling
watching television this morning was that we
cannot say that Lithuania has been invaded by
Soviet troops and tanks, but this threatening
presence is certainly significant. We are fully
aware that the atmosphere is tense and for all
that Mr. Gorbachev has said that he has no
intention of using force of arms and for all that
America has called on him not to do so, we
know that these things begin but we never know
low they will finish and history is unfortunatelyfull of warnings to that effect.
I should like to take away one meaningful and
what I might call consoling thought from the
speeches of Mr. Genscher and the Polish repre-
sentative at this morning's sitting. They were
speeches of great European inspiration, as Mr.
Mezzapesa said earlier. From all this upheaval
we have been witnessing in Europe, the issue to
emerge most clearly 
- 
I might even say the
trump card 
- 
appears to be Europe, the inte-
gration of Europe we have dreamed of for so
long while always encountering unending difli-
culties on the way. From all sides there is a call
for Europe and this is a favourable sign which
we must gladly, positively and with great satis-
faction take away from today's sitting.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I now call
Mr. Roseta, observer from Portugal.
Mr. ROSETA (Observer 
_from Portugal)(Translation). 
- 
I should like to begin by heartily
congratulating Mr. Pontillon on his excellent
report. I think that the renewed importance of
our organisation is the result both of the work
done and the intiatives taken during recent
years, and also of the re-emergence of politics,
which is resuming its priority over mere eco-
nomic management and the interminable dis-
cussion of quotas for this or that product. As our
President reminded us, for very many years
topics such as these appeared to dominate
European life to excess.
lt was the rapid developments in Central and
Eastern Europe, the collapse of a system that
proved to be obsolete, because it was unable to
satisfy the aspirations of the people, that
brought fundamental political questions to the
fore, and the realisation that the political
choices that had to be made are fundamentally
important to the solution of all the questions,
even the economic ones. This then is one of the
reasons why organisations that are essentially
political, such as WEU and the Council of
Europe, have once again come increasingly into
the limelight. That is why we are today dis-
cussing here the fundamental political concerns
ofpresent-day Europe, on the very day on which
the Portuguese President has convened in
Lisbon an extraordinary meeting of the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to
discuss the problems of Central and Eastern
Europe. I should like to underline some aspects
of the concerns of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe which are common to all of
them, which were confirmed by the tour
d'horizon of Minister Jo66 de Deus Pinheiro in
his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, and which
are in the report of our colleague, Mr. Pontillon,
but which I should like specially to emphasise.
All these countries wish to evolve towards a
market economy, all of them appreciate the
importance of pan-European co-operation in the
field of security, and stress the importance to be
attached to the CSCE process. All of them wish
to come closer to the Council of Europe until
they join it, and believe it to be the forum in
which the question of human rights should be
pursued. I therefore share the opinion of Sir
Geoffrey Finsberg when he said yesterday that
there is no need to create new organisations to
discuss political questions relating to human
rights and those of minorities. Only the Council
of Europe has the experience and status to do
this; another organisation would lack that status,
and would be destined to fail.
As regards security, I am in agreement with
what is stated in our report and is recommended
by others as to the r6le of our organisation.
WEU, being a political organisation, is bound to
play an increased part in matters affecting the
inviolability of frontiers and of the inalienable
and undoubted right of the German people to
self-determination, and hence its right to unifi-
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cation. What can Portugal contribute to WEU?
Portugal's special position as an Atlantic country
with special interests in the south of our world,
particularly in Africa, is a factor to be borne in
mind. Furthermore, our experience of a change
of r6gimes is considered to be extremely usefulfor the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Not only the transition from dictatorship to
democracy which the Portuguese made peace-
fully sixteen years ago but also, which many
people forget, the transition from an almost
wholly collectivised system to a market
economy, which we have completed over the
last few years. I should also like to mention our
commitment to strengthening the European
pillar, and to state that this is compatible with
our traditional Atlantic connection which, by
the way, we like others would never dream of
calling to question. We support the idea that the
security of the whole world is indivisible and
hence that the security of Europe is indissolubly
connected with the security of the rest of the
world. For this reason we shall have to give
more attention in future to questions of security
on the southern flank of Europe.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, ladies
and gentlemen, in speaking for the last time as
Portuguese observer in this Assembly, I wish to
pay tribute to the important work done by this
Assembly on the occasion of the first
enlargement of this organisation to include the
two lberian countries, without forgetting the
part played by the President and all the other
members, but also the two Portuguese observers
who, over the years, have come and taken part
in our work.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now call
the last speaker, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-
General of our organisation.
Mr. van EEKELEN (Secretary-General of
WEU) (Translation).- At the conclusion of your
debates, I wish to remind you that the joint
determination to proscribe warfare without sac-
rificing freedom is at the origin of the Brussels
and Washington Treaties. This ambition is at
the heart of all the efforts of our member states
to guarantee their collective security and to
promote co-operation in all areas while retaining
a close link with our North American allies.
The opening of the Berlin wall precipitated a
historic upheaval and 
- 
with one exception 
- 
a
peaceful transition towards democracy. In this
decisive phase the WEU countries have a duty
to be in the first line in implementing a
European Ostpolitik, the keywords of which are
opening, solidarity, security. It is indeed funda-
mental for the new democratic r6gimes to be
able to take root and gain strength. The adap-
tation, in certain cases even the reconstruction,
of the economies of Eastern Europe on the new
bases of economic truth and the laws of the
market will not be achieved without difficulty.
The co-operation we must offer them should
seek to accelerate reconversion while keeping
watch on the effectiveness of our investments
and keeping the social cost within bearable
limits. In this evolution the European Com-
munity plays an eminent r6le as a model, as a
reference and as an instrument of co-ordination.
It will play this r6le the better in that it will be
able to strengthen itself and progress towards the
goal of European union clearly spelt out in the
single act.
The most immediate ground for this
co-operation is no doubt the GDR where every-
thing began and which is today at the heart of
the European security question.
German unity is happening before our very
eyes. The unity of Germany is above all a
victory of democracy over 56 years of dicta-
torship. It will be a victory of European inte-
gration and Atlantic solidarity, for democratic
Germany will be built with due respect for the
agreements and the treaties and all the prin-
ciples defined in the Helsinki final act as
explained in the declaration adopted by the
European Council last December.
Bernard Shaw said that freedom implied
responsibility which is why so many people are
afraid of it. Germany, as a member of WEU and
of the European Community, chose freedom at
the cost of its division. East Germans are
electing to jdin it to gain their freedom. This
choice-implies unity and new responsibilities.
Let us share them with all Germans by turning
towards the future rather than cultivating
painful historical memories which are very
largely anachronistic and sterile at the presentjuntture. To advance towards European inte-
gration, whether in its economic, monetary o{
iecurity dimensions, we need the whole of
Germany. We must therefore leave Germany,
alone wiih itself in its trials today and in face of
the challenges of tomorrow.
The alliance, i.e. the link between the defence
of Europe and that of America around the
central and irreplaceable notion of nuclear
deterrence, gave us forty years ofpeace. [t must
be maintained at all costs which means that all
the European allies must assume a gf,eater share
of their defence. Now is the time to strengthen
the European pillar of the alliance and to
redefine the tasks of the American forces at our
side. Failing this it would be difficult to count
on the maintenance of an American presence
albeit indispensable for maintaining the stra-
tegic balance on our continent, for Russia will
remain a considerable continental power.
Our co-operation will be vital
areas of reduction, redeployment
in the three
and verifi-
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cation if we wish to take full advantage of the
dynamics of armaments control.
The reduction of forces should be done in a
co-ordinated manner, taking into account the
ways and means of redeploying American and
Soviet forces. Inevitably, the problem of forces
stationed in Germany, whatever their nation-
ality or juridical r6gime, will be a subject of
polemic. A possible solution in the direction of
European unity would be to form major units on
a multinational basis for our forces. It is for
WEU to study the practicality of audacious and
imaginative approaches leading to increased
security for all the nations of Europe because
they will show that recourse to military force in
Europe will no longer ever be a purely national
prerogative in the service of egoistic interests.
We must also avoid solutions imposing special
r6gimes for Germany. The idea of multilateral
forces should be applied to other countries too.
Clearly, there will be no guaranteed European
security without taking into account the specific
interests of Russia in this matter. There we
encounter the difliculty stemming from the
impossibility of foreseeing what the evolution
will be in the Soviet Union. Everyone knows the
difficulties of perestroika. Everyone sees the rise
of nationalisms around the periphery. The
security interests of the USSR of yesterday are
not the same as those of the Russian republics
today. Quite obviously we must not agravate
Moscow's difficulties, but what is Mr.
Gorbachev's 'common European house "
becoming in this context? The present state of
the Soviet house hardly allows its leaders to
propose any model for organising our continent.
The countries of WEU have been creating the
model for tens of years in the framework of the
European Community.
For the application of this model to the other
countries of Europe wishing to draw close to it,
means of association must be found which will
activate transitions. The CSCE will remain an
important reference framework but for imple-
menting its decisions we must turn to all the
European institutions. Indeed, it is they that are
the rallying-point and anchor for the new
democracios of Eastern Europe.
WEU must be the instrument for developing
security co-operation in Europe. Our countriei
must strengthen their cohesion in a spirit of
opening without fearing to assume joint opera-
tional responsibilities when their forces are
restructured and the CFE agreement or space
co-operation are verified. This answers Mr.
Baumel, who asked me this question yesterday
afternoon. WEU can play an important r0le in
the stabilisation of Europe as a privileged inter-
locutor for the new democracies in- security
questions in order to promote collective security
and shared security as appropriately proposed
by Mr. Pontillon.
The success of the Franco-German fraternity
shows us the way to be followed to create a true
fraternity of European nations. In this approach
we must not temporise nor seek to maintain
control over any nation. United Europe implies
equal rights and duties. National interests will
be served the better in a European architecture
in which each one verifies all the others and will
be verified by all.
WEU will continue to work for the devel-
opment of true solidarity which will take the
place of former conflictual relations so as to
become irreversible. Thus the progress of our
European co-operation will take on a truly his-
toric dimension.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Secretary-General.
The debate is closed.
I call the Rapporteur to reply to the
speakers.
Mr. PONTILLON (France) (Translation). 
-At this late hour and for the excellent reason
that I feel the most important things have been
said and well said by many of my colleagues, I
shall certainly not reply to the speakers.
I am gratified by the general tone of the
debate, the brilliant contributions made and
almost general approval of the views of the
Political Committee. There have no doubt been
different approaches, feelings, in the course of
the debate as is quite natural in a democratic
parliament. They in no way call in question the
tone and the substance, they merely portray dif-
ferences of pace.
I shall not try to answer all the various com-
ments. I would say, however, that I agree with
Mr. De Decker on his suggestion that France
and the United Kingdom be invited to get
together to examine a joint nuclear guarantee. I
have been flrghting for an idea of this kind for
years. I do not feel that it is my country that is
the most reserved and susceptible but I am sat-
isfied to record important progress in this
atea.
I shall not revert to the problems of the CSCE
and the ensuing discussions regarding the course
to be followed. As Mr. Eyskens said yesterday
morning, I believe we must not add further com-
plications. The CSCE, which has played an
essential r6le and is the accelerator of the
movement towards democracy in Eastern
Europe, naturally remains the necessary frame-
work for co-operation and the guarantees to be
provided at international level, although it is not
an operational structure. Here I agree with most
of the reservations expressed by Sir Geoffrey
Finsberg and the need to revitalise the institu-
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tions which are the natural bodies for European
co-operation.
My special thanks go to our German col-
leagues who have voiced their refusal of neu-
tralism. If I understood correctly Mr. Falin's
comments just now, the debate is clearly not
closed.
I likewise congratulate our ltalian colleagues
for their many and brilliant speeches which
testify to the growing importance of the
southern dimension of international relations
and, more generally, the southern flank of our
security. Our Turkish colleague needs no reas-
surance in this matter, since the place his
country already occupies in western security
seems to be in no way affected or reduced in the
future. Quite the contrary.
A brief word to echo an idea put forward by
Senator Jung in his question to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Poland suggesting going
beyond the legal framework of formal frontiers
and towards a broader European space. I find
this an interesting idea which we could possibly
explore further in the framework of our com-
mittee. I would say the same for the idea raised
by my eminent colleague, Jean-Pierre Fourr6, on
the future military status of unified Germany,
which might also be studied in greater detail in
our committee.
My introductory remarks should rather
appease Sir William Shelton's apprehensions. I
did not suggest maintaining the pacts, particu-
larly the Warsaw Pact. I merely noted that they
were still there and that, as such, they could
serve as a basis for dialogue.
Finally, I listened with pleasure to Mr. Roseta,
the forerunner from the Iberian peninsula, who
added several pertinent remarks to the debate.
This testifies to the quality of the contribution
that our Portuguese and Spanish colleagues will
make to our future work.
Thank you, too, to our Secretary-General for
sounding the final note by recalling the prin-
ciples and common values which are the basis
and inspiration for our European ambitions and
our responsibilities.
Mr. President,ladies and gentlemen, what can
we conclude from all that? We have had a good,
fruitful debate, a text on which unanimity has
been achieved and that is all to the good.
Perhaps it is diflicult for us to imagine a world
which escapes our simplifying visions. This is
true for frontiers and there it is better to
maintain the status quo than to open Pandora's
box. It is true for the alliances, although if confi-
dence returns in a lasting manner, the fear
inherited from antagonistic blocs will cease and
a new balance will progressively be imposed and
the pacts in their present form will not resist.
Starting with what now exists, we must find
what can help to prepare this different peaceful
order. And as many speakers have said, the
structures exist whose development, merger or
extension can offer a propitious framework for
the development of that Europe without bound
aries of which Frangois Perroux used to speak.
The Council of Europe, the CSCE and WEU are
amongst these structures. All we need now,
ladies and gentlemen, is political determination.
It has not been lacking here and, finally, I think
this is the most fortunate conclusion for this
debate.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the
Chairman of the committee.
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Translation). 
- 
In view of the time, I think I
will secure the backing of my colleagues if I ask
that the report be adopted. It was discussed in
detail in committee. The situation is evolving
and this is a view of the position today which
will have to be kept under review, discussed
further and brought up to date. I ask you to
adopt the report.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
All the
amendments having been withdrawn, we shall
now vote on the draft recommendation in Doc-
ument 1216.
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show
of hands unless five representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by
roll-call.
Are there five members requesting a vote by
roll-call?...
There are not. The vote will be taken by show
of hands.
(A vote was then taken by show of hands)
The draft recommendation is adoptedt.
Mr. De Decker and Mr. Tummers have asked
to explain their votes.
I call Mr. De Decker.
Mr. DE DECKER (Belqium)(Translation). -
Mr. President, my explanation will be very brief
in view of the excellent synthesis Mr. Pontillon
has made and Secretary-General van Eekelen's
remarkable statement which I fully endorse. I of
course voted in favour ofthis report, but, as you
have seen, I agreed to withdraw the amendment
I had tabled to part ll (ix) to leave out the para-
graph of the preamble which reads:
* Considering, however, that it is essential for
the new German state to be integrated in a
European collective security system with
which the United States and Canada remain
associated and constituting in itself the
nucleus of an all-European security system; "
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I proposed replacing this text by:
" Considering, however, that it is essential for
the new German state to be integrated in the
collective security systems constituted by
NATO and WEU; "
I would have preferred these words which
were more precise. But as Mr. Soell agreed to
withdraw his amendments and the debate
showed undeniably the very clear determination
- 
I would say, almost unanimous 
- 
of our
Assembly and of the Germans taking part in our
work not to have Germany follow the road
towards neutrality, since, furtherrnore, I believe
the words I introduced were perhaps more
limitative insofar as the security systems
existing today are NATO and WEU but perhaps
might tomorrow be the EEC, I believe it was
useful to withdraw my amendment. But you will
understand that I am doing this in a spirit far
closer to that described in the speeches by Mr.
Poos, Mr. van Eekelen or Mr. Eyskens than in
certain considerations .by Mr. Genscher who,
although belonging to my political family, makes
me feel that he wishes to some extent to dilute
the effort for European unity in the CSCE effort.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Thank you,
Mr. De Decker.
I call Mr. Tummers to explain his vote.
Mr. TUMMERS (N etherlands) (Translation).
- 
Mr. President, I have complimented the
Rapporteur on the tenor of his report. I feel I
have clearly stated my views on the question we
have been discussing here for two days. In my
opinion, the procedural decision was taken on
this report when it was said that it would be
referred back to the committee and the amend-
ments would be withdrawn. I then felt it no
longer necessary to vote for or against. The vote
had in fact been taken, and I therefore refrained
from voting.
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
I think,
Mr. Tummers, there is some misunderstanding.
The draft recommendation is a document of our
Assembly addressed to the Council and there is
noting 
. 
to prevent the appropriate committee
proposing a new report bringing up to date the
positions reached today in a changing context.
There will therefore be reports on East-West
relations at all our plenary sessions, i.e. other
reports on this question. I hope I have thus
cleared up any misunderstanding there may
have been.
6. Close of the extoordinary session
The PRESIDENT (Translation). 
- 
Ladies and
gentlemen, we have thus reached the conclusion
of this extraordinary session. Before declaring
the session closed, I wish to extend my final
thanks to the members of the Assembly, the
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council and all those
who have spoken from this rostrum. Finally, I
should express our sincere appreciation of the
representatives of the press and the permanent
and temporary staff.
I declare closed the extraordinary session of
the Assembly of Western European Union.
The sitting is closed.
(The sitting was closed at 1.35 p.m.)
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Draft Recommcndation
on the cstablishment of a just, pe@eful ard securc order in Eurupe -
pto$,@ls stemming from developments in Ccntml aad fustera Eumpe
The Assembly,
I
(n Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroika movement in the
USSR and continued in many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible
to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
(ii) Considering nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of
those countries;
(iit) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified
that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first
agxeement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;
(iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give
new scope to the CSCE process;
(v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to
give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new
European order;
(vt) Anxious, however, not to precipate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so
far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more diflicult to establish this new peaceful order
and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period
as necessary;
II
(i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system,
which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
(iil Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two
German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between
the two states and the four responsible powers;
(iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new
German state at the heart of Europe;
(iv) Considering that the pennanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a
prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the
creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an
obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;
(v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the
Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;(vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of
Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
(vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it unde-
sirable to grant it neutral status;
(viiil Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to
many Central and Eastern European countries;
(ix) Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a
European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and
constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;
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(t) Noting that in a period of instability it is.hardly. des^irable to add to the d_eerge and variety of
uncertainty ind hence tire maintenance of ihe alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long
as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
(ii) Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to
bonduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;
(iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new
deployment than heretofore;
(iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;
(v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint
security is becoming essential;
(vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise
lr6ater political iesponsibilities, particularly in 
-regard to arms control,. organising the collective
iecurity of Europe ai a whole and defence igainst any threat from outside the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty,
RrcounaeNos rHAT rue CouNctI-
T
l. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting_into the consequences of
a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences ofthe changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview
that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;
II
1. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into- by the Federal Republic of
Germany under the modifi'ed Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of
the Federal Repubtic of Germany's commitments to a uirified German state for the application of the
treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
(a) co-operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
(D/ implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and para-
' ' grabh III.4 of the platform bf tne Hague, spe-cifying on which frontiers member countries are
no* obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
(c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII
aiiording to whiih the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed
against any of them;
(d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. I[, III and IV and, in par-
' ' ticular, Annex I to Protocot No. Ut orrdetermining the level of forces, renunciation of the
production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant under-
takings;
(e) respectfor Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right
to cease to be a party to the treatY;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of G--erm_any a-re
duly and fully informed of these results Jo that they may take account of_the gxarantees.offered by the
motifreO Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germlny and its neighbouring countries and for the
establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;
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III
l. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to
member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it
might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
(a) for defining a sufliciency threshold in defence matters;
(b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
(c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
(a) guaruntee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unifi-
cation of the two German states;
(D/ ensure lespect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agree-
ments limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a
fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member
states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a
peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European arma-
ments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such
armaments;
6. 
. 
Dr-ary up_qprogramme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the appli-
cation of the CEE agreements;
7 . For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation
satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a pennanent exchange of information with
the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE
agreements;
2. Keep !h9 public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allow
European public opinion to become aware of co'operation in the framework of WEU. -
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submided by Mt. Pontillon, RoltpofieaO
I. Infioduction
l. Events in Central Europe in the last
months of 1989 confltrmed the decisive nature of
the reforms that had been under way in the
Soviet Union since 1985 and the changes in
Poland and Hungary since 1988 in that they
demonstrated that the whole of Central and
Eastern Europe was rejecting the political and
economic systtm imposed on it under the Stalin
doctrine. One after the other, there were popular
demonstrations in Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and, finally,
Romania following which those countries'
leaders had to relinquish power. In the first
three of these countries, the change of gov-
ernment proceeded fairly smoothly in spite, or
because, of ttre presence of the Red Army on the
territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, as in
Poland and Hungary. Only in Romania, where
Mr. Ceausescu's r6gime had long been largely
independent of the Soviet Union, did the
political police offer strong resistance to the
demonstrators, who triumphed mainly because
the army turned against the party in power.
Albania, where there was unrest in January
1990, has so far avoided this great movement
for the emancipation of the people. Its isolation,
the backwardness of its economy and its small
population mean that it can in no way oppose
the return of the rest of Central Europe to more
democratic practices. Conversely, it is to be
hoped that, one day or another, it will follow the
movement. Finally, since mid-January Yugo-
slavia has been facing serious internal diffi-
culties due to challenges to the monopoly of
power held by the kague of Communists
lnd questions in several federated republics
regarding the dominating r6le of Serbs.
2. In all the Central and Eastern European
countries where there have been revolutionary
transformations, it is the communist party's dic-
tatorship that is being challenged. Some already
have pluralist r6gimes. In others, the party has
changed its name to show its will to break with
the ideology which hitherto had kept it in power.
In all of them, new, younger teams, more in
touch with the realities of society and interna-
tional life, have replaced leaders who had
become hidebound by too much power, the
absence of contestation, the maintenance of an
obsolete ideologa and, generally, comrption. But
nowhere have free elections yet been held and it
is only possible to guess what the real state of
opinion is. Everywhere the new r6gimes are pro-_
visional and there is no guarantee that, even if
they are truly free, forthcoming elections will
produce a stable power.
3. These changes, as radical as they were
sudden, place the West in an uncomfortable
position. Its whole defence system was based on
in analysis of the facts in Eastern Europe which
no longer corresponds to the situation today.
Faced witn tne deployment of large numbers of
conventional forces with threatening offensive
means close to its frontiers, NATO had
deployed a vast defensive system designed to
convince the Soviet Union and its allies that
they could not hope to extend their influence
towards the West by the use of force without
clashing with nations determined to defend their
freedom and, for this purpose, to use all the
means at their disposal, including nuclear
weapons.
4. That this policy of defence, designed to
deter any aggressor and, consequently, to avoid
another armeO conflict in Europe, succeeded
beyond all hopes is no reason to maintain such a
syitem in full from the moment it is no longer
necessary and may, on the contrary, become an
obstacle to the organisation of peace on more
stable foundations. The attitude adopted by the
Soviet Union towards arms control since 1985,
the changes in the deployment of Warsaw Pact
forces to a defensive posture, changes in
political r6gimes and acknowlldgment of
excesses committed in the last fifty years, the
Soviet Union's difficulty in applying reforms,
the awakening of nationalities on its territory-
and the Warsaw Pact countries' questioning of
Soviet domination now make an attack on
Western Europe hiehly unlikely. All these new
facts therefore mean that Europe's security must
be examined in new terms to take account of the
diminishing threat and take advantage of the sit-
uation thus created to oryanise peace in Europe
and the world on sounder foundations without,
however, depriving Europe of the means to face
up to new dangers now emerging.
5. This certainly does not mean that the time
is now ripe to abolish the systems of alliance or
the deployment of forces which have ensured
the Westts security for forty years but they
should be reorganised to meet security require-
ments in a changed world. Thus, disarmament,
or at least the preparation of duly-veriflred arms
control agreementi, so as to achieve a balance of
forces at the lowest possible level, is becoming
fundamental in order to ensure peace in Europe.
Similarly, the success of the economic and
politicalchanges made by the Soviet Union and
its allies is now a common aim for all those who
seek to reorganise Europe on new bases. Finally,
the establishment of a lasting peaceful order in
Europe means placing states in the framework of
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a stable, structured international system to
prevent the maintenance of peace being at the
mercy of states' internal developments or the
re€mergence of national issues such as were a
constant threat to peace in Europe from the
mid-nineteenth to tf,e mid-twentielh centuries.
6. Certain westeflt governments have there-
fore examined how to adapt the institutions
which have ensured peace in recent decades to
the new situation. The United States Secretary
of State, Mr. Baker, speaking in Berlin, thus pro-
posed reorganising NATO to make it the basis
for the new international order. For his part, Mr.
Mitterrand, President of the French Republic,
referred to the establishment of a European con-
federation associating eastern and western coun-
tries without replacing existing structures. But
these are still only vague proposals and it seems
hardly possible to go much further in thinking
about the future of Europe. Only in the short
term is it now possible to pursue this analysis
more deeply. The specific purpose of the present
document is to see what can be done in the near
future to meet the needs created by the transfor-
mation of Eastern Europe.
IL Dewlopnents in Centrol
and fustern EamN in 1989
7. From 1985 to 1988, the only repercus-
sions in the people's democracies of the changes
made by Mr. Gorbachev's government had been
confined to Poland and Hungary, which had
embarked upon what was then thought would be
a slow evolution. In 1989 the changes extended
to all the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, with the sole exception of Albania. Fur-
thermore, the governments the most hostile to
liberal trends collapsed and were replaced by
leaders determined to promote far-reaching
reforms. In the presence of Soviet forces sta-
tioned on their territory, the governments of
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Demo-
cratic Republic and Bulgaria gave in, without
serious resistance, to pressure from the people
and made way for pennns who, whether
members of the communist party or not, were
determined to apply radical economic and
political reforms. The Romanian authorities, on
the contrary, put up strong resistance and
cruelly repressed the popular demonstrations
but, isolated at home and without external
support, they had to capitulate in December
1989. Yugoslavia tried to moderate political
reforms and the repression of nationalisi aspira-
tions by the Albanian minority in the province
of Kosovo.
8. There seem to be three causes for the dis-
appearance of the r6gimes which had dominated
these countries for more than forty years. First,
the fact that the same gxoup had remained in
power for such a long time had resulted in
serious comrption in the communist parties.
Those in positions of authority had progxes-
sively lost all contact with the people and domi-
nated only by force. Secondly, the absence of a
reaction from the Soviet authorities to events in
Hungary and Poland indicated that Soviet
forces would not intervene to support the
rdgimes they had established and kept in place
by the threat, and sometimes use, of violence in
previous decades. They were therefore no longer
feared and, thanks to perestroika, the Soviet
Union was even seen as a model of reformist
policy. Finally, the economic failure of the com-
munist system became increasingly clear to the
people, who could no longer be kept in igno-
rance of thd thriving economies and standard of
living of Western Europeans or the public and
individual freedom they enjoyed and of which
they had been deprived for so long.
9. The question is therefore to what extent
the Soviet Union might have provoked the revo-
lution that has just taken place in the Central
and Eastern European countries in order to
allow the communist parties to remain at the
head ofstates or, at least, to continue to partici-
pate in governments. Whether this hypothesis is
true or not, the abandonment of the Brezhnev
doctrine, according to which those countries'
sovereignty was limited by the requirement to
keep communism in power, ensured the success
of national, popular movements which seem, in
several cases, to go much further than the intro-
duction of perestroika in the countries con-
cerned. If free elections are effectively held in
the first half of 1990, as planned in all the coun-
tries in which power has changed hands, there
should at least be a significant reduction in the
communist parties'share of power although, due
to the speed of events, in most countries no
organised political force apart from the com-
munist party itself is prepared to take over now
that control has slipped from the hands of the
former leaders. Nor is anything definite known
about the trends of public opinion, leaving much
uncertainty about the true nature of rdgimes
which have taken control or which will do so
after elections.
(a) Poland
10. Poland was the only Eastern European
country to have had an overt opposition for the
last ten years thanks to the emergence of a trade
union-type organisation, Solidarity, whose legit-
imacy was, however, contested by the author-
ities. Moreover, the Catholic Church had far
greater influence than any other organisation
independent of the communist party in any
other Eastern European country. Admittedly,
after the widespread strikes in 1980, the
appointment of General Jaruzelski as President
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of the Republic and the proclamation of a state
of war trad teA to Solidarity being banned in
1981, some of its leaders being arrested and
repression, albeit moderate compared with that
in-the German Democratic Republic in 1953,
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968'
Doubtldss this repression had been called for by
the Soviet Union, anxious to retain control over
Poland as a key area for the deployment of
Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.
However, the magnitude of the influence exer-
cised by Solidarity, with the support of the
Catholic Church, made it difficult to put down
the opposition completely. Its ability to paralyse
the economy of a country in which there was
already a veiy serious crisis allowed it to wait for
a more Bropitious time without being dissolved.
ll. It was therefore possible for the Polish
Government to negotiate the transformation of
the rdgime with a more or less organised oppo-
sition once this became inevitable. Moreover,
the opposition did not seek total victory and this
allowed elections to be conducted freely, but
with limited effects, on 4th and lSth June 1989.
Meeting as from 6th February 1989, a round
table asiociating the Catholic Church, Solidarity
and the government managed, on 5th April, to
conclude an agreement recognising the legality
of Solidarity ahd defining ways and means for
future elections. Solidarity obtained all the seats
in the new Diet reserved for the opposition, i.e.
35V0, but 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate,
showing its real influence in the country.
12. Solidarity was therefore in a strong
position to negotiate the formation of a go.v-
ernment which was to be led by one of its
leaders, Mr. Mazowiecki, but in which represen-
tatives of the communist party (the Polish
Workers' Party) retained an important place.
However, this was the first crack in the doctrine
set out in the constitutions of most people's
democracies that the party had permanently to
exercise a leading rOle, although Mr. Jaruzelski
remained President of the Republic.
13. The announcement that a new consti-
tution is to be drawn up suggests that Poland is
anxious to extricate itself from a situation that is
based on such contradictory principles as the
maintenance in power of the communist party
and free elections, particularly as the Polish
economy is completely ruined, the public debt
enofinous and inflation galloping, which would
call for strong state authority based on a wide
consensus. However, the compromise on which
it is based is made possible by the Polish peo-
ple's apparent keen awareness that the country's
Eeographical situation does not allow it to break
away from the eastern bloc. Soli.larity does not
contest Poland's membership of the Warsaw
Pact or of Comecon, although it would like
sweeping changes in the latter, as announced by
Mr. Swiecicki, the Minister of Finance, on the
eve of the forty-fifth session of that.organisation
in Sofia on 9th and l0th January 1990. All those
in power seem to wish to give priority to
rebuilding the economy and well know that thisis impoisible without substantial western
assistance and wide access to the free market.
14. This desire for an opening towards the
West has been demonstrated by the devel-
opment of relations between Poland and the
Cbuncil of Europe, on the one hand, and the
European Economic Community, on the other.
This has allowed the Polish Government to
accede to the European Culturd Convention, to
receive financial assistance from the West and
to obtain western investment to revive its
economy thanks to a relaxation in internal legi-s-
lation oir Soint ventures. On 30th January, Mr.
Mazowiecki asked for Poland to join the
Council of Europe. Poland has also asked the
Soviet Union to withdraw its forces stationed in
Poland in the near future. The Soviet Union
agreed in principle but seems to be delaying
implementation. Poland has expressed the wish
to remain a member of the pact, moreover.
15. Finally, on 28th January 1990, the Polish
United Workers' Party, probably in order to
improve its chances in the forthcoming elections
planned for June 1990, decided to changg its-
name to Social Democracy of the Republic of
Poland, without however preventing a split with
the most reform-minded elements of the PUWP,
who set up a Social Democratic Union of the
Republic of Poland. Some of the PUWP reP[e-
sentatives in Congress and the majority of its
deputies in the Dliet have not yet made their
choice known, thus leaving considerable uncer-
tainty about the conditions in which the Polish
partibs wilt be able to tackle the June elec-
tions.
(b) Huqcrt
16. Unlike Poland, the geographical position
of Hungary, in a state of deep shock after the
repression following the 1956 uprisirlg, helped it
to acquire at least some economic indepen-
dence, even when there was no question ofcon-
testing the communist party's monopoly of
power-. Even the leaders placed in office !y the
Red Army in 1956, such as Janos Kadar,
managed fo take advantage of the situation to
allow-a large co-operative sector to develop,
avoiding burdensome state intervention and
leadingio a broad range of trade with countries
outside the communist bloc, particularly neigh-
bouring Austria, with which Hungary lad a long
historical tradition of association. They even
showed growing tolerance for contacts main-
tained oi re-established with emigrants who,
since 1956, had included a large proportion of
the Hungarian intelligentsia.
l0l
DOCUMENT I2I6
17. In 1988, the Hungarian opposition startedto meet in an association, the Democratic
Forum, that was clearly political but tolerated by
the government, and there was more parlia-
mentary activity in the Hungarian National
Assembly than in any other Eastern European
country thanks to active movements even within
the communist party itself. On I lth January
1989, it passed a law making independent
parties legal again. On 2nd May, the government
restored freedom to cross the Austrian frontier
for citizens of the two countries conoerned and,
during the summer, the relaxation of controls
allowed many citizens of the German Demo-
cratic Republic to reach Austria and the Federal
Republic. A crisis ensued in relations between
the GDR and Hungary and, on lfth September,
Hungary denounced the treaty by which it had
declared it would not open its western frontiers
to nationals of the GDR.
18. Furthermore, the evolution in the Hun-
garian Communist Party was particularly
important since it offers hope that the forth-
coming free elections will be held in the best
possible cpnditions. It started by revising its
own history, the culmination being the rehabili-
tation of Imre Nagy, the former Prime Minister,
condemned to death and executed in 1958 in the
reprisals that followed the 1956 uprising. It then
replaced its leaders and those of the state by
younger persons. On 7th October, it changed its
name, abandoning the word communist and
declaring itself to be social democrat. The new
party programme provides for a peaceful, pro-
gressive move towards democratic socialism. On
23rd October, Hungary renounced the title of
People's Republic and now calls itself merely a
Republic. Finally, on 25th November, it was
decided to hold free elections in March 1990.
19. Hungary therefore preceded the other
Central European countries by means of the
internal evolution of the leading party, allowing
the opposition to prepare itselfto participate in
free elections and introducing certain economic
freedoms. It was probably particularly successful
because its foreign policy, while increasing
approaches to and exchanges with Western
European countries, allowing it to take part in
the activities of the Council of Europe and
showing its intention eventually to join the
Community, ensured that it broke neither with
the Soviet Union, nor with the Warsaw Pact,
nor with Comecon. By refusing to consider these
positions contradictory, although at first sight
they are not very coherent, Hungary made a
remarkable contribution to inducing the eastern
and western countries to envisage a common
future. Without any break, immediate at least,
with structures inherited from the past, that it
still seems to consider useful for its security, it
was the first to raise the question of a European
Community opening towards the East and to
anticipate a future all-European organisation
associating East and West in a new peaceful
order in Europe. In November 1989, it asked tojoin the Council of Europe.
(c) Germaa Democrutic Republic
20. The GDR is at one and the same time the
most successful Warsaw Pact country economi-
cally and its weakest political link, quite simply
because it is the only one not based on national
sentiments. Forty years of laborious efforts to
arouse East German national feelings proved a
total failure once the GDR was no longer able to
stop its citizens emigrating to the Federal
Republic.
21. Unlike the people's democracies, the
GDR had retained a multi-party r6gime, while
ensuring that the Unified Socialist Party, the
local offshoot of the communist parly, remained
permanently in power. It had had to exercise a
'particularly strict dictatorship because it was
impossible for it to prevent the population
remaining in constant contact with that of the
Federal Republic. When the opening of the fron-
tiers between Hungary and Austria in summer
1989 allowed the mass exit of its citizens
towards the Federal Republic, the Pankow gov-
ernment thought it was still possible to react,
probably because it was convinced that the
Soviet Union would support its struggle to
retain power, i.e. to keep Germany divided. The
emigration of almost 200 000 persons in the last
quarter of 1989, many of whom were highJevel
experts, alone created a serious threat to the sur-
vival of the state.
22. Nevertheless, when the popular demon-
strations against the r6gime multiplied with
greater backing at the beginning of October and
it became evident that the Soviet Union would
not support a policy of repression, the SED tried
to put an end to the unrest by progressive con-
cessions: Mr. Honecker was replaced at the head
of the party by Mr. Egon Krenz, former head of
the political police, the former leaders were
indicted and their comrption denounced,
certain freedoms were restored and, in par-
ticular, the ban on citizens of the GDR crossing
the wall which had separated the two parts of
Germany since 196l was lifted and, finally, the
wall was destroyed. These measures were
intended to show that the GDR's policy had rad-
ically changed and was no longer opposed to the
establishment of normal relations between the
two sections of German society.
23. Under pressure from the people, and par-
ticularly as a result of the demonstrations ofjoy
at the opening of the Berlin wall, Mr. Modrow
formed a new government on 24th November in
which the SED was associated with opposition
parties and announced in the Volkskammer a
reform policy that included abolition of the con-
stitutional guarantee of the leading r6le of the
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p&rty, abolition ofthe reign ofterror and the cre-
atioir of a de jure state. The number of members
of the political police, the Stasi, was symboli-
cally reduced by 10Y0.
24. This first series of measures was not
enough to halt demonstrations which were soon
directed against the new government, accused of
including too many people who had been
involved in the former r6gime, wishing to keep
the political police in place in a new guise and
doing nothing to promote the reunification of
the two German states. At a party conference on
7th and 8th December, Mr. Krenz was replaced
by Mr. Gregor Gysi as President of the SED.
Ggal action-was also started against the former
state and party leaders. It is clear that the party
has little chance of remaining in power once free
elections can be held. According to opinion polls
conducted early in January, it will receive only
100/o of the votes and more than a million of its
2 300 000 members are reported to have termi-
nated their party membership. Conversely, dem-
onstrations throughout the GDR would seem
increasingly hostile to the new authorities and
the SED.
25. In spite of its economic lead over the
other Eastern European countries, the German
Democratic Republic has to come to grips with a
serious crisis due to the decrepitude of its
equipment and the brain drain to the West. A
government that lacks the support of the gre-at
majority of the population can hardly launch the
necessary reforms, particularly as it is constantly
accused of not taking strong enough action to
purge its predecessors now that the population
has-realised the extent of the comrption that
prevailed during the Honecker era. Nor is it
equipped to pursue the dynamic external policy
exbected by a population convinced that the
question of German reunification is now at
hand.
26. There were several new developments in
January 1990: the date of the elections was
broughl forward from May to 18th March 1990,
theriwas a further purge ih the SED and its title
was changed, links were established between the
new SPD and the SPD in the Federal Republic,
a coalition government was formed and, finally,
the SPD adopted positions favourable to the
reunification of Germany and to the withdrawal
of the new German state from the alliances, a
requirement that the Federal German Gov-
ernment immediately rejected.
27. However, while it was possible to justify
bringing forward the date of the elections
because ofthe weakness ofthe government coa-
lition, it may catch the parties unprepared: they
are too numerous, not well established and
embarrassed when a clear position has to be
adopted on the crucial problem of how to
reunify Germany. By the time the Assembly
debatds the present report, the results of these
elections will be known. At the present juncture,
it can but be hoped that they will be clearcut
enough to produce an authority capable of nego-
tiating the future status of Germany.
28. Thus, there were two successive peaceful
revolutions in the GDR in November and
December in the presence of Soviet forces and,
in the first case atleast, with the endorsement of
Mr. Gorbachev who, attending the ceremonies
to mark the fortieth anniversary of the GDR at
the end of October, referred to the punishment
that history inflicted on those who lagged behind
and visibly urged Mr. Honecker to resign.
However, the fundamental political problem has
certainly not yet been solved, nor-has a stable
rdgime 
-been -achieved 
and this, for the time
being, does not facilitate the search for a
solution to the German Problem.
GD CzunosuY*ia
29. Since the failure in 1968 of what is known
as the Prague spring, Czechoslovakia had been
led by a team that had little concern for reforms
or sharing power, the opposition having been
reduced to silence. Here, too, it was because the
Soviet Union, whose armed forces were still
present, made it plain that it would not
intervene that the spread of demonstrations, as
from lTth November, as massive as they were
calm, led the Secretary-General of the Com-
munist Party, Mr. Milos Jakos, to resign on
lst December, together with thirteen members
of the Politburo and the Prime Minister,
Mr. Adamek.
30. However, Czechoslovakia had the benefit
of relatively favourable circumstances because
many of the former party leaders who had
play6d a paft in the 1968 attempt at reforms,
iuch as Mr. Dubcek, were still alive and were
truly popular. Hence it was possible to call on
refo-rm-minded communists who had authority
in the country. Moreover, various opposition
factions managed, on 3rd December, to unite to
set up the Democratic Forum which encourage{
the continuation of street demonstrations until
what it considered to be a satisfactory political
solution was found. It set certain conditions for
its participation in a new government, in par-
ticular the elimination of all who had taken partin the 1968 repression and the deletion of
Article 4 of the constitution stipulating the
requirement for the party to play a leading r6le.
Finaly, the Communist Party accepted these
condiiions and formed a government with the
Democratic Forum. Mr. Vaclav Havel, leader of
the Charter 77 association, was elected Pres-
ident of the Republic on 29th December 1989
and Mr. Dubcek, offrcially rehabilitated, became
President of the Chamber of Deputies. The new
twenty-one member government includes only
ten communists, most of whom are known to be
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in favour of serious reforms. One of the first
steps taken by the new government was to
destroy the barriers symbolising the iron curtain
separating Czecholovakia from Austria and to
announce that free elections would be held in
mid-1990. At the request of Mr. Havel, the oath
ofloyalty to socialism required ofcivil servants
was also abolished.
31. Mr. Havel proclaimed clearly that he
intended to exercise his duties on a provisional
basis only and would leave power after the 1990
elections. The present rdgime therefore con-
siders itself to be merely a transitional one and
seems determined not to call for substantial
changes in its relations with the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact apart from, like Hungary
and Poland, the withdrawal of Soviet forces sta-
tioned on its territory.An agreement reached on
25th February 1990 specified the middle ofl99l for completion of this withdrawal.
Eowever, at the beginning of January 1990,
Czechoslovakia was one of the strongest critics
of Comecon and was the only one to have called
for its abolition. At the session in Sofia, it
strongly contested the planning aspect of that
organisation and asked that it move resolutely
towards free international trade and currency
convertibility.
(e) Bulgatut
32. Bulgaria was probably the people's
democracy that best accepted its dependerrce on
the Soviet Union because this followed straight
on from the protection exercised by Tsaiist
Russia to which the Bulgarians owed their inde-
pendence from the Ottoman Empire following
the 1878 San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Con-
gress. The communist rdgime set up in the
aftermath of the second world war was not so
contested as in the other Eastern European
countries and the Secretary-General of the party,
Mr. Todor Jhivkov, did not, until the last weeks
of 1989, feel the need to introduce a reform
policy.
33. It was the party that insisted on the
departure of its leader and replaced him with a
younger, more reform-minded man, Mr. Petur
Mladenov, hitherto Minister for Foreign Affairs.
However, the change of leader triggered off
street demonstrations in Sofia, calling for
democracy, free elections and the trial o-f Mr.
Zhivkov, probably encouraged by a government
that wished to promote meaningful reforms,
since the national television showed the debateiin the National Assembly during which Mr.
Jhivkov's rdgime was accused.
34. Similarly it was Mr. Mladenov's gov-
ernment that took the initiative of adopting leg-
islation to restore freedom of political oppo-
sition and proposed holding free elections. -On
2nd December, the creation of three opposition
parties was announced: the Democratic Party
and the Radical Democratic Party, banned since
1948, and an Independent Democratic Party
stemming from an association of victims ofpolitical repression. Since then, eight other
opposition groups have been formed. These
various parties and movements have in common
a call for the deletion of the article of the Bul-
g;arian Constitution requiring that the Com-
munist Party exercise a leading r6le. They still
have to organise themselves before the elections
that are to be held during the first half of 1990
so as to show that they can offer an effective
opposition capable of exercising power if the
communists are voted out.
35. However, it must be noted that behind the
events in Bulgaria there is a national problem:
the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey does
not correspond to the limits of the Bulgarian-
speaking population of Orthodox religion and
the Turkish-speaking population, who are
Moslems. Not without sound reasons, the Bul-
garians complain of the way Bulgarians living in
Turkey are treated but, for their part, under Mr.
Jhivkov's government, they forced Turks living
in Bulgaria to adopt the Bulgarian language and
change their names to Bulgarian ones. On 30th
December 1989, the new government restored
the right of the Bulgarian Turks to use their own
names, but this measure provoked violent dem-
onstrations by Bulgarians, probably moved far
more by national feelings than by loyalty to the
former r6gime.
36. Bulgaria's case is therefore likely to draw
attention to one aspect of the problems raised by
the abolition of cornmunist r6gimes in Eastern
Europe, i.e. the re-emergence of national
feelings, which had been stifled by authoritarian
rdgimes but remained alive and which might
have deep repercussions on the internal evo.
lution in these states towards greater democratic
freedom and relations between them. This
aspect must not be overlooked because it does
not apply to Bulgaria alone.
fi Romaaio
37. The Romanian r6gime's dloofness from
the Soviet Union in the last twenty years made
Romania a very special case. Under the increas-
ingly autocratic dictatorship of the Ceausescu
r6grqre, the country, which was not occupied by
the Red Army, hardly felt the influence of Mr.
Gorbachev. At the start, the Romanian Govern-
ment's independence had given Mr. Ceausescu
some degree of popularity but, little by little,
the pursuit of radical communism, the excesses
of a police regime, the implementation of
modernisation and socialisation plans that were
shebr megalomania, the persecution of national
minorities, in particular the Hungarians who,
numbering 2 500 000 persons, represented almost
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12% of the population, and a disastrous eco-
nomic situation had deprived the Romanian
dictator of all support apart from that of those
who benefited from the r6gime and, in par-
ticular, the political police, the Securitate.
38. In spite of Romania's isolation, it was
obviously events in other people's democracies
that encouraged an uprising against the r6gime
that started among the Hungarian minority in
Timisoara on l8th December 1989 with a dem-
onstration intended to oppose the eviction of a
Protestant pastor. The movement swiftly spread
to the western part of the country, where there is
a large Hungarian minority, but it was cruelly
repressed by the Securitate.
39. Only on 2lst December, when the demon-
strations spread to the Romanian-speaking pop-
ulation, particularly in Bucharest, was the main-
tenance of the rdgime really called in question. A
public speech in which Mr. Ceausescu tried tojustify his policy and accuse western secret ser-
vices of stirring up unrest was intemrpted by
demonstrators and the police, followed by the
army with tanks, intervened and fired on the
crowd, causing many casualties.
40. In the end, it was an about-turn by the
army, probably exasperated by the r6le the
Romanian dictator made it play, that tipped the
course of events in favour of the demonstrators,
first of all in Timisoara and then in Bucharest.
On 22nd December, after two days of real civil
war between the army and Securitate, Mr.
Ceausescu fled. Arrested with his wife, the
couple was court martialled, condemned at the
close of a summary trial and executed on 24th
December. Securitate continued to oppose the
people and the army with sporadic, but mur-
derous, resistance for several more days.
41. During this bloody revolution, the only
one in which those in power sent in armed
resistance against street demonstrations, a
National Salvation Front was formed consisting
mainly of dissident communists and intellec-
tuals who had protested at the excesses of the
r6gime, such as Mr. Ion Iliescu and the former
Romanian Representative to the United
Nations, Mr. Dumitri Mazilu, who was in prison
for having denounced the violations of human
rights committed by his country. This com-
mittee immediately announced that Romania
was to set up a democratic rdgime and hold free
elections in April 1990. An intellectual known
for his active opposition to Mr. Ceausescu's
rdgime, Mr. Petre Roman, was appointed Prime
Minister. The question has been raised as to the
extent to which the formation of this National
Salvation Front had been prepared, even before
the events in Timisoara, by the Soviet Union,
but no clear answer can be given.
42. In any'event, the coming to power of the
National Salvation Front was not enough to
restore internal order, many people complaining
that it was composed of former communists. In
January, many parties of all leanings were
formed or reformed and the National Front had
to negotiate with twenty-nine of them in order
to reach agreement on lst_February 
^on _sharingpower in a provisional Council of National
Union between the Front, the opposition
parties, representatives of national minorities
and non-political bodies. The continuing con-
fusion in the country indicates that the elections,
which have been postponed until20th May, may
well not produce a firm basis for forming a
stable government. In spite of being reduced to
the status of a party like all the others, the
National Salvation Front seems to have retained
a strong influence among the workers and to be
the main rampart of the social advantages
acquired during the communist period in face of
ill-structured and very conservative political for-
mations in a country that lacks democratic tra-
ditions and experience.
43. Indeed, it must be noted that Mr.
Ceausescu's rdgime was particularly repressive,
especially in recent years. It left its opponents no
possibility of grouping and organising them-
selves, with the result that one may wonder in
what conditions the Romanian people will
tackle the May elections and whether a majority
will emerge that is capable of running the
country, whereas those nostalgic for the former
rdgime seem organised and determined to
defend the advantages they enjoyed. Fur-
thermore, Mr. Ceausescu's r6gime, under the
pretext of maintaining the country's indepen-
dence, had accepted no foreign loans for many
years, thus depriving itself of the means to
invest. Although the country is not in debt, like
Poland and Hungary, it is in a state of extreme
need and will be unable to reactivate its
economy without large-scale external assistance
and not for some time, which suggests that
Romania is still far from having a stable
political and economic r6gime.
(0 Sovia Unioa
44. Since the Assembly had an opportunity,
in June 1989, to consider developments in the
Soviet Union since 1985, your Rapporteur will
merely make a few remarks here about events in
the second half of 1989 and the Soviet attitude
towards the changes in Eastern Europe.
45. In the first case, what seems most
important is the radicalisation of national
claims by the Baltic nations whose three
republics have abandoned the principle of the
party's monopoly of power on their territory.
Pro-independence demonstrations have prolife-
rated and the communist parties in the three
republics have proclaimed their independence
of the Soviet Union's party so as to uphold
national claims more effectively. The most
serious secessionary attempts have been made in
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Estonia where the superiority of national legis-
lation over the Soviet Union's legislation was
proclaimed, * Soviet immigrants " lost their
national citizenship and, in short, elements of
true independence were introduced. At the same
time, the legitimacy of the annexation of the
Baltic republics was vigorously questioned and
direct relations between the republics and
Finland developed post-haste.
46. The affair of the Baltic republics is serious
for the Soviet Union due to local and more
general considerations. The Baltic region is one
of the most prosperous in the Soviet Union and
one in which the training of managerial staff is
most developed, but above all it commands Rus-
sia's access to the Baltic Sea, makipg it particu-
larly important for the security of the Soviet
Union and its access to the high seas. Moreover,
it would be diflicult to refuse other republics
whatever the Soviet Union might allow in the
Baltic republics and there is little doubt that any
concession to separationism would bring grist to
the mill of Mr. Gorbachev's enemies in Russia
itself.
47. Soviet policy towards the Baltic republics
has therefore been to grant them a maximum of
autonomy and satisfaction at national level
without allowing their membership of the Soviet
Union to be questioned. Thus, on 24th
December 1989, the Supreme Soviet denounced
the RibbentropMolotov protocol of 23rd
August 1939 which allowed the Soviet Union to
annex the Baltic states but which was not a duly
legal instrument. Conversely, Moscow adheres
firmly to the principle of maintaining the fron-
tiers defined and ratified by international
treaties, a principle confirmed in the CSCE final
act in Helsinki in 1975, and has not agreed to
re-examine the 1940 annexation of the Baltic
states. Soviet doctrine was defined as follows by
Mr. Valentin Falin on 2lst August 1989:
" Anyone who persists in wishing to divide what
cannot be divided and remodeling countries and
frontiers without paying attention to the life and
safety of people is heading for disaster. " Simi-
larly, Moscow was tolerant about the appearance
of non-communist parties in the Baltic republics
and the success of their candidates in several
cases against the local communist parties' candi-
dates. It did not agree, however, to these com-
munist parties being independent of the CPSU.
'Accountable autonomy " has been granted to
the Baltic republics, but no independence,
whereas on 25th February 1990 elections in
Lithuania gave supporters of independence a
majority. On I lth March, the Lithuanian Par-
liament voted a proclamation of independence
by a very large majority.
48. It should be recalled that the western
countries have never recognised the Soviet
Union's annexation of the Baltic states and,
when members of the Assembly met Soviet
leaders, the latter agreed that the citizens of
those republics should be invited to vote by refe-
rendum on whether their countries should
remain in the union. When Mr. Gorbachev
toured those countries in January 1990, he
restricted himself to proposals on autonomy
which obviously failed to satisfy part of the pop-
ulation. At that time, the Soviet Union was
admittedly faced with other, more serious,
national problems in the Caucasus and its inter-
vention to restore order there might have been
even more diflicult if it had acceded to Baltic
claims.
49. The nationality question is indeed acute
in the Caucasus, where the permanent conflict
between Arrnenians and Azerbaijanis has not
been solved, in spite of efforts by the central
government. In January 1990, the massacre of
Armenians in Baku, at a number of points along
the frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and in the Armenian enclave of Nagorny
Karabakh was so serious that the central author-
ities had to bring in the army to protect the
people threatened, restore order and prevent
frontiers being crossed between the two
republics and between the latter and Turkey or
Iran. This unrest, followed since l0th February
by demonstrations and military repression in
Tadjik and, several days later, Uzbekistan,
revealed the considerable influence acquired by
fundamentalist groups among Moslem inhabi
tants of the Soviet Union and Iran's assistance
to these nationalist movements. The western
powers had assured the government in Moscow
that they would do nothing to prevent it
restoring order in the Caucasus. Clearly,
however, the army was ill-prepared to carry out
the task of keeping order, nor were the Russian
people very willing to become involved in such
operations. For the first time, therefore, it seems
that the Soviet Union, a third of whose popu-
lation is Moslem, is threatened by powerful dis-
integrating forces due to the awakening of
national aspirations, that it had not realised the
extent of the danger and that it is hardly
equipped to handle it.
50. Furthermore, events in Romania seem to
have provoked a further outbreak of claims by
the Moldavians, at least in terms of cultural
autonomy, since their national language is
Romanian. Finally, Moscow has actively sought
to improve its relations with the Vatican to try
to calm down the religious claims of the
Ukrainian Uniats, who are opposed to their
church being incorporated in the Russian
Orthodox Church.
51. At the beginning of 1990, the Soviet Gov-
ernment appears to be giving priority to these
various domestic concerns. Presumably it will
be particularly firm about any infringement of
the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in
Europe and at the same time it will probably do
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its utmost to prevent renewed nationalism in
Europe. It will therefore foster the speedy estab-
lishment of a peaceful organisation of European
security based inter alia on the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of states.
52. This was the Soviet Union's attitude
towards the changes in the people's democ-
racies. Nowhere, even when it was there, did the
Red Army intervene and, while the Soviet
Union seems to have been in favour of com-
munist party leaders in those countries being
replaced, it was discreet and left the local forces
to act alone. Probably wishing to promote
perestroika in the European countries with com-
munist rdgimes, it did not object to the recog-
nition of new parties by the authorities in all
these countries or to non-communist forces such
as Solidarity in Poland assuming positions of
responsibility. Conversely, it rejected calls for it
to intervene in the civil war in Romania and to
terminate Mr. Ceausescu's rdgime, for which it
had no sympathy.
(h) Yugoslafia
53. This country which, since the end of the
second world war, has a communist r6gime
which emerged from its internal resistance
movement, has not been occupied by the Red
Army and has never been part of the military
system set up by the Soviet Union. Under the
leadership of Marshal Tito, it conducted several
economic and social experiments which led to a
break with Moscow but with mediocre results.
Nevertheless, the authority of Marshal Tito,
who was a Croat, allowed order to be main-
tained within a country which has always been
torn by national rivalries since a large number of
minorities cohabit alongside a Serbian majority.
54. Since Tito's death, the Serbian element
seems to have taken control of the League of
Communists and the central authorities, leading
to constant rebellions by Albanians who are
in the majority in the autonomous region of
Kosovo and discontent among Croats and Slo-
venians. Events in the other communist coun-
tries at the end of 1989 first led to the Slovenian
Communist Party breaking away from the
federal league, followed in February 1990 by the
Croat Party, and then a further wave of unrest in
Kosovo, where the government in Belgrade,
after restricting the province's autonomy in
March 1989, had to send in the army on lst Feb-
ruary 1990. Nor do the political reforms
embarked upon by the federal government seem
to have put an end to unrest throughout the
country's non-Serbian provinces. Calls for the
rdgime to be reformed are closely linked to
national reactions vis-i-vis a League of Commu-
nists that has remained conservative.
55.
tions
re-emergence of nationalist
Yugoslavia is particularly
because it jeopardises the survival of a country
which has always lacked national cohesion and
because several minorities can claim kinship
with neighbouring countries to obtain political
or military support. In the circumstances, if
nationalist unrest in Yugoslavia were to worsen,it might again endanger peace in the Balkan
Peninsula and hence throughout Europe.
(i) Conclusioas
56. Thus, events in Eastern Europe in the last
months of 1989 allow a far clearer picture to be
obtained of the reality of changes in Soviet
external policy. It is now evident that it no
longer considers it essential to maintain docile
communist parties in power in the Central and
Eastern European countries. The Comecon
session in Sofia on 8th and 9th January 1990
suggests that the Soviet Union does not intend
to continue the economic domination of the
region that led these countries to bankruptcy,
although there seems to be no question of
Comecon not being maintained. Conversely,
whether it wishes to keep the Warsaw Pact struc-
tures intact is an open question.
57. If we now look at the other Eastern
European countries, several factors seem worthy
of mention and, first of all, their moderate reac-
tions to the Soviet Union, Comecon and the
Warsaw Pact. Nowhere have the governments
and people been aggressive towards the Soviet
Union. pven when Hungary and Czechoslovakia
asked it to withdraw its forces from their ter-
ritory, they negotiated the time-table. In no case,
except in Romania, where the Soviet Union was
not involved, was the break between the old and
the new r6gimes radical and no irreversible situ-
ation has been created from the point of view
of relations between Mr. Gorbachev's Soviet
Union and the Eastern European countries.
58. However, two aspects of the situation are
still disturbing. On the one hand, none of the
rdgimes set up in 1989 seems likely to last, but,
except perhaps in Hungary where events did not
move so fast, the prospect of holding free elec-
tions in no way guarantees the creation of
rdgimes capable of governing the countries con-
cerned, except perhaps in Hungary where the
evolution was slower, the parties capable of
struggling for power being unable to express the
views of the nation. It is not therefore out of
the question that, in certain countries at least,
the former leading parties, even if they have
changed their names as in Hungary, moy be able
to take advantage ofthe disorganised opposition
and the imminence of the elections to retain a de
facto leading r6le, the principle of which they
have renounced. Moreover, the re-emergence of
nationalism has become a threat for the mainte-
nance of international order in Eastern Europe.
Until now, the problem has been brought into
aspira-
senous
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the open only in regard to the Turks in Bulgaria,
the Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo and the
Azerbaijanis and Balts in the Soviet Union, but
the part played by the Hungarian minority in
Romania in the revolt against Mr. Ceausescu's
tyranny suggests that it will ask for a status that
the Romanians will probably not unanimously
wish to grant it. The national aspect of claims by
the people of the GDR is also clear and raises a
question which deserves to be examined sepa-
rately.
III. The German prohlem
59. To go to the heart of the matter means
examining the problem raised by the fate of
Germany as a separate question, not so much
because of its extremely complex juridical
aspects but because of the existence, at the
centre of Europe, of a German nation grouping
about 80 million persons that quite naturally
wishes to recover its unity. Because of the size of
the population, the economic strength of the two
German states, the crimes committed by the
Nazi rdgime and the deep wounds they left
throughout Europe, the r6le played by Germany
in the two world wars and the place of the
German states in the two present systems of
alliance, the German problem concerns all
Europe, and the stability of a new European
order will depend largely on how it is solved.
Any organisation of Europe that failed to satisfy
the underlying feelings of the Germans would
inevitably be precarious. On the other hand, the
reunification of Germany or, more accurately,
grouping the two German states in a single
political entity, since there is no question of
reconstituting a state which claims a return to
1937 frontiers, might revive a variety of fears
among Europeans and jeopardise the new
European order if not accompanied by satis-
factory guarantees for the other nations of
Europe, particularly Poland. It is not just an
inter-German matter; it concerns the whole of
Europe. This is one of the reasons why, alone,
the simple application of Article 23 of the Basic
Law which allows any German Land so wishing
to be incorporated into the Federal Republic is
unacceptable in present circumstances.
60. It should first be recalled that there were
two separate reasons for the division of
Germany and Berlin. The first, the juridical
basis of the German problem and its historical
origln, was the occupation of the entire territory
of Germany within its 1937 frontiers by the
victors of 1945, the division of the major part of
this territory into four zones shared between the
United States, the United Kingdom, France and
the Soviet Union, the creation of a special Berlin
area occupied jointly by these four powers and 
-
subject to a final settlement of territorial ques-
tions in a peace treaty 
- 
the handing over of
another part of this territory to Poland and the
Soviet Union. The second, of a political nature,
was the division of Europe into two camps
which prevented a four-party agreement on the
treatment of all the zones of occupation and the
conclusion of a peace treaty for Germany as pro-
vided for at the Potsdam conference. Conse-
quently, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and
the three western powers, on the other, went
their separate ways in settling their relations
with their respective zones. Thus, two different
German states were created without this
affecting quadripartite responsibilities towards
Germany as a whole, ffid the four powers
still exercise these responsibilities directly in
Berlin.
61. In regard to the specifically German
aspect of the problem, it should be recalled that,
after the victors took over supreme power in
Germany, no central German authority
remained in the aftermath of the war. Attempts
by German authorities, established by the allies
at regional level, to safeguard German unity
failed. It was possible to hold free elections only
in the three western zones. In these zones, they
were the basis of a new democratic order, con-
sidered to be transitional until the final
settlement of the German problem. The
essential elements of relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany thus created and
the three western powers were laid down in the
1954 agreements, which included:
- 
an undertaking by the Federal Republic
to become integrated in the European
edifice, join the Atlantic Alliance and
contribute to European defence under
the supervision of Western European
Union;
- an undertaking by the three powers to
guarantee the freedom and security of
the western sectors of Berlin and to
support the common aim of rebuilding
a unified, free and democratic Ger-
many on the basis of a peace settle-
ment for Germany as a whole.
62. The second German state, the German
Democratic Republic, established under the pro-
tection of the Soviet Union and integrated in the
Warsaw Pact and Comecon, had difficulty in
obtaining recognition by the international com-
munity outside the Warsaw Pact for lack of an
endorsement by its population. Only the con-
clusion of the inter-German treaty in 1972led to
international recognition of the GDR and the
accession of both German states to the United
Nations and the Helsinki final act. One of its
aims was to improve the situation of the
German people in both states in spite of their
conflicting positions on basic matters.
63. The responsibility of the four 1945 occu-
pying powers for the entire German territory as
long as a peace treaty or equivalent international
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act has not set up a single German state is exer-
cised in a particular manner in the case of
Berlin. The agreement of the four powers is nec-
essary for any change in the present status ofthe
German states, and of Berlin, and any change in
the frontiers between the German states and any
other European state.
64. The division of Europe into two camps is
becoming less marked thanks to changes in the
Soviet Union and most Central and Eastern
European countries. Developments in the
German Democratic Republic in the last
months of 1989 have allowed the demarcation
line between the two German states to be
opened to the free movement of persons, the
movement of goods having been regulated, since
1972, to grant it a major rOle in the economies
of both states. The opening of the Berlin wall
and the accompanying or ensuing demonstra-
tions showed that the belief of the two sections
of the German people that they belong to the
same national community had remained very
strong.
65. The unification of Germany has been a
topical matter since the end of 1989 but it
remains to be seen how it must be achieved. For
the reasons set out above, while the will
expressed by East German crowds and, in a dif-
ferent manner, by West German citizens may
compel the four powerc to embark upon a
process leading to reunification, they have their
word to say about how this should be done and
the commitments a reunified Germany will have
to enter into to reassure its partners. This is par-
ticularly important since the problem concerns
all European countries, particularly those
co-operating, in the framework of the CSCE
process, in the establishment of a stable,
peaceful order in Europe based on the right of
nations to self-determination. It is in the
interests of no one for the popular enthusiasm
stemming from the destruction of the Berlin wall
to lead to an uncontrolled situation. Nor wouldit be acceptable to arouse a feeling of help-
lessness and revolt among Germans by not
acting on these demonstrations. Moreover, the
treaty concluded between the Federal Republic
and the western occupying powers in 1954
leaves the latter no choice but to do their utmost
to bring about reunification.
66. Events in the German Democratic
Republic are moving so fast that the parties con-
cerned must reach very early agreement on a
progxamme for the reunification of Germany if
reunification is to be achieved in an orderly
manner, avoiding all the drawbacks that would
result from an uncontrolled development of the
situation in Germany for the establishment of a
stable, peaceful order in Europe. The emigration
of citizens from the GDR to the West is acceler-
ating. Since the beginning of 1990, it has been
proceeding at a rute of 2 000 persons a day,
which is tolerable neither for the GDR, which is
losing the pick of its population, nor for the
Federal Republic, which has to house them. The
Deutschmark is already starting to replace the
East German Mark in stimulating economic
activity in the GDR. Economic assistance from
the Federal Republic and investments by West
German firms are becoming essential for the
economic recovery of the GDR. State officials,
whether party members or not, are concerned
about their future and hesitate to serve a state
which seems doomed and is already contested
and powerless, and there have been numerous
desertions from the army and among its officers.
In short, the state is threatened with complete
collapse. Already very shaken by the economic
crisis in the GDR, the nation may be even more
disrupted by the monetary reunification which
will be effected inevitably in favour of the West
German mark.
67. The prospect of such a collapse made the
leaders of the GDR seek arrangements with the
Federal Republic, including fi nancial assistance,
but, at the meeting between Mr. Kohl and Mr.
Modrow on 13th February, the Federal Chan-
cellor insisted that monetary unification, i.e.
using the Deutschmark throughout Germany,
must be organised beforehand. A paritary com-
mittee was set up to arrange for this aspect of
reunification even before the elections to be held
in the GDR on l8th March.
68. The march towards the reunification of
the two German states is therefore now under
way. It is inevitable because of the dislocation of
the state and the economic crisis in the GDR
and most leaders in the countries particularly
concerned by the German question have, in one
way or another, given their views on reunifi-
cation. In particular, this was so for Chancellor
Kohl, speaking in the Bundestag on 28th
November 1989 and in Paris on 17th January
1990, Mr. Shevardnadze, whose clearest com-
ments were made to the Political Committee of
the European Parliament in December 1989,
Mr. Baker, in his Berlin address on l8th
December, Mr. Mitterrand, speaking as
Chairman-in-Oflice of the European Com-
munity, during his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev
in Kiev on 6th December, in Berlin on 22nd
December and on several other occasions earlyin 1990, Mr. Gysi, the new Chairman of the
SED Party, on 7th January, Mr. Mazowiecki,
Polish Prime Minister, addressing the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on
30th January and, finally, Mr. Genscher,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Tutzing
on 3lst January. There are certainly differences
between their words but it must first be stressed
that they agree on the main course, i.e. that there
must be reunification but that it must remain
under government control and come about pro-
gressively in line with the establishment of a new
European order with which it is closely linked.
109
DOCUMENT I2I6
69. In January 1990, the various countries
concerned managed to define three levels of
negotiations on German reunification:
(i) after the elections on 18th March
1990, negotiations between the gov-
ernments of the two German states
with the purpose of defining the
stages in their rapprochement, first of
all in a confederal-type association,
so as to safeguard the interests of the
populations of the two states;
(irl negotiations between the two
German states and the four powers
responsible for the territory that
remained German in 1945, to fix and
guarantee the frontiers of the new
state and specify what commitmentsit will have to enter into vis-i-vis
its partners. Some countries have
objected to these restricted, so-called
* 2 plus 4 " negotiations, either, as in
the case of Poland, because of its
vital interest in the fixing of the
eastern frontiers of the new German
state, or, as in the case of certain
western countries, because they are
afraid of a European directorate
being formed from which they would
be excluded. It seems inevitable,
however, for legal reasons and in
order to find an early, generally-
acceptable solution, to abide by this
procedure which is obviously based
only on the 1945 situation and will
not need to be perpetuated once the
four powers have handed over to a
unified German state full sovereignty
over its territory;
(iii) negotiations open to all the thirty-
five countries taking part in the
CSCE to arrange for the inclusion of
the new state in a new peaceful order
in Europe. These negotiations are to
start in autumn 1990 with a meeting
of heads of state or of government.
70. Finally, it is inevitable that bringing the
two German states together will lead to changes
in the international organisations to which they
belong. There are already plans for a meeting of
heads of state or of government of the EEC
countries in Dublin in April. The question of the
membership of the future German state and the
limits to the stationing of foreign forces on its
territory have arisen, and the answer to these
questions will lead the members of the Atlantic
Alliance to deterrrine the organisation of the
alliance. Finally, application of the modified
Brussels Treaty to a reunified Germany will also
raise a number of questions that the WEU
Council will have to tackle.
(a) Undcrcunding betweea
the blo German states
71. The German Democratic Republic is now
recognised at international level. This implies
that the state must be maintained as long as an
international act has not handed over its rights
to another state, whatever may be the opinion of
its people about its continued existence. The cre-
ation of such a state is provided for in the lat-
ter's Basic Law, Article 146 of which specifies
that it " shall cease to be in force on the day oh
which a constitution adopted by a free decision
of the German people comes into force ". How-
ever, this requires prior agreement between the
two German states on the establishment of an
all-German political system, be it a matter of
creating a confederation or, as proposed by Mr.
Gysi on 7th January 1990 in a document
entitled " Model of security 2000", establishing
an inter-Gennan community in the framework
of a European confederation in which the two
states would remain. Admittedly, Mr. Gysi's
proposals seem unsatisfactory because they do
not take due account of the wishes still being
expressed every day by the people of the GDR,
and it will be necessary to wait for the free elec-
tions to be held in the GDR on l Sth March 1990
before having a suffrciently representative gov-
ernment which can really negotiate on behalf of
the GDR. It would, moreover, be sound demo-
cratic practice for the parties that are to present
candidates at the May elections to state clearly
their views on German reunification in order to
help the citizens to vote on this vital question.
72. The ten-point programme presented by
Chancellor Kohl on 28th November 1989 
-
dthough it was a pity the Federal Republic's
allies were not informed beforehand 
- 
is a pro-
gressive one, the first stage of which resembles
the confederation referred to by Mr. Gysi but
what the former sees to be one step in a gradual
process is apparently the final aim ofthe second.
Chancellor Kohl's fourth and fifth points set out
his views on the future of inter-German rela-
tions as follows:
" 4. (East German) Prime Minister
Modrow spoke in his governmental decla-
ration of a 'contractual community'. We
are prepared to accept these thoughts...
This co-operation will also increasingly
demand common institutions... It goes
without saying that Berlin will be fully
included in these co-operative efforts...
5. We are also prepared to take a further
decisive step, namely to develop confede-
rative structures between the two states in
Germany with the goal of creating a fede-
ration, a federal state order in Germany.A legitimate democratic government
within the GDR is an unrelinquishable
prerequisite.
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We can envisage that after free elections
the following institutions be formed: a
common governmental committee for
permanent consultation and political
harmonisation; common technical com-
mittees; a common parliamentary body...
Such a coming together is in the interest
of the continuation of German history.
State organisations within Germany are
always confederations or federations...
Nobody knows how a reunified Germany
will look. I am however sure that unity
will come, if it is wanted by the German
nation. "
73. It is now certain that, after the elections
on l8th March, there will be negotiations
between the two states and they will probably
deal first with their mutual relations in the
framework, suggested both by Mr. Modrow and
by Chancellor Kohl, of a " contractual com-
munity " designed to become a confederation,
but only the result of the elections in the GDR
will decide whether the subsequent stage, i.e. a
federation, can be envisaged immediately. Its
achievement will very probably also depend on
the decisions adopted at the so-called 2 plus
4 negotiations.
(b) Reuaifrcatioa and the Eumpean Community
74. The seventh point of Chancellor Kohl's
programme refers to the r6le that the European
Community might play in the reunification
process:
" 7. The powers of attraction and the aura
of the European Community is and
remains a constant feature in the pan-
European development. We want to
strengthen this further...
We understand the process leading to the
recovery of German unity to be of
European concern. It must, therefore, be
considered together with European inte-
gration. In keeping with this, the
European Community must remain open
to a democratic GDR and to other demo-
cratic countries from Central and South-
Eastern Europe. The EC must not end on
the Elbe...
Only in this way is it possible for the EC
to become the foundation for truly com-
prehensive European unity.'
75. There is no major economic obstacle to
this proposal since inter-German trade is
already considered to be internal Community
trade under the protocol to the Rome Treaty
which specifies that the Community makes no
distinction between the part of German territory
subject to the Basic Law and the part which is
not. However, it raises a number of quite dif-
ferent questions and, in particular, who will take
part in the management of the Community: both
states or the confederal body? Will the GDR
take part in the activities of the European
Council? What consequences would that have
for defining a common European policy in areas
where it exists? Finally, the approaching estab-
lishment of the single European market in
January 1993 and progress towards economic
and monetary union make one wonder how
monetary union will be introduced between the
two German states, what will be the conse-
quences for the Deutschmark, which will inevi-
tably have to become the common currency of
unified Germany, and what will be the ensuing
burden for the Community, of which one
member at least, the United Kingdom, has
clearly voiced its opposition to taking a share.
(c) Reunification aad the alliances
76. The fact that the Federal Republic is part
of the Atlantic Alliance and the GDR of the
Warsaw Pact raises problems that are far more
serious insofar as these two organisations are
major frameworks for maintaining peace in
Europe and pursuing the various disarmament
negotiations. At the present juncture, it would
be dangerous to touch either the Warsaw Pact or
the Atlantic Alliance and, however much good
will the Federal Republic's partners may have,
they cannot risk destroying the balance on which
peace in Europe is based in order to accelerate a
solution of the German problem.
77. Admittedly, as Chancellor Kohl says in
the ninth point of his programme:
" 9. The surmounting of the separation of
Europe and the division of Germany
demands far-reaching and speedy steps
pertaining to disarmament and aflns
control... "
'18. Moreover, as Mr. Shevardnadze made
clear in his address to the Political Committee
of the European Parliament, it is the Federal
Republic's participation in the NATO inte-
grated military structures that the Soviet Union
and certainly most of its allies, too, consider to
be the major obstacle to the reunification of
Germany. It is perfectly understandable that the
Soviet Union should do its utmost to avoid the
establishment in the centre of Europe of a strong
state whose army would be at the service of an
organisation designed inherently to ensure
western security. Nor can NATO continue its
work, which has in fact paved the way for the
reunification of Germany, without the partici-
pation of the Federal Republic. It therefore has
to be concluded that, at least in a first stage, as
the two German states come closer together, the
possibility must be safeguarded for each of them
to remain in the alliance of which it is now a
member.
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79. The agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union reached in February 1990
to limit to 195 000 men their military presence
in the Federal Republic, in the case of the
former, and in the other members of the Warsaw
Pact, in the case of the latter, shows how the two
countries view this first stage: maintaining a
smaller force, limited by joint agreement, on the
territory ofeach ofthe two present states. Such a
solution, possible for only a relatively brief
period, can obviously not last, since it is hard to
imagine a reunified, independent country on
whose territory forces from two different alli-
ances would be stationed. Furthermore, keeping
Soviet forces on the territory of the present
GDR, if not strictly limited in time, might risk
incidents with the population, which might lead
to serious difficulties in the peaceful move
towards German reunification. Similarly, the
idea of keeping the territory of the -Gpn
demilitarised, or deploying only non-integrated
territorial forces there, while the territory of the
Federal Republic and part of the German army
would be integrated in NATO seems possible for
only a limited period. However this might be, as
Mr. Genscher underlined in his speech in
Tutzing, the idea that the part of Germany now
forming the GDR might be included in NATO
military structures would block the way to rap
prochement between the two Germanys.
80. Mr. Gysi made proposals for a bilateral
disarmament agxeement between the two
German states including:
(r/ renunciation of the modernisation
of weapons;
(i/ renunciation of low-altitude flying;
(iii) rcnwciation of submarines;
(iu/ renunciation of landing craft;
(u,) progressive withdrawal of allied
troops before l99l;
(vi) rcturn of regular servicemen to
civilian life;
(vly' reduction of military service to
twelve months;
(viii) banning the stationing of units less
than 50 or 80 km on each side ofthejoint frontier;
(ix) 5001o reduction in troop levels in
both armies;
(x/ reduction in the production and
procurement of armaments.
81. In fact, such an agreement would mean
the Federal Republic withdrawing from NATO
and the GDR from the Warsaw Pact resultingin the de facto neutralisation of Germany.
Moreover, Mr. Gysi hardly disguised this when
he said: " If there are people who cannot
imagine Europe without NATO, our view of
Germans' future in a united Europe is more
peaceful and friendly. The alliances should be
dissolved in such a Europe. " Two themes of the
propaganda spread by the Soviet Union and its
allies since Khrushchev's time are to be found in
these proposals: the neutralisation of Germany
and the dissolution of the pacts. The end result
is almost the same since the territory of the
Federal Republic is essential for the credible
deployment of NATO forces.
82. The proposal made by Admiral Theodor
Hoffmann in East Berlin on 22nd February
derives from the same concept: the armies of the
two German states would be merged in a single
Bundeswehr with about 150000 troops. In the
flirst stage, Soviet and American forces would
remain in the two German states but would be
progressively reduced with a view to the early
disbandment of the alliances.
83. It is quite natural for Mr. Gysi to reject
the proposal made by President Bush in
November 1989 for Germany to be reunified in
the framework of NATO. Mr. Gysi said: * The
SED-PDS refuses a united Germany in NATO.
It does not want a Fourth Reich that would be
capable of strengthening NATO, destroying the
European balance and frightening its neigh-
bours. " However, it is not acceptable for the
dissolution of the alliances to be made a prior
condition for understanding between the two
German states since to disband them would
destroy this very balance of forces in Europe.
Only when disarmament in Europe has made
substantial progress and a peaceful structure has
acquired suffrcient authority will it be possible
to consider dissolving present structures.
84. Although the pre-electoral situation in the
GDR lessens the weight of much of its leaders'
ideas, it is nevertheless clear that, on this point,
Mr. Gysi was expressing views shared by the
Soviet Union Mr. Falin confirmed this
moreover 
- and, probably, by other Eastern
European countries. So, in however weak a
position the Soviet Union may have been placed
in negotiations on German unification because
of the will expressed by the people of the GDR,
there can be no such unification without its
agtreement and this largely depends on how its
security interests are taken into account. The
utmost attention should therefore be paid to
these interests if German reunification is to be
achieved in the framework of a reunification of
Europe, the only real guarantee of long-term
peace. That is why, at the beginning of February,
Mr. Genscher proposed forbidding NATO to
extend its deployment further East. This pro-
posal was well received by both Mr. Shevard-
nadze and Mr. Baker, the Secretary of State,
when they met in Moscow on 8th February, andit was tiken up by Mr. Wiirner, Secietary-
General of NATO, in a speech in Hamburg on
9th February. It is the basis of the agreement
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reached between President Bush and Chancellor
Kohl on 24th February and of the present nego-
tiations on a reunified Germany's place in the
organisation of European security.
85. In fact, everything indicates that the pro-
posal taken up by Mr. Shevardnadze to
neutralise reunified Germany was made only to
allow the negotiations to be started. Some of the
Soviet Union's allies, such as Poland, have
announced that they are hostile to this solution
which they believe to have the disadvantage of
allowing a German national military power to
be built up on their frontiers. They seem to
prefer an integrated German army to German
national power. The Soviet Union itself very
probably does not want such neutralisation,
unless limits and controls are imposed that
Germany could hardly accept. However, it also
appears that the Soviet Union, for under-
srandable reasons, is not prepared to admit that
the reunification of Gennany will bring NATO's
integrated military system 250 km eastwards.
86. Furthermore, as Mr. Hurd emphasised in
Bonn in February, some of Germany's westeffr
allies are not prepared to let a united Germany
associate the present forces ofthe two states nor
to break away from the Federal Republic's
renunciations in regard to armaments or the
deployment of its forces.
87. A solution to the problem raised by the
reunification of Germany must be sought on the
basis of these two considerations. It may be
deduced that neither the new state's mem-
bership of the alliance nor the presence of allied
forces, in numbers limited by international
agreement, are necessarily unacceptable to the
Soviet Union. Possibly then, Germany, while
remaining a member of the alliance, might
withdraw from the integrated military structures
and the maintenance of American forces west of
the demarcation line could perhaps be governed
by a bilateral agreement between Germany and
the United States. Othenrise, as Mr. David
Owen said on 3lst January, the other European
members of the alliance would have to accom-
modate the American forces that were to be kept
in Europe. Conversely, forces from WEU coun-
tries might remain on German territory on a
reciprocal basis, i.e. German forces would be
stationed on the territory of other WEU coun-
tries, so as to safeguard an essential element of
deterrence, i.e. the unambiguous allied concept
that ahy attack on a WEU member country will
be met jointly by all its members. The INF
agreements should preclude any nuclear
wiapons being kept on German territory, partic-
ularly if the CFE agreement is to be quickly fol-
lowed by negotiations to eliminate very short-
range nuclear weapons.
88. In any event, the modified Brussels
Treaty is to be revised in the coming years fol-
lowing the accession of Portugal and Spain. This
revision will obviously have to take account of
Germany's new status and the decisions taken
by the 2 plus 4 conference on the external conse-
qirences of reunification. At the present stage of
the negotiations, WEU should be able to play a
major i6le in settling the military aspect of the
problem and, as in 1954, allowing Germany to
play an essential part in the European security
system, for there can be no security in Europe
without Germany participating fully and on an
equal footing.
(d) Reunification of Germany and rcunificatioa ol EamN
89. Like Chancellor Kohl, Mr. Gysi stressed
that any reunification of Germany must be
placed in a European context. This point of
view was also defended by Mr. Mitterrand,
Chairman-in-Office of the European Com-
munity, when he visited East Berlin on 22nd
Deceniber and then at his meeting with Chan-
cellor Kohl, when they both said that the estab-
lishment of a confederation between the states
of the two parts of Europe was their common
aim.
90. In his reunification programme, Chan-
cellor Kohl referred to two aspects of this
question. On the one hand, in the sixth point, he
said that:
* 6. The development of inner-German
relations remains bedded in the pan-
European process and in East-West rela-
tions. The future structure of Germany
must fit into the future architecture of
Europe as a whole... "
Again, in the eighth point, he expressed his
views on procedure to be followed to set up this
confederation:
* 8. The CSCE process is and remains a
crucial part of the total European archi'
tecture and must be further advanced. "
91. However, publication of this programme
gave rise, among some of Germany's partners, in
6oth East and West, to the remark that it con-
tained no reference to the maintenance of
present frontiers. The Polish Prime Minister,
Mr. Mazowiecki, supported by Mr. Shevard'
nadze, is calling for a solemn declaration by the
Federal Government on the intangibility of
those frontiers. Yet it is quite clear that reunifi'
cation cannot concern only the two German
states, with Berlin, but that claims to other terri-
tories that belonged to Germany in 1937 might
destabilise the whole of Europe and be a setback
to any reunification process. While it is true that
Chancellor Kohl's proposals concerned only
future relations between the two German states,
it is equally true that any uncertainty about the
attitudt of the Germans in this connection may
have dangerous consequences.
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92. Over the years, the Federal Republic of
Germany, either in its 1970 treaties with the
Soviet Union and Poland (the German-Polish
declaration issued after Chancellor Kohl's visit
to Poland in November 1989 specifically refers
to them) or in recent statements by its Minister
for Foreign Affairs and resolutions adopted by
the Bundestag, has shown clearly that it does not
intend to call in question the Oder-Neisse line
separating the GDR from Poland. Under-
standably, the federal authorities hesitate to take
the initiative in statements which would make
them lose any advantage they might derive from
the absence of a peace treaty. Juridically
speaking, one might say that only the gov-
ernment of a reunified Germany can ratify
changes made by treaty to Germany's 1937 fron-
tiers. However, now is probably the time, if
we really want a reunification of Germany
acceptable to Europe as a whole, to renounce
verbal reservations which might suggest that,
after reunification has been achieved, Germany
might resume claims which the Federal
Republic had renounced. Quite rightly, the
Federal Government is very vigilant about the
legal aspects of questions relating to the future
of a Germany whose status still lacks adequate
foundations. Furthermore, the United States,
France and the United Kingdom, in their joint
declaration in the flrnal act of the London con-
ference of 3rd October 1954, after taking note
that the Federal Republic had undertaken never
to have recourse to force to achieve the reunifi-
cation of Germany, asserted that " a peace
settlement for the whole of Germany, freely
negotiated between Germany and her former
enemies, which should lay the foundation of a
lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their
policy. The final determination of the bound-
aries of Germany must await such a settle-
ment ".
93. After the elections on lSth March, negoti-
ations will be started between the two German
states, although they have in fact already begun
on monetary unification. It will then be possible
for the parliaments of the two states repre-
senting Germany as a whole to make a joint
undertaking not to call in question Germany's
eastern frontier. Nevertheless, a prior decla-
ration by the two governments would be a useful
contribution to the process of reunification
because it would reassure Poland and also many
other Europeans by specifying that reunification
as understood by the Germans is indeed the
reunification that other Europeans are prepared
to accept and support. There is every reason to
welcome the fact that, in an article in the
Augsburger Allgemeine of 24th February, Mr.
Genscher proposed that such a step be taken in
the near future. Finally, it might help to appease
their fears if other European countries were
associated with the negotiations which concern
them directly.
(e) Conclusions
94. All the peoples of Europe are now con-
vinced that a new peaceful and stable order
requires reunification to which no opposition is
being expressed, although it has caused under-
standable concern among some people because
of the past and also because of geographical,
demographic, economic and monetary realities
that will inevitably ensure that Germany,
reunified in one form or another, will play a
leading part in the Europe of tomorrow.
Germans must therefore recognise these con-
cerns and ensure that reunlfication is achieved
with Europe and not against it. This means that
reunification, whose principle is now accepted
in accordance with the right of each nation to
self-determination, must take account of the
feelings of neighbouring countries, respect the
international acts which recognise the existence
of the two German states and ensure mainte-
nance of the structures of a European organ-
isation that already exists in Western Europe
with the Atlantic Alliance, the Community and
WEU, in Eastern Europe with the Warsaw Pact
and in Europe as a whole with the CSCE. These
structures are the best guarantee that the reunifi-
cation of Germany will coincide with the reuni-
fication of Europe. However, if they are main-
tained, this means that the solution of the
German problem does not depend only on
agreement between the two German states.
Their raison d'€tre will disappear only when a
European confederation has acquired sufficient
authority to guarantee effectively the security of
all. At present, the CSCE seems to be the most
appropriate framework for ensuring that the
rapprochement between the two German states
is accomplished with the consent of the whole of
Europe.
95. This requirement means that the reunifi-
cation of Germany must be progressive and not
the result of a simple understanding between the
two German states. It also requires close consul-
tation between the Federal Government and the
other members of the Community, WEU and
the Atlantic Alliance so that the West stands
united in such a delicate matter. Finally, it
means that Germany once reunified, like the
two German states until then, will have to
maintain its renunciation of nuclear weapons,
since otherwise fears might be revived that the
new German state might use this weapon to
defend national interests that none of the
partners of either German state is prepared to
endorse.
96. The reunification process is a side-effect
of perestroika and was triggered off by the
people of the GDR, the very great majority of
whom in any case could apparently no longer
stand their political and economic r6gime. It
may be thought that the elections on l8th March
will confirm its will to proceed swiftly to the uni-
I
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fication of the two German states. In fact, steps
have already been taken in this direction, e.g.-in
the monetary field. The external conditions for
such an association must therefore be settled as
soon as possible and the stages fixed if there is
not to be de facto reunification making it far
more difficult to hold subsequent negotiations
in which other countries are to participate. A
time-table has already been worked out for these
negotiations, the main steps being planned to be
tat-en in 1990. However, everyone knows that it
is essential for the broad lines of a settlement to
be drawn up even before the actual negotiations
start. It is therefore essential to prepare an
outline settlement quickly, at least for the most
important aspects, the main one now being the
place of reunified Germany in the organisation
of European security. This is why the member
countries of the Atlantic Alliance, on the one
hand, and the members of WEU, on the other,
must reach early agreement on this point with
the Soviet Union and its allies. There is already
some degree of convergence on excluding the
neutralisation of Germany and on the unre-
served participation of .reunified Germany in
the NATO integrated military system. However,
it is essential for further progress to be made
quickly so that a first compromise can be
worked out and everything indicates that in this
respect WEU can contribute to a solution. As far
as your Rapporteur knows, the Council seems to
have done little so far to help the search for such
a solution.
97. It is also tempting to look ahead to a
time when peace, guaranteed by radical disarm-
ament, is firmly established in Europe, thus ren-
dering vain any measures to set the reunification
of Germany in the framework of present secur-
ity systems. But it should be recalled that, far
from ensuring such a development in the near
future, events in Central and Eastern Europe in
1989 have increased the causes ofinstability, for
the next few years at least. Hence the settlement
of the German question cannot be based on an
over-optimistic view of a future that is far from
sure. The principles set out in the platform of
The Hague still meet Western Europe's-security
requirements and will probably do so for some
yeirs. There can be no question- of renouncing
iheir application in the name of an admittedly
enticing-vision of the organisation of a peaceful
order in Europe, but which is still remote from
present-day realities.
IY. Towards a new EuroPean order
98. In the last forty years, there has been a
considerable growth in inter-state organisations
working in many different areas in Europe. This
has led, on the one hand, to limits if not on the
sovereignty at least on the freedom ofaction of
national states and, on the other, to the emer-
gence ofa feeling ofsecurity that Europeans had
not known for more than a century. The fear of
armed conflicts between neighbours has disap-
peared from Western Europe, economic soli-
darity has become a reality in the Common
Marliet countries and commitments entered into
in the Council of Europe or the CSCE have done
much to remove dictatorial or totalitarian incli-
nations. However, this organisation of peace in
Europe has been limited by the division of the
continent into two camps. Two military alliance
systems and two economic co-operation organis-
alions have maintained permanent tension in
the centre of Europe and have significantly
curbed the feeling of security arising from the
disappearance of traditional antagonisms.
99. Events in Central and Eastern Europe in
1989 suggest that this division no longer colre-
sponds -io the realities of the Euro-pe of
tomorrow, if not today, and that henceforth a
peaceful order can be built that is truly
European. The question therefore is whether we
are to build a common house that will be some-
thing entirely new and whether it is desirable to
destioy the system that was developed after the
war oi whether it is preferable to base the new
order on relations between existing organis-
ations, which will merely have to adapt their
activities to the new circumstances.
100. As a consequence of this situation, both
sides have accepted new concepts, as Mr. Pierre
Harmel most aptly indicated in his paper at the
Florence colloquy in April 1989, i.e. the concept
of shared security whose corollary is the mainte-
nance of a minimum threshold of security and
deterrence, based on the notion ofsufficiency, a
concept to which the Soviet Union is no longer
opposed, if Mr. Shevardnadze is to be
believed.
101. The Atlantic Alliance, on the one hand,
and the Warsaw Pact, on the other, are now the
essential instruments for maintaining this
shared security and defining together the
minimum threshold of security to be ensured.
Together, they have to achieve a balance of
security which still can be defined only as a
balance of forces between two opposing military
systems. In addition, NATO has to handle trans-
atlantic relations which are being called in
question by the evolution ofthe external threat.
However, although both systems are facing
crises, the position is far more acute in the
Warsaw Pact, which has just witnessed the col-
lapse of the system of values that it claimed to
upnot0 and whose existence is in jeopardy, than
in tle Atlantic Alliance, whose success is clear,
since it has managed to ensure peace in Europe
without renouncing any of the values it had the
task ofdefending. It is probably this success that
led the United States Secretary of State, Mr.
Baker, to propose extending the alliance's actionto political questions, without taking drF
account ofthe fact that other organisations, such
as the Council of Europe and WEU, were
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probably better placed to pursue such action, in
certain areas at least. It is obviously not very
desirable to create new international institu-
tions, and it should therefore be determined
more clearly, as far as possible, in which areas
each one can help to establish a new European
order.
(a) Tb alliorwa
192. The question of maintaining the existing
alliances 
- 
the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic
Alliance with WEU 
- 
is obviously the most
acute since they are often accused, wrongly
rather than rightly, of bearing responsibility foi
the long East-West confrontation. In fact, they
probably made a major contribution to pre-
venting confrontation, of which they were a
result rather than the cause, from degenerating
and at the same time they ensured peace within
each camp. Clearly, the question must be solved
at one and the same time and in the same
manner for NATO and the Warsaw Pact sinceit is out of the question for one of these
organisations to become the instrument of all-
European security. Moreover, the dissolution of
the pacts may, in the short term, be a goal for
countries wishing to free themselves quickly
from everything that was part of the Soviit grii
and may appear, even to a section of western
public opinion, to be an obvious implication of
ddtente.
103.. Faced with the transformation of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the devel-
opment of disarmament negotiations, the first
question is therefore whether Western Europe
still needs a defensive system. As matters now
stand, there is no doubt that it does, for several
reasons:
1.04. 
_(i) The Soviet Union is and will for a long
time be a very great military power with consid-
erable conventional and nuclear means. In its
own words, it needs some ten years to achieve a
significant reduction in its conventional
weapons, seven years to destroy its chemical
weapons and time to reorg;anise its military
system. Moreover, the redeployment of Soviet
forces 
_to qrove that its offensive strategy has
been abandoned has not yet been effected- and,in any event, the situation will remain pre-
carious. No one can guarantee the pursuit ofthepolicy started by Mr. Gorbachev, although it
seems to conform clearly to the interests o-f the
Soviet Union. There can be no question of
assessing the threat a state may exercise on the
basis of intentions, even if they are assumed to
be sincere, but only on the basis of the means
available for threatening peace. The Soviet
Union still has such means. Disarmament in the
West must therefore be gradual and propor-
tional, as agreed by the -Vienna negoliators,
moreover.
105. (ii) The very fact that disarmament is the
subject of negotiated agreements makes uni-
lateral measures by one side or the other unde-
sirable as they would detract from the impor-
tance of the negotiations and the bartering
values of the negotiators which are fundamental
in negotiations.
106. (iii) The tremor that hit the Eastern
European r6gimes has left all these countries in a
weak political situation where no development
can be excluded and certainly not a resurrection
of national claims supported by large sections of
prrblic opinion. Faced with these dangers, the
Warsaw Pact and the presence of Soviet forces
in-Eastern Europe help to maintain some degree
of stability and avert real dangers. There is
therefore no question of speeding up the disso-
lution of the pact. But similarly Wesiern Europe
must retain a defensive and deterrent capabilily
and military cohesion that will give the nec-
essary political weight to any action it may take
and protect it from the effects of crises thal may
arise from a re-emergence of nationalism.
107. (iv) ln the last ten yea$, some countries
close to Europe, particularly along its Mediter-
ranean shores, have procured sophisticated,
powerful weapons which oblige Western Europe
to remain on its guard.
108. Hence, it appears that in future years
Europe must retain a military system adequate
to meet the requirements of defence and deter-
rence as defined in the platform of The Hague.
109. It is more difficult to solve the question of
how to ensure defence and deterrence. A key
factor will quite obviously continue to be thb
cohesion of the western world as guaranteed bythe Atlantic Alliance and the presence of
American forces in Europe. But if this presence
is called in question, which sooner or lat-er seems
inevitable, Western Europe may find itself solely
responsible for western military deployment iir
lurope, which would mean increasing its mil-
itary expenditure. The United States has already
undertaken to reduce the number of its troops
stationed in Europe to 225 000, but its gov-
ernment is under strong pressure to make
further cuts. If, as it may beiupposed, negotia-
tions on shorter-range nuclear weapons are
opened and lead to an agreement for their total
withdrawal, it is most unlikely that the United
States will keep troops on European territory
that are too few to be able to defend themselved.It is therefore possible that the European
members of the Atlantic Alliance may, fbr a
time, have to disarm more slowly thin theirpartners and retain strategic, and perhaps
prestrategic, nuclear weapons which are the
essential instrument of deterrence. Furthermore,
even if the military link between Europe and th6
United States is maintained in full, as firmly
asserted by Mr. Baker during his tour of Europein December, this will nevertheless imply- a
ll6
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stronger organisation of Europe in the alliance,
which should be one of the key rOles of WEU.
Finally, the reduction of American forces and
armaments in Europe will make it necessary to
improve the protection of air routes and sea
lants across the North Atlantic to allow rein-
forcements and weapons to be brought in
rapidly in the event of a serious crisis.
I 10. The second r6le of the Atlantic Alliance is
already, and will continue to be, to organise
western participation in negotiations on disarm-
ament, European security and confidence-
building measures and to ensure continuing con-
sultatiohs between the Americans and their
allies to ensure that Western Europe's security is
not jeopardised by agreements between the two
great powers in which Europe did not take part.
NnfO has just shown its ability to play this r6le
by adopting, on l5th December 1989, the draft
tieaty on conventional forces in Europe that it is
to submit to the Vienna conference, and the
Warsaw Pact has done likewise. At the minis-
terial meeting in Ottawa from l2th to l4th Feb-
o&ry, it managed to come to an agreement with
the Warsaw Pact countries on the broad lines of
an * open skies " agtreement for a system of
reciprocal overflying of the respective territories
of members of the two alliances in order to
verify application of arms control agreements
and consolidate mutual confidence. However,
the more forces the United States withdraws
from Europe, the more the latter will have to
shoulder iti responsibilities in the limitation of
armaments and in defence matters and, to this
end, WEU will also have to play a greater r6le.
1l l. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the
action of the Atlantic Alliance is still insuffrcient
to ensure the defence ofthe southern flank ofits
area, i.e. the Mediterranean. Under the Wash-
ington Treaty, it was given no deterrent capa-
bility beyond an area limited in the south by the
Mediterranean. If Europe is to take action to
safeguard lines of communication and the
traniport of vital supplies such as oil, it must
have the political and military means essential
for tasks such as its mine-sweeping operations in
the Gulf in 1988. WEU, although not used
enough for this purpose, is still the sole
instrument for co-ordinating member states'
action in this area.
ll2. It wilt admittedly be diflicult to maintain
a military system that is adequate to ensure
these duties. Dissolution of the alliances and
denuclearisation of Europe are still at the top of
the list of the Eastern European countries'
claims, although the Soviet Union seems more
cautious than before on these questions now that
doubts about communist rdgimes is making the
Warsaw Pact a more important factor in main-
taining some deglee of cohesion in Eastern
Europe. Addressing the Political Committee of
the European Parliament in December 1989,
Mr. Shevardnadze said clearly that the Soviet
Union had taken note of the western point of
view on the need to maintain minimum deter-
rence. However, western public opinion will
probably be receptive to arguments such as
ihose used by Mr. Gysi when proposing the dis-
armament of the two German states and, on the
other hand, will call for a reduction in defence
budgets, which will seem less necessary, to cut
public expenditure or to divert it to areas of
more direct benefit to the community. A consid-
erable effort will therefore have to be made to
explain to everyone the requirements of a Euro-
pean security policy. The governments showed
they realised that this was necessary when they
decided to reactivate WEU in 1984 and it is one
of the aims they have assigned to the new WEU
Institute for Security Studies. They now have to
guide the work of the institute in that direction
and give it the wherewithal for the studies it pre-
parei to have the desired impact on the public.
Nor is there any doubt that our Assembly will
willingly play this rOle, as it has already been
doing to the best ofits ability for several years.
113. While it is still necessary to maintain the
alliances and their progressively slimmer mil-
itary systems, to intensify international co-oper-
ation in the framework of these alliances, in par-
ticular on disarmament, and to develop
exchanges of information on the projects-
planned by either side, following the example of
Mr. Shevardnadze when he met the Secretary-
General and permanent representatives of the
NATO member countries in Brussels on l8th
December, it does not seem very realistic or
desirable to extend NATO's activities in areas
not within the purview of the North Atlantic
Treaty. In this connection, the address by Mr.
Bakei, United States Secretary of State, in Berlin
on l2th December 1989, when he gave his views
on * a new architecture for this new era " that
should be designed, attributed to the alliance
activities far exceeding the responsibilities it is
now recognised as having. By referring to a
reunified Germany as a member of the organ-
isation, he admittedly solved the German
problem but in terms that were rejected by both
Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gysi. By proposing
that NATO also consider new initiatives to be
taken by the West, in particular through the
CSCE process, in order to create economic and
political links with the East, he was assuming
that the western security organisation was
empowered to express its views in areas that
member countries have never yet accepted or
even seriously considered assigning to it. It is
hardly probable that the Eastern European
countries will accept NATO as a valid or
desirable interlocutor in such areas.
ll4. Conversely, Mr. Baker's proposals
relating to the wider rOle that might be exercised
by NATO by exchanging - at the same time as
WEU 
- 
information on all questions raised by
lt7
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arns control and verification of related agree-
ments, even if this should remain a national
responsibility, seem to correspond to the natural
vocation of the western security organisation
now that disarmament ought to be one of its
main preoccupations. Rather than working out a
'new Atlanticism ", the purpose would be to
guide the necessary alliance between Western
Europe and the United States towards the
solution of problems now raised by the mainte-
nance of security.
I 15. However, the reduction in the level of
American troops in Europe, the new trend in the
Atlantic Alliance towards the political aspects of
security and, consequently, the larger part that
will have to be played by the European members
of the alliance in the joint military system and
political action should result in their being given
a more important r6le in the alliance, thus
meaning that WEU will exercise more responsi-
bilities. This seems to be the principal con-
clusion drawn from the Wehrkunde colloquy
held in Munich on 3rd and 4th February 1990,
which was particularly outstanding because of
the presence of most European defence min-
isters. Nor did they mince their words, in that
they had to complain about not having been
informed until the last minute of President
Bush's decision to reduce the American presence
in Central Europe to 195 000 men. While Mr.
Wtirner, Secretary-General of NATO, said the
alliance needed its European members to play a
larger, * more coherent' part, Mr. Stoltenberg,
Federal German Minister of Defence, suggested
that Eurogroup or WEU should play a greater
r6le in all the NATO structures and General
Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's National
Security Adviser, underlined the r6le WEU
would have to play and said: * It is time for a
European pillar to be built in the security field. "
However, it was the French Minister of Defence,
Mr. Chev0nement, who was most specific on
this point:
" Deterrence is the only strategic concept
that meets Europe's first concern, which is
to prevent war and not to win it. I think
that the Western European countries can
reach an agreement concerning this kind
of deterrent power which, if in close
contact with the American potential,
could be used as a pivot by the European
defensive bulwark which France hopes to
see.
If such a structure is to see the light of
day, it needs the backing of the principal
Western European countries and must
accompany progress in the European
Economic Community in strengthening
common political institutions. The Com-
munity institutions 
- 
European Council,
European Parliament 
- 
can now provide a
sound, democratic basis for the major
debates that influence our security.
However, it is not yet time for them to
handle purely military matters. WEU is
probably the most appropriate place for
doing so and has proved its ability to
shape strong ideas such as the Charter. It
is in present circumstances that its r6le as
a forum for discussion on strengthening
European security is becoming essential.
The idea of a bulwark to the west of
Europe would not weaken the alliance: on
the contrary, it would re-establish a
balance. "
(b) The Eurcpeaa economic area
116. While the economic difliculties of the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European coun-
tries prompted the idea of perestroika and the
revolt of the people against the established
r6gimes, if they were to continue the stability of
power in those countries and the introduction of
a new peaceful order in Europe would bejeopardised. It therefore seems essential for the
West to provide as much assistance as possible,
first to allow the people to survive in the coming
months, particularly in Romania and Poland
where there are alarming shortages, then to
foster the recovery and reorganisation of the
economies of all the Central and Eastern
European countries and, finally, to develop
exchanges and co-operation between the two
parts ofEurope so that peace can be given new
and sounder bases.
ll7. It seems clear today that the European
Community is better prepared than any other
organisation to undertake this long-term task
because it has the means and unrivalled expe-
rience of economic co'operation. It was given a
clear mandate at the Paris summit meeting in
July and at the meeting of the European Council
in Strasbourg in December 1989. In his Berlin
address, Mr. Baker, the Secretary of State, pro-
posed that it play this r6le and the Eastern
European countries certainly consider it to be a
model that they would like to follow and a real
centre of attraction with which some wish to be
associated or even join. Since 1988, special
agreements have already been signed between
the Community and the Soviet Union and
several Eastern European countries, and the
German Democratic Republic has privileged
status in the Common Market. The reunifi-
cation of Germany will obviously imply its
accession and it will be difficult to defer an
answer to Austria's candidature, which will
accompany that of Hungary, until after 1992.
118. Without prejudging the situation in the
more distant future, it can be affirmed that the
present economic situation in the eastern coun-
tries and uncertainty about the nature, scale and
effects of their economic restructuring do not
allow them to join the Community. This uncer-
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tainty was demonstrated very clearly at the
Com'econ meeting in Sofia in January 1990
when three countries - Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland - wished to move quickly
towards liberalisation of their external trade,
while others were far more hesitant. Further-
more, the opening of the GDR's frontiers with
the West has already made the Deutschmark a
far more sought-after currency than the eastern
Mark and an incomparable economic stimulus.
Mr. Shevardnadze's proposal in Brussels on
l8th December 1989 to build European eco
nomic co-operation on three pillars - the Com-
munity, EFTA and Comecon - therefore seems
to have little connection with economic realities.
As for the CSCE, it is obviously an excellent
forum for associating eastern and western gov-
ernments for defining common aims and con-
cluding co-operation agreements, but it has no
facilities for research and implementation and
can therefore not compete with the Community
in practising effective co-operation.
119. Yet so far the Community has not
managed to take swift, effective action in areas
for which it is responsible to promote such
co-operation, while the Soviet Union and the
United States seem to be hampered in such
areas by political considerations that prevent
them frbm tackling problems realistically. This
is, in any event, the impression given by both
Mr. Bak6r and Mr. Shevardnadze in Brussels in
December. At the Paris summit meeting in July
1989, the Community was instructed to
co-ordinate assistance by the twenty-four OECD
countries to Poland and Hungary, and develop-
ments in the other Eastern European countries
should naturally mean this being extended to
include the entire region. There seem to be
regrettable delays in carrying out this pro-
grimme, however. So far, no means of agricul-
tural production seem to have been supplied,
investment has not been encouraged and no
assistance given for modernising infrastructure.
The Commission has not yet set up offices in
Budapest and Warsaw that it would need to
carry out the task assigned to it. On the other
hand, at the Strasbourg meeting of the European
Council on 9th November it was decided to set
up a European bank for reconstruction and
development to promote productive, compet-
itive investment in Central and Eastern Europe,
to facilitate the transition to a more market-
oriented economy, to reduce risks and to speed
up the necessary structural adjustments.
120. Yet it just seems as if events in Eastern
Europe had caught the Commission of the Com-
munity on the wrong foot at a time when it was
starting to assume a number of responsibilities
in regaid to security, defence and armaments for
whicL it had received no clear mandate from the
governments. It is obviously aware that, if 
- 
it
idvances in this sector, it may find that the
Soviet Union and certain eastern countries will
question its ability to become the instrument of
the reunification of Europe in the economic
sector. This would explain its hesitation to
which it should put an end. It has no choice but
to opt for co-operation with Eastern Europe,
which means that it should let the Western
European governments agf,ee in WEU on
matters within the purview of that organisation,
as proposed by Mr. Genscher in his l'pry-
gramme for Germany'of lst October 1989. If it
does not do this soon, it might well lose its gen-
erally agreed responsibilities in the first sector
with- little chance of gaining authority in the
latter area.
l2l. Admittedly, if the Community is not to
disintegrate in ihis co-operation and lose its
truly eommunity vocation - now the very
reason why it has the necessary authorityto play
a crucial driving r6le in reunification - it must
strengthen its siructures and develop means of
action in all areas for which it is explicitly
responsible. The Single European Act gave it a
framework, the single market is to be established
within the prescribed time limits and the mea-
sures adopted Uy ttre European Council in Stras-
bourg are to be completed so that the economic
and monetary union can be achieved without
delay. The opening to the East makes it more
than ever necessary for the Community to adopt
a social policy so as not to appear to its new
partners to be the instrument of capitalism,
ignoring the needs of society. The speedl
aihievement of this programme is necessary if
the Community is to remain a pole of attraction
for the eastern countries and the changes in
Europe ate not to jeopardise the planned
European union of which the Community is the
strongest part.
(c) The common house
122. All the political leaders who have con-
sidered co-opeiation between the Western and
Eastern European countries have stressed the
essential r6le played by the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe in the last
fifteen years and how it has helped to restore
mutual 
- 
confidence, promote the success of
freedoms in Eastern Europe and start
co-operation between the two parts of Europe.
As Mr. Gorbachev usefully recalled when
addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg^
on 6th July 1989, it also has the advantage.of
associating the United States and Canada with
its work and does not leave a Europe divided
into small states face to face with the Soviet
giant.
123. Since the signing of the Helsinki final act,
which was the first undertaking by the Eastern
European countries to reform their internal
r6gimes, the conference has developed its activ-
ities significantly in various directions, and, at
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its meeting in Vienna which ended in 1989,
plans were made to hold several specialised con-
ferences covering almost all areas in which it is
possible to develop co-operation, including con-
ventional disarmament, since that is the
framework in which the CEE negotiations are
being held. We can share the idea expressed byMr. Shevardnadze, when speaking to thi)
Political Committee of the - Euroftan Par-
liament, that the CSCE has already established
certain aspects of a European juridical area.
121. Howe-ver, whatever the merits of the pro-
cedures it offers, that interyovernmental body is
a cumbersome, slow way of working and its
meetings are too infrequent for it to be able to
meet the needs of a Europe which is now
evolving so quickly. It has no organisation of its
own to give constant impetus to its work and
ensure that its decisions are implemented, nor
has it any parliamentary body. There is every
reason to be gratified that it was the Soviet Min-
ister who proposed the creation of " committees
or centres comprising groups of highly com-
petent experts. Such bodies could later assume
consultative functions and perhaps even become
supranational in nature, if all thirty-five CSCE
countries so decide'. He also proposed holding
an annual summit meeting, setting up a com-
mittee of ministers for foreign affairs-and per-
manent missions to the CSCE and * the imple-
mentation of projects such as the centre for
reducing the risk of war and preventing surprise
attack, the centre for emergency ecological
assistance, the European human ri-ghts
institute ".
125. It should be stressed that Mr. Baker,
Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand all
eqnhasised the need to develop the procedure
offered by the CSCE and it ii probable and
desirable that the summit meeting of all its
members to be held in the second half of 1990
wiff not be just to sign the CFE agreement but
will also tackle the repercussions for collective
security of events in Eastern Europe and take
lhe first steps to create a pennanent brganisationfor security and co-operation in Europe cover-ing three dimensions: security, economic
co-operation and the definition of European
law. In this connection, the increasingly aitive
part played in meetings by the Soviet Union and
several Eastern European countries and their
scrutiny of conventions concluded in the
framework of the Council of Europe with a view
to possible accession suggest that it may be pos-
sible to make considerable progress in-the very
near future.
126. Speaking in Tutzing on 3lst January, Mr.
Genscher proposed a programme for the CSCE
suTmit meeting designed to give the conference
a large number of permanent institutions toprovide useful structures for a peaceful order in
Europe:
" l. An institution for East-West eco-
nomic co-operation. The European
Development Bank must also be
considered from this point of view.
2. An all-European institution to guar-
antee human rights. The Council of
Europe's Human Rights Convention
will soon be applied to the whole of
Europe.
3. A centre for establishing a Europeanjuridical area with a view to
. 
standardising law.
4. A European ecological agency.
5. Extension ofco-operation in Eureka
to the whole of Europe.
6. Co-operation between ESA and cor-
responding institutions in the East.
7. A centre for developing a European
communications network.
8. A centre for developing a European
transport policy and infrastructure.
9. A European verification centre.
10. A European centre for settling con-
flicts. ,
Th.rg proposals, or some of them, are worthy of
the closest attention because they demonstrate
what can now be envisaged at all-European level
and, at the same time, what must remhin in the
hands of truly western organisations.
127. President Mitterrand was obviously
thinking of such developments when, on 3lsi
December 1989, he proposed the establishment
of a European confederation, an idea endorsed
by Chancellor Kohl in his Latchd interview on
4th January. The purpose was obviously not for
this confederation to replace the European Com-
munity, which France and the Federal Republic
intend, on the contrary, to consolidate, but to
give meaning and an aim to the process started
!y the CSCE and the follow-up action proposedby Mr. Shevardnadze. A confederation is an
association of states which pool the exercise of
part oftheir sovereignty but retain sovereignty.
While, generally speikiirg, external and defin6epolicy have, historically, been the first to be
exercised by confederal authorities, this is not a
necessity and today it would be logical for
confederal authority to be exercised rather in the
areas mentioned by Mr. Shevardnadze and
Mr. Genscher.
(d) WEU ia thc acw cirxamstances
128. WEU is fortunate that the events in 1989
precede its agreed re-examination of its found-
ing te_xt, the modified Brussels Treaty, once the
act ofaccession ofPortugal and Spain has been
ratified by all member countries, which should
t20
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be completed in March 1990, with Portugal's
ratification. Revision of the treaty will thus be
included in the Council's agenda during the year
now starting and this will obviously be an
opportunity to examine, not, as was hitherto
thought, its adaptation to the post-I985 circum-
stances but the post-1990 situation. This is not
without significance since, in the former case, it
was mainly planned to delete provisions relating
to the control of armaments among member
countries. The disbanding of the Standing
Armaments Committee, decided upon in
November 1989, and the limitation of the
Agency for the Control of Armaments since
1989 to verifying the non-production of
chemical weapons by the Federal Republic, were
more or less taken for granted. It may now be
wondered whether these duties that were con-
sidered as having lost interest are not assuming
new importance.
129. However, rather than speculating about
the institution, it seems preferable to ponder on
Western Europe's needs in security-related areas
by considering what can be done by each ofthe
institutions working in these areas. Thus, it can
quite normally be seen that relations between
the United States and Western Europe, defence
planning for the area covered by the Atlantic
Alliance and crisis management are the respon-
sibility of NATO, whereas the implementation
of the CFE agreements, the application of
confidence-building measures, the prevention of
certain types of crisis, gathering information and
the development of exchanges with the East are
matters for WEU which should also redefine the
respective r6les of the Community, the IEPG
and WEU for everything relating to research,
studies and the joint production of arma-
ments.
130. On this basis, consideration can be given
to present problems, which may be divided into
three groups:
131. (r/ WEU's main vocation is obviously to
guarantee the security of member countries in
the face ofany form ofthreat from any directionby ensuring cohesion in their military
deployment and foreign policy, while respecting
state sovereignty. However, requirements in the
deployment of forces and armaments will be
changed by factors outside WEU 
- 
the with-
drawal of American forces and the CFE agree-
ments 
- 
and by factors within member states 
-
the reduction in the proportion of their GNP
that they earmark for defence. This reduction
will make each country increasingly dependent
on the community, as was well demonstrated by
the Belgian Chief-of-Staff, General Charlier,
when he briefed the Assembly's Defence Com-
mittee on Belgium's programme for organising
its forces adopted in 1989. He summed it up as
being to strengthen ourselves where we are the
strongest and to rely on our allies for the rest.
This should allow Belgium to use its military
investments to best avail for joint defence pur-
poses, but make it wholly dependent on those
whose forces are complementary to its own. For
a country firmly committed to a collective
security system, it seems a reasonable solution
to a problem that cannot be solved by other
means.
132. The larger countries, such as France, have
so far managed to limit their defence budgets or
even reduce them in real terms without giving
up any part of their defensive systems, but have
managed to do so only at the cost of extending
the period of arms procurement programmes.
One may wonder whether this is wise if it means
keeping obsolescent equipment in service for too
long at the expense of the security of personnel
and the efliciency of the armed forces. They,
too, will probably have to resign themselves in
the near future to making more significant cuts
in their armaments programmes.
133. There is certainly a link between the
Belgian decision to adopt the Charlier plan and
the steps taken by the Belgian presidency to
induce member countries' chiefs-of-staff to meet
in the framework of WEU. The policy inaugu-
rated by Belgium requires closer agreement
between military headquarters to organise the
use of their forces and plan their arms pro-
curement policy, taking into account the
stronger and weaker points of their partners'
capabilities. It is therefore to be deplored that
the governments have not yet managed to agree
to follow up the Belgian proposal. WEU has
never yet made a serious effort to carry out the
task it set itself of giving political impetus to thejoint production of armaments. The time seems
ripe to do so.
134. (i/ Requirements stemming from the
forthcoming conclusion of the CFE agreements
have rightly led the Council to study the situ-
ation that will emerge from these agreements,
with particular regard to common action by its
members to prepare for the implementation by
member countries of the verification measures
they believe to be necessary. It is indeed impos-
sible for each individual country to train verifi-
cation teams that are qualified at both technical
and diplomatic level. In order to play an
effective part in the verification they consider
necessary, it is in everyone's interest to have a
vast amount of information, staff with very
wide-ranging qualifications and structures for
updating and comparing information received
from a wide variety of sources. On the basis of
the experience 
- 
unique in the world 
- 
acquired
by its Agency for the Control of Armaments,
WEU is the only European organisation in a
position to arrange the participation of member
countries: data banks, studies of these data,
training of inspectors and, if necessary, the use
of satellites would be the main elements.
t2r
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135. The Assembly is therefore gratifred that
the Council has started to follow up its recom-
mendation for the creation of a European space
agency and the joint development of obser-
vation satellites. It can but deplore the slowness
of the Council's progress 
- 
if it is possible to
speak of progress 
- 
in its deliberations in view of
the fast-approaching timeJimit for solving the
verification question.
136. (iii) The establishment of a peaceful order
in Europe also concerns WEU and is likely to
guide its work in new directions. In this context,
Belgium, following the crash of a Soviet military
aircraft on its territory in July 1989, made an
interesting proposal for the future: to create an
early warning system, in case of need, linking
Eastern and Western European countries to
allow them to take immediate steps in the event
of unforeseen threats. This is part of the
confidence-building measures that are on the
agenda of the CSCE, but wEU might, by fol-
lowing up the Belgian proposal, be the insti-
gator. The Council seems to have done little to
advance in this direction.
137. The terms of the modified Brussels Treaty
make WEU an organisation that aims to
establish confidence as well as being a defensive
alliance. It has managed to do so in Western
Europe but might do more today by giving the
Eastern European countries a guarantee that
each of its members will respect its undertakings
in all disarmament agreements, be it the CFE
agreements or agreements on banning chemical
weapons and on non-proliferation and giving
firm content to the concept of shared security.
138. Generally speaking, the new peaceful
order will require confidence that can be based
only on each country having an in-depth
knowledge of each other's military system and
capabilities. East-West exchanges of information
are already being developed and will have to
increase. Meetings are being held between repre-
sentatives of eastern and western military head-
quarters on strategy and the use of forces.
Western Europe will need an instrument to
organise these exchanges and collect and study
the information. The Council's November 1989
decision to set up a WEU Institute for Security
Studies is a first step in this direction and the
Assembly will follow the activation of this
institute with interest and hopes it will fulfil the
r6le described here. However, the very limited
resources that it is planned to give it will cer-
tainly not allow it to carry out this task and, if
the Council wishes to use the institute for that
purpose, it wi[ have to give it explicit instruc-
tions and the funds necessary to carry out such
tasks.
139. The Council's activities should also
include informing the public, without which
Europe's work in security matters will lack a
sound basis. Your Rapporteur has often had the
opportunity to emphasise how inadequate the
Council's efforts in this area have so far been.
140. These various guidelines for WEU's activ-
ities do not necessarily mean revising the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, Article VIII of which gives
the Council legal bases for a very wide range of
action. Other considerations linked with the
accession of Portugal and Spain or the interna-
tional status of unified Germany may lead to
this. However, the prospect of such a revision
should encourage it to examine Western
Europe's security requirements more closely
now that Europe is in the process ofchanging. It
would thus contribute to the necessary consoli-
dation of Western European structures now that
the latter is going to have to consider the
building of the common house with the Eastern
European countries. Even if this should include
a collective security organisation, which seems
evident, a truly European, truly western
structure will remain essential for a long time to
come. This does not mean, however, that it will
not be in WEU's interest, or in any event that of
its Assembly and institute, to encourage and
develop their exchanges with partners from the
Soviet Union or other Central and Eastern
European countries who are determined to pool
their concerns in security matters.
Y. Conclusions
l4l. From these various considerations, it is
apparent that, because of events in Central and
Eastern Europe in 1989, Europe must embark
upon a vast operation to organise a new interna-
tional order and it must act very quickly because
of the nature and speed of the upheavals. The
new authorities in the GDR and Romania,
unable to keep pace with popular demonstra-
tions, are already bending under their pressure
and losing control of the situation; in Bulgaria,
very strong nationalist feelings are surfacing,
Yugoslavia is threatened by the awakening of
nationalities, while Poland and Romania have
very serious food shortages and are having the
utmost difficulty in setting their economies in
motion again. Comecon and the Warsaw Pact
are starting to be contested. There is no guar-
antee that it will be possible to hold completely
free elections in some of these countries nor that
the results of such elections will allow a gov-
ernment to be formed that can be sure of the sta-bility and popular support necessary for
restoring a democratic order and reviving the
economy. If the West, and Western Europe in
particular, do not come quickly to their
assistance, Eastern Europe may soon fall prey to
serious troubles that could be overcome only by
authoritarian r6gimes.
142. Yet the opening to the East must not
weaken the structures that ensure peace and
prosperity in Western Europe. One way or
i
'I
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another, those that exist must be maintained
and strengthened and at the same time new mea-
sures must associate the two parts of Europe
more closely and permanently. In this con-
nection, the most recent Soviet proposals tally
well with western views. There is no longer any
question of the immediate dissolution of the
pacts or of the premature extension of the Com-
munity but of reasonable development of
co-operation in appropriate frameworks. The
common house has certainly become a clearer,
more realistic goal than it was in spring 1989.
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Documentation * ,-::r::* statas of Germany
1, Pmtuol betwun the Governments
of the aniud Stata of Americo,
the United Kingdom and the Union
of Sotia Socialist Republics
on the zorcs of occupation in Germany
aad the administration of Greater Berlin
12th Septanbu 1911
l. Germany, within her frontiers as they
were on 3lst December L937, will, for the pur-
poses ofoccupation, be divided into three zones,
one of which will be allotted to each of the three
powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be
under joint occupation by the three powers.
2.
The Berlin area (by which expression is
understood the territory of Greater Berlin as
defined by the I-aw of 27th April 1920) will bejointly occupied by armed forces of the United
States of America, the United Kingdom, and the
USSR, assigned by the respective Commanders-
in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of
Greater Berlin will be divided into the following
three parts...
5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority(Kommandatura) consisting of three com-
mandants, appointed by their respective
commanders-in-chiei will be established to
direct jointly the administration of the Greater
Berlin area.
2, Yalta Agrcenent 
- 
statemcnt
on ,hc rcsult of the Crimea conference
lth-llth Fcbruary 1915
Occupation and control
We have agreed on common policies and
plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender
terms which we shall impose together on Nazi
Germany after German armed resistance has
been finally crushed. These terms will not be
made known until the final defeat of Germany is
accomplished. Under the agreed plans the forces
of the three powers will each occupy a separate
zone of Germany. Co-ordinated administration
and control has been provided for through a
Central Control Commission consisting of the
Supreme Commanders of the three powers, with
headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that
France should be invited by the three powers, if
she should so desire, to take a zone of occu-
pation, and to participate as fourth member of
the Control Commission. The limits of the
French zone will be agreed by the four govern-
ments concerned through their representatives
::.:. 
European Advisory Commission.
Poland
The three heads of government consider
that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow
the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in
some regions of 5-8 kilometres in favour of
Poland. They recognise that Poland must
receive substantial accessions ofterritory in the
north and west. They feel that the opinion of the
new Polish Provisional Government of National
Unity should be sought in due cource on the
extent of these accessions, and that the final
delimitations of the western frontier of Poland
Ya 
thereafter await the peace conference.
3. Act of military surrender
7th May 1915
1. We the undersigned, acting by authority
of the German High Command, hereby sur-
render unconditionally to the Supreme Com-
mander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simul-
taneously to the Soviet High Command all
forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this
date under German control.
2. The German High Command will at once
issue orders to all German military, naval and
air authorities and to all forces under German
control to cease active operations at 23.01 hours
Central European time on 8th May and to
remain in the positions occupied at that time.
No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or
any damage done to their hull, machinery or
equipment.
3. The German High Command will at once
issue to the appropriate commanders, and
ensure the carrying out of any further orders
issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Force and by the Soviet High
Command.
4. This act of military surrender is without
prejudice to, and will be superseded by any
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general instrument of surrender imposed by, or
on behalf of the United Nations and applicable
to Germany and the German armed forces as a
whole.
5. In the event of the German High
Command or any of the forces under their
control failing to act in accordance with this Act
of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High
Command will take such punitive or other
action as they deem appropriate.
Signed at Reims, France, on 7th May 1945.
4, loint declaration of the membert
of tlu Allied Coatrul Commission for Germany
ith ,Iune 1915
The German armed forces on land, at sea,
and in the air have been completely defeated
and have surrendered unconditionally, and
Germany, which bears responsibility for the
war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of
the victorious powers. The unconditional sur-
render of Germany has thereby been effected,
and Germany has become subject to such
requirements as may now or hereafter be
imposed upon her.
There is no central government or
authority in Germany capable of accepting
responsibility for the maintenance of order, the
administration of the country, and compliance
with the requirements of the victorious powers.
It is in these circumstances necessary, without
prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may
be taken respecting Germany, to make provision
for the cessation of any further hostilities on the
part of the German armed forces, for the main-
tenance of order in Germany, and for the
administration of the country, and to announce
the immediate requirements with which Ger-
many must comply.
The representatives of the Supreme Com-
mands of the United Kingdom, the United
States of America, the USSR, and the French
Republic, hereinafter called the " allied repre-
sentatives', acting by authority of their
respective governments and in the interests of
the United Nations, accordingly make the fol-
lowing declaration:
" The Governments of the United King-
dom, the United States of America, and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, hereby assume supreme
authority with respect to Germany,
including all the powers possessed by the
German Government, the High
Command, and any state, municipal, or
local government or authority. The
assumption, for the purposes stated
above, of the said authority and powers
does not affect the annexation of
Germany. The Governments of the
United Kingdom, the United States of
America, and the USSR, and the French
Provisional Government, will hereafter
determine the boundaries of Germany or
any part thereof, and the status of
Germany or of any arca at present being
part of German territory".
5. Communiqud issued in London,
Washington and Moscow
on the decisioas reached at Potsdant
2ad Augttst 1915
Political and economic principles governing the
treatment of Germany in the initial period of
allied control
Political principles
9. The administration of affairs in Germany
should be directed towards the decentralisation
of the political structure and the development of
local responsibility. To this end:
(i) I-ocal self-government shall be
restored throughout Germany on
democratic principles, and, in par-
ticular, through elective councils, as
rapidly as is consistent with military
security and the purposes of military
occupation.
(ii) Nl democratic political parties with
rights of assembly and. public dis-
cussion shall be allowed and
encouraged throughout Germany.
(iffl Representative and elective prin-
ciples shall be introduced into
regional, provincial, and state admin-
istration as rapidly as may be jus-
tified by the successful application
of these principles in local self-
government.
(iv) For the time being no central German
Government shall be established.
Notwithstanding this, however,
certain essential central German
administrative departments, headed
by state secretaries, shall be estab-
lished, particularly in the fields of
finance, transport, communications,
foreign trade, and industry. Such
departments will act under the
direction of the Control Council.
The conference examined a proposal by
the Soviet Government that, pending the final
r25
DOCUMENT I2I6 APPENDIX j
,i
,i
j
\
determination of territorial questions at the
peace settlement, the section of the western
frontier of the USSR which is adjacent to the
Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the
eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east,
north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting-
point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish
Republic, and East Prussia.
The conference has agreed in principle to
the proposal of the Soviet Government con-
cerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet
Union of the city of K<inigsberg and the area
adjacent to it as described above, subject to
expert examination of the actual frontier.
The President of the United States and
the British Prime Minister have declared that
they will support the proposal of the conference
at the forthcoming peace settlement.
Provisional Polish western frontier on Oder-
Neisse line
In conformity with the agreement on
Poland reached at the Crimea Conference, the
three heads of government have sought the
opinion of the Polish Provisional Government
in regard to the accession of territory in the
north and west which Poland should receive.
The President of the National Council of Poland
and members of the Polish Provisional Gov-
ernment have been received at the conference
and have fully presented their views. The three
heads of government reaffirm their opinion that
the final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three heads of government agree that,
pending the final determination of Poland's
w€stern frontier, the former German territories
east of a line running from the Baltic Sea imme-
diately west of Swinemiinde, and thence along
the Oder river to the confluence of the western
Neisse river, and along the western Neisse to the
Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of
East Prussia not placed under the adminis-
tration of the USSR, and including the area of
the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the
administration of the Polish state, and for such
purposes should not be considered as part ofthe
:::n, 
zone of occupation in Germany.
6. The basic bw
of the Fedual Republic of Germany
2jrd May 1919
Article 23
For the time being, this basic law shall
apply in the territory of the Laender of Baden,
Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg,
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia,
Mineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wuert-
temberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern.
In other parts of Germany it shall be put into
force on their accession.
Article 146
This basic law shall cease to be in force on
the day on which a constitution adopted by a
free decision of the German people comes into
force.
7. Convention on relations
between the three poweflt
and the Federul Republic of Germany
Bonn,26th May 1952
Article 1l
1. The Federal Republic would have full
authority over its internal and external affairs,
except as provided in the present convention.
2. The three powers would revoke the occu-
pation statute, and abolish the Allied High Com-
mission and the oflices of the land commis-
sioners, upon the entry into force ofthe present
convention and the conventions listed in Article
8 (hereinafter referred to as * the related con-
ventions ").
3. The three powers would henceforth
conduct their relations with the Federal Rep-
ublic through ambassadors, who would actjointly in matters which the three powers con-
sidered of common concern under the present
convention and the related conventions.
Article 2 |
l. In view of the international situation, the
three powers would retain the rights hitherto
held by them relating to
(a) the stationing of armed forces in Ger-
many and the protection of their
security,
(b) Berlin, and
(c) Germany as a whole, including the
unification of Germany and a peace
settlement.
2. The Federal Republic would refrain from
any action prejudicial to these rights and would
co-operate with the three powers to facilitate
their exercise.
Article 3
1. The Federal Republic agreed to conduct its
policy in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter and the aims defined in
the Statute of the Council of Europe.
L These two articles did not come into force. They were
amended by the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954.
The amended text is given in Document 8 hereafter.
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2. The Federal Republic affirmed its
intention to associate itself fully with the com-
munity of free nations through membership in
international organisations contributing to the
common aims of the free world. The three
powers would support applications for such
membership by the Federal Republic at appro-
priate times.
3. In their negotiations with states with
which the Federal Republic maintained no rela-
tions, the three powers would consult with the
Federal Republic in respect of matters directly
involving its political interests.
4. At the request of the Federal Gov-
ernment, the three powers would represent the
interests of the Federal Republic in relations
with other states, and in certain international
organisations or conferences, whenever the
Federal Republic was not in a position to do so
itself.
Article 7
l. The three powers and the Federal Rep
ublic were agreed that an essential aim of their
common policy was a peace settlement
for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated
between Germany and her former enemies,
which should lay the foundation for a lasting
peace. They further agreed that the final deter-
mination of the boundaries of Germany must
await such a settlement.
2. Pending the peace settlement, the three
powers and the Federal Republic would co-
operate to achieve, by peaceful means, their
common aim of a unified Germany enjoying a
liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the
Federal Republic, and integrated within the
European community.
4. The three powers would consult with the
Federal Republic on all other matters involving
the exercise of their rights relating to Germany
:::*n"
8. Agreement to end the occupation rdgime
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
-
amendments to the convention on relations
between the three powers
and the Federal Republic of Germany
2id Oaober 1954
i,n* ,
Substitute:
Article I
l. On the entry into force of the present con-
vention the United States of America, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the French Republic (hereinafter
and in the related conventions sometimes
referred to as'the Three Powers') will terminate
the Occupation r6gime in the Federal Republic,
revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the
Allied High Commission and the Offices of the
Land Commissioners in the Federal Republic.
2. The Federal Republic shall have accord-
ingly the full authority ofa sovereign State over
its internal and external affairs.
Article 2
Substitute:
Article 2
In view of the international situation,
which has so far prevented the reunification of
Germany and the conclusion of a peace settle-
ment, the Three Powers retain the rights and the
responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by
them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a
whole, including the reunification of Germany
and a peace settlement. The rights and responsi-
bilities retained by the Three Powers relating to
the stationing or armed forces in Germany and
the protection of their security are dealt with in
Articles 4 and 5 of the present convention.
9. Final act ofthe nine-power conference
held in Loadon between
28th September and 3rd October 1954
I, GERMANY
The Governments of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States declare that
their policy is to end the occupation rdgime in
the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to
revoke the occupation statute and to abolish the
Allied High Commission. The three govern-
ments will continue to discharge certain respon-
sibilities in Germany arising out of the interna-
tional situation.
It is intended to conclude, and to bring
into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary
procedures have been completed, the appro-
priate instruments for these purposes. General
agreement has already been reached on the
content of these instruments, and representa-
tives of the four governments will meet in the
very near future to complete the final texts. The
agreed arrangements may be put into effect
either before or simultaneously with the alrange-
ments for the German defence contribution.
As these arrangements will take a little
time to complete, the three governments have in
the meantime issued the following declaration of
intent:
t27
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'Recognising that this great country can
no longer be deprived of the rigbts
properly belonging to a free and demo-
cratic people; and
Desiring to associate the Federal Republic
of Germany on a footing of equality with
their efforts for peace and security;
The Governmehts of France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States of
America desire to end the occupation
rdgime as soon as possible.
i
'i.' 
orr^*TroN BY rHE G,,ERNMENT
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER.
MANY AND JOINT DECTAMTION BY THE
GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
Declaration by the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany has
agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with
the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in
Article 2 of the Charter.
Upon her accession to the North Atlantic
Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the Federal
Republic of Germany declares that she will
refrain from any action inconsistent with the
strictly defensive character ofthe two treaties. In
particular the Federal Republic of Germany
undertakes never to have recourse to force to
achieve the reunification of Germany or the
modification of the present boundaries of the
Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by
peaceful means any disputes which may arise
between the Federal Republic and other states.
Declaration by the Governments
of the United States of America,
the United Kingdom and France
Take note that the Federal Republic of
Germany has by a declaration dated the third
of October, nineteen hundred and fifty-four
accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of
the Charter of the United Nations and has
undertaken never to have recourse to force to
achieve the reunification of Germany or the
modification of the present boundaries of the
Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by
peaceful means any disputes which may arisb
between the Federal Republic and other states;
Declare that
l. They consider the Government of the
Federal Republic as the only German Gov-
ernment freely and legitimately constituted
and therefore entitled to speak for Genhany as
the representative of the German people in
international affairs.
2. In their relations with the Federal Rep-
ublic they will follow the principles set out in
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
3. A peace settlement for the whole of
Germany, freely negotiated between Germany
and her former enemies, which should lay the
foundation of a lasting peace, remains an
essential aim of their policy. The final determi-
nation of the boundaries of Germany must
await such a settlement.
4. The achievement through peaceful means
of a fully free and unified Germany remains a
fundamental goal of their policy.
5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the
maintenance of the position of the three powers
there are regarded by the three powers as
essential elements of the peace of the free world
in the present international situation. Accord-
ingly they will maintain armed forces within the
territory of Berlin as long as their responsibil-
ities require it. They therefore reaffrrm that they
will treat any attack against Berlin from any
quarter as an attack upon their forces and them-
selves.
6. They will regard as a threat to their own
peace and safety any recourse to force which in
violation of the principles of the United Nations
Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the
Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In
the event of any such action, the three govern-
ments, for their part, will consider the offending
government as having forfeited its rights to any
guarantee and any military assistance provided
for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its pro-
tocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4
of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to
taking other measures which may be appro-
priate.
7. They will invite the association of other
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
::Tt*r"n 
with this declaration.
10, Final aa ofthe conference on security
and co-operation in Eumln
H.kinhl, Itt lugtttt 1975
L 
-Sovereign equality, respect for the rightsinherent in sovereignty
The participating states will respect each
other's sovereign equality and individuality as
well as all the rights inherent in and encom-
passed by its sovereignty, including in particular
the right of every state to juridical equality, to
territorial integrity and to freedom and political
independence. They will also respect each
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APPENDIX DOCUMENT I2I6
other's right freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems
as well as its right to determine its laws and reg-
ulations.
Within the framework of international
law, all the participating states have equal rights
and duties. They will respect each other's right
to define and conduct as it wishes its relations
with other states in accordance with interna-
tional law and in the spirit of the present decla-
ration. They consider that their frontiers can be
changed, in accordance with international law,
by peaceful means and by agreement. They also
have the right to belong or not to belong to inter-
national organisations, to be or not to be a party
to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the
right to be or not to be a party to treaties of
alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.
III. Inviolability of frontiers
The participating states regard as invio-
lable all one another's frontiers as well as the
frontiers of all states in Europe and therefore
they will refrain now and in the future from
assaulting these frontiers.
Accordingly, they will also refrain from
any demand for, or act of, seizure and usur-
pation ofpart or all ofthe territory ofany partic-
ipating state.
IV. Territorial integrily of states
The participating states will respect the
territorial integrity of each of the participating
states.
Accordingly, they will refrain from any
action inconsistent with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations
against the territorial integrity, political inde-
pendence or the unity of any participating state,
and in particular from any such action consti-
tuting a threat or use of force.
The participating states will likewise
refrain from making each other's territory the
object of military occupation or other direct or
indirect measures of force in contravention of
international law, or the object of acquisition
by means of such measures or the threat of
them. No such occupation or acquisition will be
recognised as legal.
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Amendments l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61 7r 81 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
16th March 1990
Estahlishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Eurupe 
-
pmspects stemming from developments in Cenfial and Eastern Europe
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3, 4,5,61 7,8r 9,10, 11, 12 and 13 
'
tabled by Mr. Soell
l. In part II, paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " reuniting the
German people in a single political system " and insert " reuniting the two parts of Germany in a feder-
alist state'.
2. In part II, paragraph (ix), second line, of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out
" European " and insert * future all-European ".
3. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " with which
the United States and Canada remain associated " and insert * with which the United States, Canada
and the Soviet Union are also associated ".
4. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from *and
constituting" to the end of the paragraph.
5. In part III, paragraph (r/, of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after ' peace and order
in Europe " add * , particularly ".
6. In part III, paragraph (t), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, at the end of the
paragraph, add " if the alliances eliminate the confrontation and offensive elements from their strategic
doctrines and their military options ".
7. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Take account of the proposal by the Chairman of the WEU Council of Ministers to conclude a
non-aggression pact between the western and eastern alliance systems; "
8. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a second new paragraph as follows:
'Develop the CSCE as the future framework for an all-European security system, providing it
with a stable organisational structure (council of ministers, parliamentary assembly, secretariat-
general, arms control agency) and appropriate possibilities for taking operational action;"
9. In part II, paragraph l, bf the draft recommendation proper, after * Inform the Assembly
whether' add 'and to what extent ".
10. In part III, paragraph I (b), of the draft recommendation proper, leave out * shared security "
and insert 'joint security ".
ll. In part III, paragraph 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out *lever for" and insert
" first stage in ".
12. In part III, paragraph 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " in which it might " and
insert * which might ".
13. In part III, paragraph 2 (a), of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " including those
resulting from the unification of the two German states " and insert " including the frontier between a
future unified Germany and the Republic of Poland ".
Signed: Soell
l. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March 1990 (amendments withdrawn).
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Amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17
16th March 1990
Establishmcnt of a just, pcaceful a.d secure order in Europe -
pn sryts stemming from developmcnts k Ceatml and Eastern Europe
AMENDMENTS 14,15,16 and 17 
'
tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Mn Benacsi
14. After part III, paragraph (iiil, of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new
paragraph as follows:
* Considering that further negotiations must address the question of tactical nuclear weapons
and short-range missiles stationed in Europe; "
15. In part III, paragraph (t), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after * alliances " add
" and their political collaboration ".
16. At the end of part III of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as
follows:
" Considering that the new all-European security order must be discussed and decided upon at
the next meeting of heads of state or of government of the CSCE and achieved grag_u4ly $rough
collaboration between existing alliances and organisations in Europe, including WEIJ,'
17. In part III of the draft recommendation proper, redraft paragraph 2 as follows:
'Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order that must guarantee the intangibility of
its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states,
and WEU must ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context
of agreements limiting forces or annaments or the non-production of certain weapons;"
Signed: Pieralli, Benassi
1990 (amendments withdrawn).
l3l
l. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March
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Amendment lE
22nd March 1990
Establishmont of a just, peonful and secure otder in Eumpe 
-
I,mspds stenming from devclopmeats ia Ccatml and fustern Europc
AMENDMENT lt 
'
tobted by Mr. De Declcer and Mr. Bumel
18. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " a European
collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting
in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system " and insert * the collective security systems
constituted by NATO and WEU'.
Signed: De Decl<er, Baumel
l. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March 1990 (amendment withdrawn).
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